Why metaphysics is not like mathematics

The gradual abandonment of Latin as the universal language of the world of learning was a long process. Felicity Henderson's ‘Faithful interpreters?’ in this issue examines a stage in the process, during the early years of the Royal Society, in which correspondents' relatively novel use of

The article analyzes the conflict between the “analytic” and “continental” approaches in philosophy on the example of the development of historical epistemology, which can be considered as “French style” in the philosophy of science. The French tradition is especially interesting due to the specificity of the reception of analytic philosophy that took place in it, where analytic philosophy did not receive an institutional form. The phrase “analytic philosophy” was problematized in the French academy in the 1950s and indicates the existence of a number of differences between the two types of philosophizing, as well as the absence of any stable connection between the French and Anglo-Saxon philosophical communities. One of the main reasons of this divide is that the philosophers interested in logical positivism and seeking to acquaint the French philosophical public with its ideas have suddenly passed away. The author’s argumentation is based on the material of historical epistemology in France, which was traditionally associated with the philosophy of science much more than epistemology in other countries. The article considers two approaches to defining the difference between analytic and continental philosophy: theoretical approach (distinctions between these traditions that are based on the subject of research, methodological techniques, key ideas, style) and institutional (based on geographical division – a particular philosopher belongs to a country or an academy – or based on the choice of his predecessors by the philosopher himself). The author demonstrates the inconsistency of the theoretical approach to the definition of analytic and continental philosophical traditions.

The ArgumentIn this rejoinder to Gyorgy Markus (Science in Context1:5–51), I argue that although there are nonphilosophical hermeneutical studies of communication among scientists (a “weak” hermeneutics) from which much can be learned about scientific practices, there is also the philosophical genre of a hermeneutics of natural science (a “strong” hermeneutics), with which this paper is concerned. The former is the nonphilosophical use of hermeneutics in the study of texts and historical sources; the latter is a philosophy pursued within a working canon of philosophical works defined principally by the writings of Heidegger and Husserl. There is also a hermeneutically sensitive analytic philosophy of science, such as in the work of Kuhn, Toulmin, and Elkana. These genres are distinguished by their literary canons and their basic phenomenologies or critical experiential givens; each genre comprises an exemplary phenomenology as understood with the help of a characteristic fundamental literary canon.I argue that analytic philosophy is pursued within a canon that makes it difficult to raise hermeneutical questions about natural science, and that it assumes a generally positivistic phenomenology. I argue that hermeneutical phenomenology currently defines itself in dialectical opposition to “science” as understood (positivistically) by analytic philosophy, and has failed to exploit the opportunity of making its own positive contribution to the philosophy of science by examining for itself the phenomenology of laboratory work, especially data production, and the transformation of the language of theory into a descriptive language of scientific phenomena. A “strong” hermeneutical philosophy of natural science, then, challenges both analytic philosophy and the existing tradition of hermeneutical phenomenology.

Discrete mathematics, pure mathematics, and applied mathematics constitute three interrelated pillars of mathematical science. Pure mathematics pursues abstraction through infinite structures and nonconstructive existence proofs, valuing theoretical generality and coherence. Discrete mathematics focuses on countable, separable entities and constructive methods aligned with algorithmic design and digital computation. Applied mathematics integrates both paradigms to build models such as discrete, continuous, or hybrid such as that address real-world problems in engineering, physics, biology, and finance. This paper contrasts the philosophical bases of pure and discrete mathematics, examines their methodological affinities, and explains core domains such as set theory and logic, algebraic structures, analysis versus recurrence, and graph theory versus topology and how these frameworks converge within applied subfields such as optimization, numerical linear algebra, and stochastic processes. Through concrete examples like binary encoding and logic circuits, Huffman coding, graph-coloring timetables in transportation, cellular automata, and Reed–Solomon error-correcting codes. It then demonstrate the coevolution of abstraction and constructiveness in driving innovation. Finally, emerging interdisciplinary directions like topological data analysis, quantum algorithms, and blockchain consensus protocols are explored. By weaving pure insights, discrete techniques, and applied modeling, this synthesis underscores that twenty-first-century challenges demand a unified mathematical enterprise where theory and computation coalesce.

