Abstract
Abstract Many political philosophers affirm what I will call the Good Samaritan Principle (GSP): There is a natural duty of justice to provide aid to others in great need, if we can do so at little cost to ourselves. This essay presents two arguments against the GSP, suggesting that the principle is in tension with practices of gratitude and blame. It then disputes whether denying the GSP is intuitively unacceptable, as its defenders have claimed. Finally, it advocates turning to a model-based approach to investigate the principle. Rather than appealing directly to intuition, philosophical models consider a principle’s fit within a system of independently supported conceptual claims. I conclude that this approach reinforces doubts about the GSP.
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