What Role for the European Parliament Under Article 50 TEU

Following the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union in a national referendum there has been much debate over the correct legal process to be followed under both domestic law and the EU Treaties to give effect to this decision. This paper seeks to contribute to these discussions by focusing on an aspect of the withdrawal process which, in the author’s view, has not been given full consideration to date; namely, the need for the consent of the European Parliament before any withdrawal agreement may be completed.

This round of Euro-Barometer surveys focused on the current status of the European Community (EC), assessing respondents' awareness of and attitudes toward (1) the EC's activities and institutions, (2) various aspects of the Maastricht Treaty and the European Union, (3) EC policies, and (4) the European Parliament's work. A special set of questions focused on issues facing European societies, including family values and attitudes toward immigrants and people in other countries. Respondents were asked to rank their level of interest in European politics, and to indicate their level of support for the unification of Western Europe, including: (a) the degree to which they found European unification personally important, (b) whether they thought membership in the EC was a good thing, (c) whether membership would benefit their country, and (d) how they would feel if the EC were eliminated. They also rated how well they thought democracy worked in the EC and in their own country. Awareness of European institutions was measured by questions on how much respondents knew about the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Court, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and others. Several questions concerned the presidency of the EC's Council of Ministers, then held by Denmark. In addition, participants were asked about their knowledge of and attitudes toward the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the proposed European Monetary Union. This section of the questionnaire explored the Maastricht Treaty's implications for national and EC control of drug traffic, crime, defense, immigration, and a number of other areas of public policy. With regard to defense policy, respondents were asked specifically whether the EC should intervene militarily in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Opinions were obtained on the formation of a European Union with a European government responsible to the European Parliament. The Single European Market, in operation since January 1, 1993, was the topic of several questions, including whether respondents regarded the Single Market with hope or fear, and whether they had yet had any direct experience with the Single Market. In anticipation of the first general election of a European Parliament by the European Community's citizens in June 1994, the survey assessed respondents' awareness of the European Parliament, their overall impressions of its work, and opinions about its role in policymaking. Participants' intentions to vote and reasons for not voting in the upcoming election were also solicited. A special focus of this Euro-Barometer was the family, its composition and personal importance to respondents, and family values. The respective roles of mother and father in various parenting tasks were explored. The trend for grown children to stay at home longer was evaluated by respondents as good or bad for the children and the parents. Respondents assessed the priority for government policy on a number of family issues, such as infant care leave, availability of child care, availability of housing, and flexible working hours. Citizens' opinions of other European peoples and countries were sought through questions asking how much trust respondents placed in the people of various EC countries (as well as the United States, Japan, and Russia), which countries they favored becoming part of the European Community, and which citizens of other countries ought to be able to work and reside in the European Community. A number of questions concerned immigration and its effects on the European Community. Opinions were also solicited about Summer Time, a move to prolong daylight by putting clocks forward one hour from the last Sunday in March to the last Sunday in September. As in previous Euro-Barometers, questions on political party preference asked respondents which party they felt closest to, how they voted in their country's last general election, and how they would vote if a general election were held the next day. Additional information was gathered on life satisfaction, family income, number of people residing in the home, size of locality, home ownership, trade union membership, region of residence, occupation of the head of household, and the respondent's age, sex, education, religion, religiosity, subjective social class standing, socio-professional status, languages spoken, access to and use of media, left-right political self-placement, and opinion leadership.

The Treaty of Lisbon has strengthened the rights of both the European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments in the European Union (EU) decision-making process. The EP has benefited from greater legislative rights and extended veto powers, which ultimately has implications for EU citizens, since most legislative decisions affect them directly. EU citizens are also represented by their national parliaments. The Lisbon Treaty acknowledges for the first time that national parliaments ‘contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union’ (Article 12, TEU). The Treaty provides them with the right to information directly from EU institutions and has established the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) through which national parliaments can formally raise their concerns over subsidiarity infringements. Another important stipulation is that the Lisbon Treaty formally recognizes interparliamentary cooperation ‘between national Parliaments and with the European Parliament, in accordance with the Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union’ (Article 12 TEU), which allows them to determine ‘the organisation and promotion of effective and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation within the Union’ (Article 9 of Protocol 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union).

