When the Death Penalty Is Not an Option: Procedural and Linguistic Strategies in Sentencing Palestinian Defendants in Military Courts’ Terrorism Cases

When the Death Penalty Is Not an Option: Procedural and Linguistic Strategies in Sentencing Palestinian Defendants in Military Courts' Terrorism Cases

In this article was made a research of the organization of the activities of emergency military courts of the UPR, which was made on the basis of the legislation, which was in force at that time and based on archival materials. It is noted that on January 26, 1919, military field courts were replaced by emergency military courts. They had to be based in those territories that were declared under martial law or under siege. These courts operated in all those areas controlled by the UNR army and all unfinished cases of the former military field courts were transferred to them. The legal basis of the activity was the law "On Emergency Military Courts" of January 26, 1919. All military and civilian persons were under the jurisdiction for these courts in cases of commiting crimes recognized by law. All cases submitted to the extraordinary military court were subject to consideration and decision in a court session, which was opened, as a rule, in the place where the crime was committed. The verdict of the extraordinary military court was announced publicly by the head of the court. Appellate and cassation appeals against verdicts were not foreseen. Those, who were sentenced to the highest degree of punishment, were executed within a day. It is noted for which crimes the death penalty was used as a measure of punishment. Based on the analysis of archival materials, examples of execution of the death penalty as a measure of punishment are given. It is emphasized, that the extraordinary military court did not satisfy the civil claim when issuing the guilty verdict. Civil lawsuits were not subject to consideration. The judgment of the extraordinary military court, which had entered into force, was subject to execution. After all sentences were transferred for execution, the emergency military court was considered disbanded. The shortcomings of the law "On Emergency Military Courts" of January 26, 1919 are pointed out. However, it is emphasized that in those difficult times of constant military confrontation, it was quite difficult to adopt a normative legal act that is perfect from today's point of view.

The article analyzes the activities of military courts in the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in the context of their independent functioning within the system of the judicial branch of power. In particular, the author defines a three-stage system of military courts, which consisted of 12 field military district courts, 3 regional courts (Lviv, Stanislav and Ternopil military regions) and the Supreme Military Tribunal of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic. The author defines the organizational and legal framework for the operation of military courts and the conduct of court proceedings, in particular, the legal basis for it was the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which remained in force at that time. Special attention is paid to the legal status of judges of military courts: the author defines the educational and qualification requirements for judges, the procedure for appointment and conferment of military ranks, taking office, and taking the oath of a judge (the text of the oath is provided), etc. The article focuses on the practical component of the activities of military courts in the context of military operations and opposition to state-building by the Polish population of Eastern Galicia. Thus, the powers of military courts extended to crimes committed against the state, officials, espionage and terrorist activities, as well as criminal acts of military personnel of the Ukrainian Galician Army. The author analyzes in detail the trial process, including the participation of victims and defendants, the prosecutor and defense counsel, as well as the possibility of introducing a simplified procedure to speed up the trial. The author identifies the peculiarities of sentencing by military courts and the process of execution, especially the death penalty. Separately, it should be noted that the theoretical and legal analysis of the activities of military courts in the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in the article is filled with specific examples of court cases. The key aspect of the manuscript is the authors’ conclusions, which state that the judiciary in the newly created state was an independent branch of government, and military courts in a difficult time for the country worked effectively in the direction of investigation and consideration of criminal cases, ensuring the proper state of law and order in the state, and thus made a significant contribution to the establishment of the Ukrainian state in Eastern Galicia.