14th International Symposium on Geometric Function Theory and Applications (GFTA 2018)3-5 December 2018, Puri Pujangga Hotel, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Selangor, MalaysiaThe 14th International Symposium on Geometric Function Theory and Applications (GFTA 2018) is a continuation of the series of the annual international “GFTA” symposia. GFTA 2018 is the 14th symposium in its series. The first symposium was held in 2005 at the University of Victoria, Canada. Since then, the symposium was held annually at different locations, mainly in Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Malaysia. The list of all the symposia can be found in the conference website. The scientific program will focus on Geometric Function Theory and its Applications, as well as other fields of Mathematical Sciences, particularly Pure and Applied Mathematics. Therefore, the main topics of the conference is divided into two main categories: Pure Mathematics and Applied Mathematics.The aim of the symposium is to bring together leading experts as well as young researchers working on topics mainly related to Univalent and Geometric Function Theory along with other areas of Pure and Applied Mathematics and to present their recent works to the mathematical sciences community. Notable speakers in the field of Geometric Function Theory and other fields of mathematical sciences are invited to give their plenary talks. The Symposium is also open to other fields. Thus, it is with great pleasure for the School of Mathematical Sciences, Faculty of Science and Technology, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (the National University of Malaysia) together with the Malaysian Mathematical Sciences Society (PERSAMA) to organise the 14th International Symposium on Geometric Function Theory and Applications (GFTA 2018) to bridge as well as nurture the understanding and collaboration amongst the regional and global mathematical scientists and practitioners.EditorsRoslinda NazarMaslina DarusAlawiah IbrahimList of Organising Committee, Keynote Speakers and Invited Speakers (Parallel Sessions) are available in this pdf.

Columbia Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies is the first guide to cover both the Anglo-American analytic and European continental traditions. Organized thematically, the volume thoroughly discusses the major movements and fields of each tradition and features the contributions of highly distinguished specialists in their fields. This book is divided into three sections. The first is devoted to highlighting the multidimensional work of philosophers identified with the analytic tradition, with Nicholas Rescher writing on neoidealism, Josephine Donovan commenting on feminist philosophy, Tyler Burge discussing the philosophy of language and mind, and Robert Hanna reflecting on Kant's legacy. The second section presents the thought of those who identified themselves with the continental tradition, featuring Jean Grondin on hermeneutics, Leonard Lawlor on phenomenology, Charles Scott on postmodernism, and Babette Babich on the philosophy of science. This volume also covers logical positivism, naturalism, pragmatism, aesthetics, existentialism, Marxism, the Frankfurt School, structuralism, psychoanalysis, political philosophy, ethics, and the philosophy of religion. The final section addresses concurrent trends in Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and African philosophy, and a comprehensive introduction by the editor not only provides a thorough outline of the problems and issues of the analytic and continental traditions but also boldly challenges the conviction that the two approaches must be rivals. Columbia Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies is an invaluable overview of the ideas that have shaped a monumentally important century in the history of philosophy, offering an unusually panoramic perspective that allows readers to form their own interpretations of original materials.

This article contributes to explaining the rise of logical empiricism in mid-twentieth century (North) America and to a better understanding of American philosophy of science before the dominance of logical empiricism. We show that, contrary to a number of existing histories, philosophy of science was already a distinct subfield of philosophy, one with its own approaches and issues, even before logical empiricists arrived in America. It was a form of speculative philosophy with a concern for speculative metaphysics, normative issues relating to science and society, and issues that later were associated with logical empiricist philosophy of science, issues such as confirmation, scientific explanation, reductionism, and laws of nature. Further, philosophy of science was not primarily pragmatist in orientation. We also show, with the help of our historical characterization, that a recent account of the emergence of analytic philosophy applies to the rise of logical empiricism. It has been argued that the emergence of American analytic philosophy is partly explained by analytic philosophers' use of key institutions, including journals, to marginalize speculative philosophy and promote analytic philosophy. We argue that this use of institutions included the marginalization of speculative and value-laden philosophy of science and the promotion of logical empiricism.

The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well‐known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful.

George Boolos. The iterative conception of set. The journal of philosophy, vol. 68 (1971), pp. 215–231. - Dana Scott. Axiomatizing set theory. Axiomatic set theory, edited by Thomas J. Jech, Proceedings of symposia in pure mathematics, vol. 13 part 2, American Mathematical Society, Providence1974, pp. 207–214. - W. N. Reinhardt. Remarks on reflection principles, large cardinals, and elementary embeddings. Axiomatic set theory, edited by Thomas J. Jech, Proceedings of symposia in pure mathematics, vol. 13 part 2, American Mathematical Society, Providence1974, pp. 189–205. - W. N. Reinhardt. Set existence principles of Shoenfield, Ackermann, and Powell. Fundament a mathematicae, vol. 84 (1974), pp. 5–34. - Hao Wang. Large sets. Logic, foundations of mathematics, and computahility theory. Part one of the proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, London, Ontario, Canada–1975, edited by Robert E. Butts and Jaakko Hintikka, The University of Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, vol. 9, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht and Boston1977, pp. 309–333. - Charles Parsons. What is the iterative conception of set?Logic, foundations of mathematics, and computahility theory. Part one of the proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, London, Ontario, Canada–1975, edited by Robert E. Butts and Jaakko Hintikka, The University of Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, vol. 9, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht and Boston1977, pp. 335–367. - Volume 50 Issue 2