The attitude of the Irish public to European Union (EU) membership has traditionally been positive through the years of membership and remains so now (even if trust in EU institutions has now fallen sharply due to the association in the public mind of these institutions with the harsh economic medicine doled out in order to deal with the banking and financial crisis). Thus, even at the times when two of Ireland’s many referendums on EU-related issues went against the ratification of individual EU treaties, opinion polls concerning the merits of EU membership itself consistently gave results that were among the most favourable in Europe.1 Ireland has now had nine referendums concerning seven treaties — beginning with the Treaty of Accession to the original three European Communities, and followed by referendums on the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty,2 the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice (twice) and the Lisbon Treaty (twice). Most recently, on 31 May 2012, a constitutional amendment facilitating ratification of the Fiscal Stability Treaty was approved in a referendum, with 60.3 per cent of votes in favour and 39.7 per cent against on a turnout of 50 per cent. The major role assigned to referendums in the Irish legal system has, however, tended at times to divert attention from the rules governing the role of the Irish Parliament (the Oireachtas) in EU affairs, which merits attention and is of considerable comparative interest.

The ”Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of May 25, 1915,” also known as the Twenty-one Demands, was condemned by the Chinese people on the grounds it was agreed to only under the pressure of a Japanese ultimatum. In 1923, Peking parliamentarians proposed that the treaty was without effect since it had never been approved by the parliament. Although they continued to argue that the treaty had been pushed on China by force, they also provoked a new discussion in terms of domestic and international law. This article focuses on three dimension of this issue: (1) The power to sign treaties according to the early Republican constitutions and the precise capacities to revoke treaties. (2) The legal grounds for the parliament's view that the treaty was without effect. (3) The opinion of the Peking government's Foreign Counselor that the treaty was indeed valid in international Law.

We usually distinguish between primary and secondary art market. In the primary art market, the contemporary art galleries use (also on the internet) the images reproducing the works of art of the artist, with the artist's consent. In this case, the license is granted on a free basis for the promotion of the works of art by the galleries. In the secondary art market the art professionals (art dealers or auction houses) need the previous written consent of the artist or his estate for the reproduction of the images of the works of art on sale catalogues or on the relevant websites. This license may request the payment of fees to the artists or to the estate. The legal issues concerning the reproduction of contemporary works of art has a relevance on the international art market and opened a debate also in connection with the implementation of the Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. Indeed, the Directive provides for exceptions to the reproduction and communication to the public rights in case of use of works for the purpose of advertising the public exhibition or sale of artistic works, to the extent necessary to promote the event, excluding any other commercial use. This exception has not been implemented in Italy by the Italian Copyright Law (Italian Law n. 633 of 22 April 1941, as subsequently amended).

The brief article deals with the proposal for a directive on actions for antitrust damages launched by the European Commission on 11 June 2013. It presents the features of the proposal, but focuses on three issues that may be isolated as the more sensitive and critical points in the debate on the private enforcement of antitrust rules: the value of NCA decisions in proceedings before National Courts, the mechanism for access to evidence and the criteria for the calculation of damages. On evidence related issues the article examines the mechanism of disclosure of information, inspired by the EC directive 2004/48 (so called “enforcement directive”) in the field of Intellectual Property Law: a mild form of discovery, less broad and less costly than the US one. On the interaction between public and private enforcement one of the key goals of the proposal the article analyses the binding effect for national courts of the final decisions of NCAs, provided that they are subject to judicial review. On quantification of harm the article looks into the issue of the access of the injured party to evidence as 1 Court of Rome 2 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, O.J. L 157, 30, o4, 2004, p.45. well as the issues of the burden of proof of the amount of damages and of the standard of evidence required to assess them. In this framework it also considers the Guidance Paper on the quantification of antitrust harm published by the Commission. The articles draws three main conclusions on the policies of the proposal: 1) the central role of public enforcement; 2) the court centered system of private litigation and 3) the residual gaps on key procedural issues. 1. FROM THE GREEN PAPER TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON ACTIONS FOR ANTITRUST DAMAGES On 11 June 2013 the European Commission launched a proposal for a directive on actions for antitrust damages. The general legal grounds for the proposal are, of course, articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty and Regulation 1/2003 so called Regulation on modernization of competition law that has strengthened the role of National Courts in the 3 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013)404final. A draft “ Proposal for Council Directive on rules governing actions for damages for infringements of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty was circulated in the antitrust community a few years ago but has never been adopted. 4 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules of competition.

European Union as a entity with own resources, single currency and Central Bank, How the European Union arrange the revenue and expenditure structure of annual budget for accomplish the goals set by the establishing the European Union founding Treaties. and handle with all kinds of problems after ten eastern countries enter into the European Union. With the enlargement of the European Union by ten new member states, budget negotiations over the next Multiannual Financial Framework are inevitably going become more complicated and complex. Sustaining the European Union's capacity to act therefore requires not only new financial engineering, but also a fundamental rethink of the European Union's economic governance and of the financial means and resources necessary for achieving its objectives. The European Union budget rules are stipulates in articles 268 to 280 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The budget is proposed by the Commission, and approved unanimously by the Council after consulting the European Parliament. The annual European Union budgets are constrained by the Multiannual Financial Framework, an inter-institutional agreement between European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, whereby the main budgetary priorities are agreed in advance over a period of seven years and enshrined in a framework called the Financial Perspective. The Financial Perspectives indicate a maximum expenditure under each of the established headings in terms of million of euros and as percentages of Community GNP. Between the authorised own resources ceiling and actual payment appropriations there is a margin for unforeseen expenditure that provides room for adjustment in the resources available for the Community. The United Kingdom rotate as Chairman of the Presidency of Council of European Union, the period of seven years Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) 2007-2013 was passed at 12.2005,what are implied meaningfulness of the 2007-2013 Multi-annual Financial Framework, it to be worth to confer.

