Abstract
Game theoretical analysis can be useful in contexts such as securities regulation, where multiple decision makers (i.e. securities regulatory authorities or commissions) act unilaterally but can also potentially reap benefits from cooperation. We deploy several models in seeking to render more transparent the strategies and payoffs that motivate jurisdictions to support or resist the introduction of a national securities regulator for Canada. Our analysis suggests that consensus has not been reached regarding a national regulator not only because of a lack of cooperation but also because of a lack of coordination. Indeed, it seems plausible both that provinces recognize the benefit of adopting a common standardized regulatory model; and that the source of disagreement surrounds the precise regulatory content of that common standardized model. This paper explores the implications of this insight.
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