The Lublin castle has historical connections with the old town area. The castle hill was the seat of a stronghold and residence of the starost who ruled in the king’s name. Excavations led to discovery of traces of a 9th century settlement. The construction of a stone castle began in the 14th century. It was used as a prison in the 19th century and until 1954. In 1939‒1944, the Lublin Castle housed a prison of the Nazi secret police and security service, the Sicherheitsdienstpolizei and Sicherheitsdienst Lublin. The role of the Lublin Castle prison was particularly dreadful; dring the period of martyrdom and extermination of the Polish nation under the Nazi occupation of Poland. Even today, the castle is treated as a national symbol of the heroism and suffering of the Polish nation. Before they took flight, the Nazis organized a last execution on Jury 22, 1944: 286 prisoners were murdesed in the Castle. On that same day and on July 20, 1944, a further 800 prisoners were taken from the castle and executed at the concentration camp in Majdanek, a suburb of Lublin. On July 22, 1944, of the Polish Committee for National Liberation (PKWN) was created under Soviet pressure. It assumed power over the territory of Poland which had been taken by the Red Army after the flight of the Nazis. Organized armed forces known as the Home Army, ‒ operated in Poland troughout the war. They were subordinate to the Polish Government in Exile, residing in England. The Government in Exile was recognized by all counties except the USSR. Home Army troops refused to submit to the Red Army and PKWN. For this reason, the Soviet and Polish army, together with security services, started to disarm the Home Army troop. Mass arrests and deportations into the USSR began. A number of Home Army units were disarmed, among them the famous 27th Infantry Division. Troughoot the Lublin District, mass arrests of Home Army soldiers took place. The detainees were sent to the former concentration camp in Majdanek and the Lublin Castle prison. Arrested were also state oflicials ‒ delegates of the Polish Government in London. The Commander of the Home Army Lublin District, General Kazimierz Tumidajski, was detained during negotiations with Soviet authorities and deported to the USSR. Home Army soldiers who had been arrested and confined to Polish prisons, were subjected to investigations by the Soviet and Polish security service which involved the use of threats and a variety of tortures. Describing his ordeal, one of the prisoners stated he could not relate “all the atrocities” he had suffered from Soviet officers. The detained soldiers received no medical assistance; those who managed to survive the Castle prison nightmare described the appearance of battered Home Army soldiers and related their complaints. During the initial period discussed in this report, most Home Army soldiers were arrested by Soviet authorities without due judicial decision. They were interrogated in Russian, a language they did not speak. It was only 2 or 3 months later that the detainees were handed over to Polish authorities. Only then, Polish prosecutors issued formal decisions to remand them in custody, and the records of selected hearings were translated into Polish. The evidence gathered by Soviet security officers provided the grounds for indictments directed to military courts that operated in Lublin. III. In 1944, the indictments signed by Polish military prosecutors were lodged with the Military Court of the Lublin Garrison, commanded by a Soviet officer, Colonel Konstantin Krukovsky. Preceding the first-instance hearing was a closed sitting where the court, composed of three judges, confirmed the indictment; the trial followed on that same day. The copy the indictment was delivered to the detainee only after the hearing had started. The main charges contained in indictments were: membership in the Home Army, unlicensed possession of firearms, or evasion of military service ‒ acts threatened with capital punishment. There is evidence to show that the actual penalties were decided upon by the Mi1itary Courts Department of the Polish Army, headed by a Soviet ofIicer, Brigadier General Alexander Tarnovsky. The execution of the orders was the responsibility of the head of the court, Colonel Krukovsky, and the judges presiding over the case. In none of the cases did the Lublin Garrison Military Court took any evidence whatsover, whether on motion of the defendant or on its own initiative. The only hearing of evidence consisted of hearing the defendant’s statement; the defendants admitted their membership of the Home Army but refused to acknowledge any guilt. The various formulations they used were then quoted out of context to prove they had in fact been guilty of trying to subvert democratic system of Poland ‒ an assumption made well in advance. The trials were held at the Lublin Castle prison. They were closed sittings in which neither the counsel for the defence nor the prosecutor participated. The defendant’s family were not informed about the date of the trial as they knew nothing about his fate anyway, and the defendant himself did not learn about the trial until it started. Unqualified persons participated in deciding on conviction and sentence, or the court was formed inadequately. For example, the principle that the lay judges’ rank should not be lower than the defendant’s was commonly infringed upon. A glaring example of such infringement was the case of Colonel Edward Jasiński who was convicted by N.C.O. lay judges. Delivering the judgment, the court informed the defendant that the decision was final and not subject to appeal. Most defendants were sentenced to death. Many meritorious Home Army soldiers who had fought for independence throughout the Nazi occupation met death this way. The sentences were carried out upon confirmation by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army (at that time, General Michał Rola-Żymierski) or his second in command (Generals Świerczewski and Berling), and sometimes by lower rank commanders. They were obliged to examine the justification of the sentences ex officio; they also had the right to grant pardon. Confirmation of the sentence and pardon were two separate institutions of the law of criminal procedure; thus pardon could be granted even if the sentence had been confirmed. In practice, no rules whatsoever were observed: confirmed sentences were carried out without pardon proceedings, or following such proceedings but without the proceedings aimed at review of the grounds. It should be added that under the law in force, pardon could only be refused by the President of the National People’s Council, Bolesław Bierut, while the army commanders had merely the right to grant pardon. In fact, they also refused pardon on numerous occasions. In practice, sentences were carried out basied on the order of Brigadier General Alexander Tarnovsky who informed the head of military court about the decision of Commander-in-Chief and ordered the need for immediate execution. Capital punishment was executed at the Castle prison, in the basement of the administration building, at various hours of day and night. The Report quotes the account of an execution provided by a surviving Lublin physician, and a numer of facts which, together with the now available reports from executions, tell about the identity of their participants. The grim record holders are two sergeants: within 50 minutes, one of them participated in the execution of 11, and the other one – of 12 Home Army soldiers. Until January 5, 1945, the bodies of the executed were secretly buried at a Lublin cemetery upon written of the prison warden Second Lieutenant Alojzy Stolarz; the orders have been preserved in the cemetery archives. There is no mention at all about subsequent burials although – as follows from the attached documents – Home Army soldiers were still executed at the Castle after that date. The soldiers kept on their dignity till the end; scant accounts of their demeanour were provided by prison chaplains, the only persons the convict’s family about hos death. Throughout both the preparatory and the judicial proceedings, valid legal provisions were violated. The system of military penal law contained provisions dating from the 1930’s and not yet quashed at the time of examination of the discussed cases. Such provisions were simply treated as non-existent. The Code of Criminal Procedure and the Military Code of the Polish Armed Forces in USSR, developed by the Political and Educational Board of the Polish Army in the USSR established in 1943 was adopted as the legal grounds for proceedings. As shown by the facts quoted in this report, the summary procedure was applied to defendants. It was provided for by the code of criminal procedure of the Polish Armed Forces in the USSR, but military courts competed with each other in breaking the law to the extent of not even observing the law that had been established in the USSR. Under the law then in force, none of the sentences discussed in the report ever became final and valid. Judicial proceedings glaringly infringed on all the principles of procedure: direct examination of evidence, impartiality, presumption of innocence, openness, adversary trial, right to defence, to appeal, and the right to apply for pardon. The Home Army soldiers mentioned in the report were convicted in defiance with the ban on retroactive force of law as the decree on protection of state under which they were tried had entered into force on November 4, 1944 with the binding force since August 15, 1944; most had been imprisoned for many weeks before the decree was actually introduced. VII. The extermination of Home Army soldiers at the Lublin Castle was kept secret for decades. Many attempts at revealing the tragic events failed, and the demands for posthumous acquittal, made by families of the executed, were rejected. It was only after June 4, 1989, as a result of extraordinary appeals or re-institution of proceedings, that the Supreme Court passed many decisions on acquittal, manifesting not only the groundlessness of convictions but also their function as a political disposal of opponents of the new authority – of the Home Army formed by the legitimate Polish Government to fight the Nazi invaders. The enormity of lawlessness of the discussed practices made the Parliament of Republic of Poland pass, on February 23, 1991, an act on the invalidity of the judgments in cases of persons victimized for their activities on behalf of a sovereign Polish state.

