Abstract
In 1955, a highly secret Government report painted a bleak picture of Britain after a nuclear war. Without greatly improved civil defence measures, the report warned, a hydrogen bomb attack on Britain could kill one-third of the population within 24h and leave swathes of land uninhabitable. But Government advice to the public told a different story, offering cheerful advice about vacuuming up radioactive fallout and building shelters from books and furniture. Meanwhile, civil defence spending cuts left the public lacking even the standard of protection they had enjoyed during the Second World War. This seemingly paradoxical Government response was shaped by conflicting financial and political pressures, and by the work of the Home Office scientists whose research underpinned British civil defence planning.
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