Wielding the green stick: criminal enforcement at the EPA under the Bush and Obama administrations

Abstract

The criminal prosecution of environmental offenders by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is one of the agency’s most politicised yet poorly understood responsibilities. Through content analysis of the Agency’s criminal prosecutions in 2001–2011, we undertook analysis of nearly 1000 cases to understand better whether and how the outcomes of the criminal enforcement division change under presidential administrations. Using a principal-agent framework, our results suggest presidents do matter for enforcement outcomes. Yet, the more interesting conclusion is that these outcomes are not extremely divergent, suggesting that the Agency is able to navigate the often conflicting dictates of various political principals, under similar budgetary constraints, and in step with an Agency culture that values strong enforcement. Moreover, we find that such enforcement efforts are substantively valuable, as many of these cases involve serious and willful violations of law that result in significant harm to humans and the environment.