The article examines the legal regulation of criminal liability of military personnel in NATO member countries through a comprehensive comparative legal analysis. This research investigates the diverse approaches to military criminal legislation across the Alliance, identifying both common elements and distinctive features in the legal mechanisms for prosecuting military personnel. The study reveals that NATO member states have developed two primary models of military criminal legislation: countries with separate military criminal codes (such as the United States, United Kingdom, Poland, and Turkey) and countries where military criminal provisions are incorporated into general criminal codes (including Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium). The article analyzes the specificity of military offenses as defined in the legislation of various NATO countries. Despite significant differences in legal traditions, there are common elements in the criminalization of acts such as disobedience of orders, desertion, absence without leave, breach of combat duty rules, and improper handling of weapons. Special attention is given to the implementation of international humanitarian law standards into national legislation of Alliance members, particularly concerning war crimes and crimes against humanity. The research provides an in-depth analysis of military justice systems across NATO countries, revealing three primary models: countries with developed military court systems that function during both peacetime and wartime; countries where military courts operate only during wartime or under special circumstances; and countries where military courts are absent, with cases involving military personnel heard by civilian courts. The article examines the jurisdiction of military courts and the delimitation between civilian and military justice, particularly focusing on the legal framework established by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for criminal jurisdiction over military personnel during international operations. A significant portion of the research is devoted to the specific punishments applicable to military personnel in NATO countries, which combine general criminal sanctions with specific military punishments such as demotion in rank, suspension from duties, service restrictions, and dismissal from military service with deprivation of military rank. The article notes a trend toward the humanization of punishments for military personnel across NATO countries and the gradual abolition of severe punishments such as the death penalty, except for particularly serious crimes committed during wartime. Based on the comprehensive analysis, the article formulates conclusions regarding the common and distinctive features of criminal liability of military personnel in NATO member countries and identifies promising directions for improving military criminal legislation, taking into account NATO standards and experience. These directions include in-depth analysis of military criminal legislation of individual NATO member countries, research on the implementation of international humanitarian law into the military criminal legislation of NATO countries, study of the practice of applying military criminal legislation during international operations involving NATO forces, and analysis of ways to harmonize national military criminal legislation with NATO standards.

