Why the Fascists Won't Take Over the Kremlin (for Now): A Comparison of Democracy's Breakdown and Fascism's Rise in Weimar Germany and Post-Soviet Russia

Abstract

First, we demonstrate that structural explanations based on socio-economic factors are insufficient to account for authoritarian regression in two of collapsology’s “crucial cases” – inter-war Germany and post-communist Russia. Instead, (a) a dearth of pro-democratic actors on the elite, intermediary as well as population levels, and (b) a misconstrued form of government allowing the head of state to rule without parliament in combination with the election of a restorationist president, are identified as a configuration constituting a sufficient cause for a country to experience authoritarian regression. Second, we speculate about when an electoral autocracy gets in danger to transform into a fascist ideocracy. Like in Weimar Germany, we can find in today’s Russia fascist actors and widespread nationalism among the population. In current Russia, in distinction to inter-war Germany, however, the party system is manipulated and the third sector underdeveloped. The continuing political presence of a strongly authoritarian, yet non-fascist “national leader” Vladimir Putin creates hindrances for the country to become a liberal democracy, but makes it also improbable that the Russian regime will transgress into fascism.