2018 metais Lietuvai įgyvendinus naujosios ES kelionių direktyvos nuostatas buvo naujai sureglamentuotas turizmo paslaugų teikimas, įvesta ir tokių naujovių (pvz., susije kelionės paslaugų rinkiniai), kurių iki siol Lietuvos teisėje nebuvo. Siame straipsnyje pateikiamos įžvalgos dėl Kelionių direktyvos priėmimo priežascių, perkėlimo į nacionaline teise apimties bei įgyvendinimo problemų.

Essays on the political economy of European integration

As the EC integration progresses, more EC laws including laws originated from EC laws are applied in the Member States. This has diminished the roles of Member States' parliaments as legislative and controlling authorities.The so-called ‘democratic deficit’ is the problem of degree of incorporation of the representative democracy into the EC system. In this article, the national parliaments' scrutiny systems are focused as ways to control the EC legislative process and to reduce the ‘democratic deficit.’ The national parliaments are ‘closer to the citizen’ and they play important roles in the representative democracy in the EC, complementary to the European Parliament's role.After the Single European Act entered into force in 1987, the number of EC laws increased dramatically. The national parliaments have amended internal procedures and established scrutiny systems to control their own governments' positions in the Council. In the 1990s, to make their scrutiny more effective, the French Senate, the British House of Commons, the Danish Folketing and the Finnish Eduskunta have established representative offices in the building of the European Parliament in Brussels. This enhanced relationships among European and national parliaments.First of all, the scrutiny systems of these four parliaments are studied as examples. Problems are that the governments do not always provide the parliaments all the information, that they do not provide it promptly, that the EC legislative proposals are sometimes adopted by the Council before their scrutiny is exhausted and that governments do not always take into account the parliaments' views (except in Denmark and Finland). For the purpose of the scrutiny, it is important that the parliaments can express their views before the EC legislative proposals under scrutiny are adopted in the Council. In this regard, ‘scrutiny reserve’ has been introduced. It can be said that the continued interaction between the governments and the parliaments through the scrutiny systems has contributed to make the scrutiny systems more effective and the governments to take into more account of the parliaments' views.At the EC/EU level, the protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty provides measures, although limited, to enhance national parliaments' ability to express their views on EC legislation. The European Parliament encourages the reinforcement of the national parliaments' scrutiny in its resolution A4-0179/97. To make the democratic control of the EC legislative process more effective, the European and national parliaments can jointly influence the EC legislative process by taking similar attitudes in the areas where their interests converge.Through their scrutiny systems, the national parliaments can be said to have incorporated to a certain extent the representative democracy into the EC legislative process.

The argument I will advance in this extended note on the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s decision in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union is that the decision and its aftermath can be usefully understood by reference to three fault lines: between form and substance (Part I); between the old constitution and the new constitution (Part II); and between political accountability and legal accountability (Part III). The decision and the academic debate the litigation provoked revealed that British lawyers are deeply divided about how to resolve important questions about the relationship between Parliament, the executive and the courts. And the legislative response to Miller reveals that the fault lines can operate differently in a political context than they do in a legal context (Part IV). Drawing the fault lines I have described and using them as analytical tools achieves three objectives. First, using the fault lines as analytical tools enhances the legal community’s understanding of Miller by placing the resolution of the issue relating to the triggering of Article 50 in a broader context. The litigation raised important questions about the way British lawyers understand their constitution, in particular, how to accommodate constitutional innovations such as EU membership, referendums and devolution. Second, illustrating that important tensions are to be found in the decision of the majority of the Court. For instance, on the juridical effect of triggering Article 50, substance trumped form, but when it came to the impact of triggering Article 50 on the devolution arrangements, form trumped substance; the ‘constitutional’ nature of the 1972 Act weighed heavily in the balance, but other constitutional innovations, such as referendums and devolution, exerted next to no weight at all; and although the executive’s political accountability as a matter of constitutional convention was deemed to be insufficient justification for avoiding parliamentary authorisation for the triggering of Article 50, the enforcement of constitutional conventions relating to devolution was left entirely to political actors. The fault lines thus expose important tensions in the reasoning of the Miller majority. Third, demonstrating that these fault lines are political as well as legal. The relationship between form and substance, old and new and political and legal shaped Parliament’s response to Miller just as much as it shaped the judgments of the Court and the first-instance courts. In the political arena, interestingly, form triumphed over substance, the referendum result carried decisive weight, and confidence about the effectiveness of conventional methods of parliamentary oversight of the executive outweighed concerns about the need for legal protection of the interests of individuals or Parliament. This does not represent an additional criticism of the judges. I mean only to highlight how the legislative response to Miller demonstrates that, under Britain’s constitutional arrangements, legal and political actors do not respond in the same way to the same stimuli. This phenomenon may not be unique to Britain, but if so, Miller is a striking example that ought to be of interest to constitutional lawyers in other jurisdictions.