What role does the death penalty play in contexts of protracted political violence? What does it symbolize for its opponents and proponents in such contexts? Can it survive as a potent topic of political life even without actual executions? Since 1967, the death penalty has been a lawful sanction in Israel's military courts, which have jurisdiction over Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Though it has never been carried out, it has been intensely debated throughout this period and the topic has retained major political, cultural, and judicial significance. I argue that both sides in these debates use the topic mostly symbolically, rather than as an issue of public policy. For opponents, refraining from using the death penalty has become a symbol of restraint, used in self-legitimation. For proponents, death penalty advocacy serves as what I term a penal fantasy, an outlet for frustration, symbolizing defiance against the image of restraint.

Under pressure from the military leadership, the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ceded significant constitutional and decision-making authority to the armed forces in 2015, particularly in the areas of national security, foreign policy, and human rights.Parliament passed a constitutional amendment allowing secret military courts to try terrorism suspects. The military assumed control of the implementation of a national plan to address terrorism, largely without civilian oversight. It was also formally given membership in the Apex committees, provincial committees formed to coordinate local counterterrorism efforts and security.The military muzzled dissenting and critical voices in nongovernmental organizations and media. The Rangers, a paramilitary force, were given complete control over law enforcement in the city of Karachi, where there were reports of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture. The military continued to exercise sway over the province of Balochistan, using torture and arbitrary detention as instruments of coercion.In December 2014, the Islamist armed group Pakistani Taliban, Tehreek-e-Taliban, attacked a school in Peshawar in northwestern Pakistan, leaving 148 dead, almost all of them children. The government responded with a national action plan to fight terrorism, including tactics that violated basic rights. Authorities established the use of military instead of civilian courts in terrorism cases.The government ended an unofficial moratorium on judicial executions; the death penalty was carried out 296 times in 2015 at time of writing. Abuses by the security forces led thousands of Afghans living in Pakistan to return to Afghanistan or flee elsewhere. Parliament passed vague and overbroad counterterrorism legislation.

There is a growing tendency to perceive the death penalty as always ‘on the move’, often in a teleological trajectory inevitably leading to universal abolition. This article aims to question this tendency, noting that in many cases death penalty policies remain stable, especially in cases of de facto abolition. Such cases are overlooked in the literature, treated as brief interludes towards full abolition, though in fact they can be enduring and serve important symbolic functions. Informed by the historical‐institutional approach, which rejects teleology in favour of path dependence and contingency, the article focuses on the Israeli case, where since 1967 the death penalty remained a lawful option in military courts with jurisdiction over Palestinians, but never applied. I argue that such remarkable stability is not due to inertia, but an unanticipated result of contingent events and processes leading over time to entrenchment of a ‘limbo’ arrangement, which constitute intentional, functional, policy.

