Why Dublin Fails: The Prisoner's Dilemma in Europe's Responsibility-Allocation for Refugees

Abstract

While the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe led to the de facto suspension of the Dublin Regulation in 2015/2016, researchers and practitioners are well aware that the crisis only highlighted existing shortcomings of the system governing the responsibility-allocation for asylum-seekers in Europe. Investigating the reasons for Dublin’s widely perceived failure, the thesis adds to the literature in providing a systematic analytical framework for Dublin using a 3-player Prisoner’s Dilemma. It provides evidence for the often-asserted claim that Dublin’s non-implementation is due to a systematic misalignment of incentives of refugees, entry- and destination-states. As a consequence, the system is stuck in 3 highly ineffective and inefficient Nash Equilibria. By incorporating the role of European Courts as external players in the game, the model allows for a more nuanced understanding of the fragile equilibrium between implementation and non-implementation in which the Dublin game unfolds. Applying the game-theoretical model on the Commission’s Dublin IV proposal, the thesis finds that despite its emphasis on enforcement and sanctions, the proposal is unlikely to improve Dublin’s performance in relation to any of its objectives. Based on the game-theoretical analysis, the thesis concludes by presenting an own proposal for reform that seems more promising than the Commission’s approach.