Abstract

The issue of a declaration to end the Korean War, first proposed by the Roh Moo-hyun administration, was elevated to a crucial status by the Moon Jae-in administration. However, the ambiguous nature of the declaration in terms of international law gave it a space for different understanding and interpretation for the parties concerned, causing the USA to worry about North Korea’s stretched interpretation of the declaration. Therefore, the declaration has been given different political implications by North Korea, South Korea, and the USA, making the parties concerned almost impossible to reach a consensus. From the perspective of constructing a long-running peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula, there are many limitations and hidden dangers in signing a declaration only in a symbolic manner. A valuable declaration should be signed and implemented in tandem with the process of creating a peace mechanism of the Korean Peninsula. I argue that the timing for the declaration should come when the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula proceeds from the stage of “freezing” to that of “dismantling.” The declaration should include key participants playing an active role in the process of denuclearization and three major elements: the end of the war, the direction of peace, and the principle of denuclearization.

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