The first part of this article examines wrongful convictions in India. In part because of the absence of a jury, appellate courts, including the apex court, are more willing to evaluate whether the evidence for a conviction is sufficient than appellate courts in other common law systems. From 2016 to 2022, the High Courts and the Supreme Court have acquitted over two hundred accused in death penalty cases alone. The willingness of appellate courts to acquit is a strength of the Indian system that should be maintained. At the same time, remedied wrongful convictions in India likely represent only the small tip of a larger iceberg. For example, no remedied wrongful convictions involving guilty pleas, DNA exonerations, crimes that were not committed, or that were remedied after appeals were exhausted were discovered in the research for this article, though these types of wrongful convictions are common in other democracies. The Indian record of discovered and remedied wrongful convictions confirms that, as in other countries, terrorism cases are particularly susceptible to wrongful convictions. This suggests the exception for terrorism cases from its proposed abolition of the death penalty by the Law Commission of India in its 2015 report is not justified. The death penalty presents a real risk of executing an innocent person. This article also examines wrongful prosecutions and wrongful pre- trial detention in India. It argues that the Law Commission of India was justified in its 2018 Report on focusing on this phenomenon given that over three-quarters of prisoners in India are subject to pre-trial detention. An exclusive focus on wrongful convictions and claiming innocence may not be appropriate for developing countries where most prisoners are awaiting trial. The Law Commission’s still unimplemented proposals for the creation of a separate court where malicious prosecution would have to be established are critically examined. It is suggested that to increase access to justice, criminal courts should award damages and that only negligent prosecution or detention should have to be established. However, given low conviction rates in India, such an alternative proposal could significantly increase the number of accused who might receive compensation. Although compensation for wrongful pre-trial detention is warranted, other steps to improve access to bail and to allow the accused to challenge the state’s case earlier in the pre-trial process are also required.

Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza. By Lisa Hajjar. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. Pp. 312. $24.95 paper. Reviewed by Vanessa Barker, Florida State University After 38 years of military occupation, Israel has recently withdrawn from Gaza and the West Bank. Readers seeking to understand the historic proportions of this move, especially as it is enmeshed in the legacy of Israeli control over Palestine, will be interested in Hajjar's first-rate ethnography, Courting Conflict: The Israel Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza. Operating within a complex legal framework, Israel's military court system, Hajjar argues, functions as a highly repressive form of governance even as it remains shrouded in the principles of formal rational law. The military court system, Hajjar explains, has governed the everyday lives of Palestinians in the occupied territories since 1967. That is to say, the military court system not only prosecutes cases of security violations and armed resistance, but it regulates how Palestinians live their lives in the occupied territories. By applying various military orders, the court regulates how Palestinians actually move through the territories (e.g., curfews, checkpoints, permits), how they can or cannot display signs of Palestinian nationalism, how they can or cannot protest the occupation, and how they make a living, marry, and go to school, among other more mundane activities (p. 186). Pushing her point further, Hajjar argues that the military courts along with other legal institutions in the occupied territories have created what Foucault characterized as a society. Governed by intensive surveillance, discipline, and practices of domination, Hajjar argues that Palestinians have become imprisoned in their own homeland (p. 186). Hajjar's application of Foucault is problematic. Foucault analyzed how modern democracies created carceral societies based on insidious forms of surveillance, normalization, and discipline. But they did so in ways deemed legitimate by citizens who actively participated in their own subjugation. In the case of the Israel/Palestine conflict, the court system has created a real prison inside Palestine, a conquered land. By doing so, the Israeli military courts have indeed created a carceral society but one deemed illegitimate by most if not all Palestinians. Perhaps the strongest part of the book, Hajjar's ethnography vividly captures the intensity and banality of social control. She details the tedium of the court as well as the brutal practices of torture. In part because of her own background (American with Syrian heritage), Hajjar gained a high degree of access to key actors in the military courts. During her two years of fieldwork in Ramallah, Hebron, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkaram, and Gaza (1991-1993), she was a participant-observer in daily court proceedings and interviewed 150 people, including judges, prosecutors, translators, defense attorneys, and defendants, most forthcoming in their discussions of the court, its meaning, and its role in the Israel/Palestine conflict (pp. …

This chapter examines secret military courts established for trying civilians charged with terrorism-related offenses. The first section examines how the Pakistani authorities failed to provide institutional independence to military courts (e.g., by keeping the courts within the executive branch of power) and to secure the individual independence of judges (e.g., by appointing as judges military officers with no legal training and no security of tenure). The second section explores how military courts failed to meet some key requirements of a fair trial (e.g., defendants had no right to a public hearing, no right to have a defense lawyer). The last section examines how the imposition of the death penalty by military courts was inconsistent with Pakistan’s obligation to protect the right to life.

