Abstract
In the last decade analytical philosophy of science has been considered by many people as a descriptive activity. In part I of this paper we show that philosophy of science has been designed as normative “logical analysis” by Reichenbach and Carnap before world war II. Thus the identification “analytical = descriptive” is historically unjustified. In part II we discuss three tasks of analytical philosophy of science, the logical reconstruction of concepts, theories, and methods. While the first is mainly descriptive, the third mainly normative, the second may be both, depending on the intended goal.
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