Abstract
Abstract The philosophical tradition reaching from antiquity up till the contemporary philosophy of mind had tended to conceive of the mind as something which is ‘contained’ in the head. In recent decades such cognitive internalism has been called into question by the ‘embodied cognition’ movement in the philosophy of mind. The interactionist critique of cognitive and epistemological internalism, however, is not new. As the authors demonstrate, Wilhelm Dilthey, especially in his texts from the 1880s, came up with a profound critique of internalism and was able to clearly recognise its solipsistic ramifications. Dilthey took a strong interactionist stance with regard to internalism and presented an interesting argument in favor of the objective reality of the external world. The authors reconstruct these arguments and demonstrate the closeness of Dilthey’s work to the philosophy of the American pragmatists as well as Dilthey’s possible influence on some of them.
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