In a recent study of military discipline during the First World War David Englander rightly asserted that ‘British and Belgian soldiers were more at risk [from capital punishment] than either their French or German counterparts’.1 This contradicts both existing ideas on Prussian militarism and popular notions of French military justice — or more accurately injustice — such as those conveyed by Stanley Kubrick in his film Paths of Glory. A comparison of statistics on discipline in the British, French and German armies, the three main combatants on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918, supports Dr Englander: the British condemned more than three thousand men, compared with two thousand in the French army and only 150 in the German army.2 Indeed, the comparative harshness of the British was especiaily marked in the case of deserters on the Western Front.3 While it should be noted that the number of French soldiers executed (approximately 6004) exceeded that of the British army (officially 346, but probably many more5) the two remain comparable given the relative size of the armies. Only 48 of the 150 German soldiers condemned by military courts were shot. Putting aside for a moment the apparently more oppressive military regimes in Eastern Europe and the Italian army, which executed 750 men, the British soldier was especially vulnerable among those serving on the Western Front.

Clemency is a presidential privilege that entails changes, waivers, reductions, or the elimination of criminal executions granted by the President. The scope of clemency is defined in Law No. 5 of 2010, which amends Law No. 22 of 2002 concerning Clemency. The applicable ruling must have a permanent legal force (Inkracht). Clemency can be sought for individuals sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or a minimum sentence of 2 years in prison. This study focuses on the case of Suud Rusli, a death row inmate who unsuccessfully attempted to apply for clemency but was subsequently executed. The research aims to answer the following questions: "What is the procedure for implementing clemency for the death penalty in Indonesia?" and "What is the basis for the Constitutional Court rejecting the Applicant's Application in Decision No. 32/PUU-XIV/2016?" The author uses the Juridical-Normative method, analyzing relevant legal materials, literature, principles, and theories related to the Implementation of Clemency in the Indonesian Criminal Law System (specifically, the Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 32/PUU-XIV/2016). The study reveals significant developments in the submission of clemency for death penalty cases, including a shift from the traditional hanging method under Article 11 of the Penal Code to the usage of Law No. 12/Pnps/1964 on The Procedure of Execution of The Death Penalty Imposed by the Court In the General And Military Court. The Constitutional Court, as one of Indonesia's highest judicial institutions, plays a crucial role in providing a reasoned basis for the consideration of clemency-related matters.

Desertion is a military crime involving members of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) leaving their duties or military obligations without proper authorization from their superiors. Desertion has serious implications for military discipline, cohesion, and operational efficiency, and it can threaten national defense. The legal enforcement of desertion offenses is regulated under the Military Penal Code (KUHPM), particularly Articles 87 and 88. The process of handling desertion cases involves investigation by the Military Police (POM), investigation by military investigators, and trial by military courts that issue rulings according to the applicable laws. The penalties imposed vary, ranging from imprisonment, demotion, dishonorable discharge, and even the death penalty during wartime.This study aims to explore in-depth the implementation of military law on individuals who commit desertion and to analyze the factors causing desertion. These factors include personal issues, psychological pressure, and unfavorable working environments. The study employs a normative juridical method, with an approach focused on relevant regulations and military court case studies concerning desertion offenses. The findings show that the application of military law to desertion is a crucial effort in maintaining the stability, discipline, and integrity of the TNI. However, there are several challenges in enforcing the law, such as internal and external factors affecting military personnel. In the relationship between the Military Penal Code (KUHPM) and the Criminal Code (KUHP), both are complementary, where general crimes are regulated by the Criminal Code (KUHP), while offenses related to military duties are governed by the Military Penal Code (KUHPM). This study recommends strengthening law enforcement and discipline training to minimize desertion within the military.

This chapter showcases the legal tools which were used in Poland to introduce the militarisation of behaviours. This process of social control was established by a foreign power in Polish territory after WWII. The security apparatus of the Soviet Union played a significant role in establishing the militarisation of behaviours in Communist Poland. Once the process was initiated and embedded, the Polish political leaders made full use of it. Consequently, in this chapter, political and military leadership was considered as part of a discussion on the importance of the triad of power, leadership, and authority. That discussion was supplemented by a consideration of what might happen in the face of the weakness or duality of the state’s political leadership. In the Polish case after WWII, a considerable level of social homogenisation and obedience was achieved by means of decrees (which offered simplicity, austerity, and robustness of their legal and practical solutions), labour camps, death penalty, fear and oppression (political and social repression), and the military courts (during the late 1940s).