On the 10th March, the official candidate of the Socialist Party for the French presidential elections, Benoit Hamon, outlined his programme for the European Union. This programme, whilst being against austerity and in favour of more flexibility as regards EU requirements in terms of public budgets and public debts, comes with a treaty proposal, the draft treaty on the democratization of the governance of the euro area (dubbed « T-Dem »). This treaty, which was prepared by the candidate together with the superstar economist Thomas Piketty (who has joined his team) is supposed to bring more democracy to the governance of the Euro area. However noble (and necessary) this ambitious idea might seem, the way this draft treaty has been engineered raises not only political but also legal questions.

The relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments were not free, in the past, from mutual neglect and sometimes jealousy. Only in the 1990s, after Maastricht, were foundations laid with a view to a more rational coexistence, and possibly cooperation. The chapter examines this evolution, including the experience of parliamentary participation in the constitutional convention and the claim of national parliaments for a more substantial involvement in EU affairs. The EP, after the elections of 2004, has taken first steps in order to meet the new challenge. The prospects for an improvement of relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments are positive. They will be based on an orientation favouring policy issues rather than ideological controversies. If the European Constitution will be enacted, the role of the NPs will be considerably increased. If not, in order to avoid them falling back into their former role perception, the EP and the NPs could examine how to enhance their cooperation on a sub-constitutional pragmatic level.

Following the decision of the British referendum on 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) plans to exit the European Union (EU). Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty was invoked at the end of March 2017 and the UK will officially leave the single market and customs union in March 2019. Brexit negotiations have proven difficult due to diverging positions of the two partners on many issues, such as freedom of movement, financial contributions and the potential re-emergence of a tough border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Despite the successfully negotiated Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, there is still considerable political uncertainty about the final EU-UK deal. <br> Regardless of the final outcome of the negotiations, Brexit implies fundamental changes in the British trade regime concerning third countries. This starts with a negotiation of national terms of access for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and extends to renegotiation of the numerous EU free trade agreements. Moreover, the UK will no longer be part of the European Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) or the Everything But Arms (EBA) treaty, which allow vulnerable developing countries to pay fewer or no duties on their exports to the EU. The Economic Partnership Agree-ments (EPAs) between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries will not apply to the UK either. <br> While the negative effects of Brexit on the UK and EU are in the limelight, the implications for third countries receive less attention. This paper puts the spotlight on these often-overlooked issues by presenting new findings on Brexit implications for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and discussing policy recommendations. <br> Developing countries with close ties to the UK will suffer from Brexit as import duties are once again imposed. <br> In particular, 49 of the world’s poorest countries presently benefit from preferential treatment that covers 99% of all products under the EBA agreement. Although these countries account for only 1.15% of the UK’s imports, the share of their exports to the UK exceeds 35% in apparel, 21% in textiles and 9% in sugar (calculations based on the UN Comtrade data for 2013-2015). Our findings show that losing these preferences together with the UK’s withdrawal from the EU may cause EBA countries’ GDPs to fall by -0.01% to -1.08%. Our simulations also indicate that the highest losses will occur in Cambodia and Malawi, where dependence on the UK market is strong. Moreover, Brexit may cause the number of those living in extreme poverty (PPP $1.90 a day) to rise by nearly 1.7 million in all EBA countries. These are conservative estimates of Brexit’s negative impacts; they do not take into account the additional implications of uncertainty, depreciation of the pound sterling, reduced aid spending, remittances and investments. <br> The UK must act to mitigate the adverse effects on economically vulnerable countries. Such action may include replicating existing EU treaties that grant preferential access to goods from LDCs, creating a more development-friendly UK trade policy with preferential access to services imports and cumulative rules of origin, as well as offering better-targeted aid for trade initiatives. The EU could also support LDCs by implementing liberal cumulative rules of origin and applying its preferential treatment partly to goods with a low value-added content from considered countries. <br> In addition, developing countries should diversify their export destinations and industries as well as engage in economic transformation that makes them less dependent on UK trade, aid and foreign direct investment (FDI).