When conquest would have paid: domestic mobilization and political constraints in the Thai-Cambodian border conflict 2008–2011

Abstract

ABSTRACTIn recent decades, a lack of state capacity has been seen as a major threat to international security. This article disagrees by making a simple claim: states that lack the capacity to go to war compromise to avoid it. I develop the argument using insights from the discipline of International Relations and military studies and probe its plausibility with a single case study, the Thai-Cambodian border conflict during 2008–2011. Based on data from field research in the two countries, I use Peter Liberman's framework to argue that this is a case when conquest would have paid for Thailand. Yet, a lack of domestic capacity created trade-offs, fear of instability and reduced confidence in a military strategy, which together explain why large-scale armed conflict was avoided by both sides. The findings have potential implications for how we think about international security today.