What in the Name of God is Strategic Superiority?

Abstract

In 1974, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger exclaimed, in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?' Although he would state subsequently that his comment reflected fatigue and exasperation, not analysis, the secretary's questions are not to be dismissed so lightly. The issues he raised have profound implications for the size and composition of the defense budget, to say nothing of the character and content of U.S. foreign policy. They have yet to be answered satisfactorily. Although many individuals and organizations have argued that strategic superiority is necessary for the nation's security, few have even attempted to demonstrate this position. An exception is Eugene V. Rostow who, in 1981 during the hearings confirming his nomination as director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, offered the American experience in ending the Korean War as an illustration of the ways in which superiority could be useful. In a prepared statement, Mr. Rostow attributed the end of the long stalemate at the negotiating table to a nuclear hint from President Eisenhower. He suggested further that Eisenhower's threat was credible only because in 1953, the United States enjoyed a clear strategic advantage as compared to the Soviet Union.2