When did the ROC abandon “Retaking the Mainland”? The transformation of military strategy in Taiwan

Abstract

ABSTRACT The question of when the government of the Republic of China abandoned “Retaking the Mainland” has not been clearly answered in previous studies. In this article, I attempt to address this by reexamining the transformation of Taiwan’s military strategy. I focus on the preparations for the “Retaking the Mainland” operation, which have been studied extensively, and the efforts to increase defensive capabilities as part of the “Taiwan Defense” operation, which has lesser scholarship. With respect to this period of transformation of Taiwan’s military strategy, a now broadly accepted interpretation was laid out in the 2006 National Defense Report. However, a different perspective was outlined in a 2013 book jointly compiled by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and Academia Historia. The result is that, with respect to the historical shift in military strategy, the official view of the Ministry of National Defense has become somewhat ambiguous. In this article, I advance an alternative view on this period by highlighting two points at which new policies were adopted. There was a move from a strategy of “Offensive Posture” that had been in place since 1949 to a strategy of “Unity of the Offensive and Defensive,” in the Spring of 1969. Subsequently, after the establishment of the “Guidelines for National Unification” in 1991, there was another shift, to a strategy of “Defensive Posture.” As I suggest, the ROC government abandoned the concept of using military force to “Retake the Mainland” in 1991, when it moved to a strategy of “Defensive Posture.”