Abstract
Moral ideals are strongly ingrained within society and individuals alike, but actual moral choices are profoundly influenced by tangible rewards and consequences. Across two studies we show that real moral decisions can dramatically contradict moral choices made in hypothetical scenarios (Study 1). However, by systematically enhancing the contextual information available to subjects when addressing a hypothetical moral problem—thereby reducing the opportunity for mental simulation—we were able to incrementally bring subjects’ responses in line with their moral behaviour in real situations (Study 2). These results imply that previous work relying mainly on decontextualized hypothetical scenarios may not accurately reflect moral decisions in everyday life. The findings also shed light on contextual factors that can alter how moral decisions are made, such as the salience of a personal gain.
Highlights
Bertrand Russell captured the nature of human morality when he stated ‘‘we have two kinds of morality side by side: one which we preach but do not practice and another which we practice but seldom preach’’ (Russell, 2004)
Since the literature reports that aversion to harm is such an influential force in hypothetical moral decisions (Cushman et al, 2006), our first assumption was that this deeply seated moral imperative would dictate peoples’ predictions of human moral choices
Participants in the Real PvG and Scenario PvG groups were matched for age (t(44) = 0.46, p = 0.65), the groups were not matched for gender ratio: our key analysis was repeated with gender as a covariate
Summary
Bertrand Russell captured the nature of human morality when he stated ‘‘we have two kinds of morality side by side: one which we preach but do not practice and another which we practice but seldom preach’’ (Russell, 2004). Aversion to harm appears to intensify as the prospect of hurting another becomes increasingly ‘up close and personal’ (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001), with people more likely to avoid inflicting harm if they have to carry out the physical act themselves This is illustrated most starkly by people’s responses to moral scenarios like the classic Trolley dilemmas. Subjects are presented with hypothetical moral vignettes (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010; Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 2010; Greene et al, 2001; Greene et al, 2004; Kahane et al, 2011; Tassy et al, 2011), stripped of all non-essential contextual information, and queried on their intention to perform an action These stylised scenarios act as a barometer for subject’s moral knowledge and the responses can be taken as a rough indication of subjects’ readiness to perform the associated moral behaviour (Ajzen, Brown, & Carvajal, 2004). To examine how this moral tension was resolved in both hypothetical and real contexts
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