From Inquiry to Theory: There – And Back Again

FRIEDRICH STADLER, Editorial: On the Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science Part I (Team E) THOMAS UEBEL, Some Remarks on Current History of Analytical Philosophy of Science THOMAS MORMANN, History of Philosophy of Science as Philosophy of Science by Other Means? Comment on Thomas Uebel CRISTINA CHIMISSO, Aspects of Current History of Philosophy of Science in the French Tradition ANASTASIOS BRENNER, Reflections on Chimisso: French Philosophy of Science and the Historical Method MICHAEL HEIDELBERGER, Aspects of Current History of 19th Century Philosophy of Science MASSIMO FERRARI, Well, and Pragmatism? Comment on Michael Heidelberger's Paper Part II (Team A) VINCENZO CRUPI AND STEPHAN HARTMANN, Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science VINCENT F. HENDRICKS, The Bane of Two Truths THOMAS MULLER, Formal Methods in the Philosophy of Natural Science FRANZ DIETRICH AND CHRISTIAN LIST, The Problem of Constrained Judgment Aggregation GABRIELLA PIGOZZI, Aggregation Problems and Models: What Comes first? Part III (Team B) MARCEL WEBER, in a Physical World: The Place of the CLAUDE DEBRU, Comments on Marcel Weber's Life in a Physical World: The Place of the Sciences THOMAS REYDON, How Special are the Sciences? A View from the Natural Kinds Debate MILES MACLEOD, The Epistemology-only Approach to Natural Kinds: A Reply to Thomas Reydon MEHMET ELGIN, Reductionism in Biology: An Example of Biochemistry RAFFAELLA CAMPANER, Reductionist and Antireductionist Stances in the Health Part IV (Team C) WENCESLAO J. GONZALEZ, and Problems in Philosophy of Social and Cultural Sciences: A European ARTO SIITONEN, State of the Art. A Commentary on Wenceslao J. Gonzalez's Contribution, Trends and Problems in Philosophy of Social and Cultural Sciences: A European Perspective MATTI SINTONEN, Scientific Realism, the New Mechanical Philosophers, and the Friends of Modelling DANIEL ANDLER, IsNaturalism the Unsurpassable Philosophy for the of Man in the 21st ANTONIO ZILHAO, What Does it Mean to Be a Naturalist in the Human and Social Sciences? A Comment on Daniel Andler's Is Naturalism the Unsurpassable Philosophy for the of Man in the Twenty-first Century? Part V (Team D) DENNIS DIEKS, Reichenbach and the Conventionality of Distant Simultaneity in MAURO DORATO, On Various Senses of Conventional and their Interrelation in the Philosophy of Physics: Simultaneity as a Case Study ROMAN FRIGG AND CARL HOEFER, Determinism and Chance from a Humean LASZLO E. SZABO, What remains of Probability? HOLGER LYRE, Humean Perspectives on Structural Realism F. A. MULLER, The Characterisation of Structure: Definition versus Axiomatisation Index of Names

In a special issue of Zeitschrift fr Angewandte Mathematik und Mechanik (ZAMM

1st International Conference on Applied & Industrial Mathematics and Statistics 2017 (ICoAIMS 2017)8-10th August 2017, Vistana City Centre, Kuantan, Pahang, Malaysia.1st International Conference on Applied & Industrial Mathematics and Statistics 2017 (ICoAIMS 2017) is organised by Faculty of Industrial Sciences & Technology, Universiti Malaysia Pahang, Malaysia. Our co-organisers are Institut Teknologi Sepuluh (ITS) Nopember, Surabaya, Indonesia, Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM), Malaysian Mathematical Sciences Society (PERSAMA) and Malaysian Institute of Statistics (ISM). This international conference is a biannual conference, started in 2017. The main topics of the conference is divided into six categories; Pure Mathematics, Applied Mathematics, Computational Mathematics, Statistics & Applied Statistics, Operational Research and Mathematics Education including Engineering & Industrial Applications.List of Organising, Scientific Committees and Keynotes Speakers are available in this pdf.

There are various similarities and differences between the respective approaches to analytic philosophy of Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, and Stebbing. But is there anything in common that could be taken to characterize analytic philosophy as a whole? ‘So what is analytic philosophy?’ explains that analytic philosophy is ‘analytic’ in an extra special sense because it made use of modern logic together with all the new techniques that emerged in its wake and the greater understanding of the relationship between logic and language that this generated. It looks at later analytic philosophy—ordinary language philosophy, ideal language philosophy, and scientific philosophy—before considering what is wrong and good about analytic philosophy.

The goal of this chapter is to describe the philosophical style of Jean Gayon through my own experience as a Ph.D. student. I show how Gayon’s work represents a unique synthesis of two main traditions in philosophy of science: analytical Anglo-American philosophy of sciencePhilosophy of science (Anglo-American) and biology and French historical epistemologyGayon, JeanOn historical epistemology. HisHistorical epistemology openness and curiosity towards the Anglo-American tradition led him to believe that a genuine dialogue between these traditions could benefit both. Jean also encouraged his graduate students to draw on multiple philosophical approaches, with an eye toward the sciences. In this chapter, I propose to characterize his own style as a historically grounded analysis of concepts. The analytical style he promoted is underpinned by historical reflection in which it finds a concrete and living substratum.