What drives consistent opposition to (and support for) climate policies? The case of Belgium

In recent decades, there has been increasing research interest in individuals’ support of and resistance to climate and environmental policy instruments. However, there is an empirical bias in the literature, as few studies have been conducted in low-income countries. Based on a survey with 4,766 respondents we identify the level of public acceptability for climate policy instruments and their determinants in East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda). While our sample is not fully representative of the East-African population, we capture highly educated individuals in urban areas, who are likely to have a large influence on policy processes. In line with previous studies in other contexts, we find that higher education and climate change concern are linked to the acceptability of policies aimed at reducing fossil fuel consumption. Specifying how the revenue from a climate tax or subsidy removal would be used, almost doubled the support for these policy instruments. In contrast to earlier studies, we find that investments in social programmes, not environmental programmes, was the revenue specification that increased the acceptability the most. One possible explanation would be that in a context where poverty is more prevalent, social issues are more salient to people. We also find weak associations between trust in government and the acceptability of climate policy instruments in East Africa and large heterogeneity across the five focal East African countries. Besides establishing an empirical foundation for future research on climate policy support in East Africa, the study provides essential policy insights: Investing in education and improved information, contributing to increased awareness and understanding of climate concerns, can potentially increase support for climate policy proposals also in the East African context. Earmarking revenues from climate policy instruments for social programmes may also significantly boost support. However, as our study is not fully representative of the population in the five countries and relies on stated preferences, which may be subject to different biases, the results should be interpreted with caution.

Responding to the impacts of climate change will require communities to develop an improved understanding of the factors influencing the policy preferences of supporters and opponents of climate policy. The literature on climate politics and policy has identified risk perceptions, climate-related knowledge, and ideological beliefs on government intervention as key factors impacting the general public's support for climate policies, but two important gaps within the literature remain unaddressed. The factors impacting policy preferences have been understudied among policy actors, a critical sub-population actively involved in the policy process. In addition, the effects of these factors on policy preferences have yet to be examined simultaneously. To examine the factors impacting the policy preferences of policy actors, this article conducts an analysis of questionnaire data administered in 2011 to policy actors involved in climate and energy policy in the state of Colorado. The results indicate the policy preferences of policy actors are largely affected by risk perceptions and ideological beliefs regarding government intervention. Contrary to previous studies, climate-related knowledge was found to have minimal impact on policy preferences when examined alongside risk perceptions and ideological beliefs. These findings draw attention to the need to develop a better understanding of the risk perceptions and ideological beliefs of climate policy actors throughout the development of climate policies. This article concludes with an overview of several approaches that appear to be worthy of this task, including participatory policy analysis, community risk assessments, and stakeholder analysis.

Fossil fuels, employment, and support for climate policies

Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) have been advocated as new global governance mechanisms that could address implementation and emission gaps. Yet, there is limited knowledge of how citizens evaluate MSPs as means to policy implementation, especially in comparison with governance arrangements led by traditional actors like governments and corporations. This study examines how citizens evaluate climate policy proposals involving MSPs. Does it matter for citizens who are implementing policies? If so, do citizens prefer policies implemented by MSPs or other actors, such as governments or private companies? We argue that citizens are more likely to show support for climate policies that are implemented by MSPs than for policies implemented by single actors such as governments and business. To test our expectations, we conduct a population-based conjoint survey experiment fielded to over 6000 respondents in Brazil, the UK, and the US. Our main findings are three-fold. First, in line with our expectation, we find that citizens have greater support for global climate policies if they are implemented by MSPs rather than by governments or the private sector. Second, we find that support for MSPs in the implementation of climate policies is stronger among citizens who support collaboration between different societal actors. Third, we find that citizens – regardless of their political ideology, attitudes to the environment, and confidence in their government – prefer climate policies implemented by MSPs. In addition to these results, we also find that citizens generally prefer highly ambitious and cost-effective climate policy proposals. We conclude by providing some substantial implications for our understanding of MSPs.

When the design of climate policy meets public acceptance: An adaptive multiplex network model

What are the roles of bottom-up and top-down signals in the formation of climate change policy preferences? Using a large sample of American residents (n = 1520) and combining an experimental manipulation of descriptive social norms with two choice experiments, we investigate the effects of descriptive norms and policy endorsements by key political actors on climate policy support. We study these questions in two areas considered to be central in a number of decarbonization pathways: the phase-out of fossil fuel-powered cars and the deployment of carbon capture and storage. Our study provides two important results. First, social norm interventions may be no silver bullet for increasing citizens’ support for ambitious climate policies. In fact, we not only find that climate policy support is unaffected by norm messages communicating an increased diffusion of pro-environmental behaviors, but also that norm messages communicating the prevalence of non-sustainable behaviors decrease policy support. Second, in the presence of policy endorsements by political parties, citizens’ trust in these parties influences their support for climate policies. This study contributes to research in behavioral climate policy by examining the impact of descriptive norms and elite cues on climate policy support.

French attitudes on climate change, carbon taxation and other climate policies

Why carbon leakage matters and what can be done against it

The emerging concept of sustainable welfare attempts to integrate environmental sustainability and social welfare research. Oriented at a mid-term re-embedding of Western production and consumption norms into planetary limits, it suggests the development of “eco-social” policies in the rich countries. In this theoretical context, this article empirically investigates the relationships between attitudes towards welfare and climate policy in 23 countries. Using 2016 data from the European Social Survey, we explored patterns of synergy between both kinds of policies as well as effects of crowding-out, where support for one kind of policy involves refusing the other. Since previous research addressed the role of welfare states and their institutional foundations in establishing environmentally sustainable societies, we studied how attitudes towards welfare and climate policies differ according to welfare regime affiliation. Additionally, we examined how a range of socio-demographic and political factors such as class, education, income, and political position shape people’s views on welfare and climate policy goals. The results of a multiple correspondence analysis indicate that the simultaneous support of welfare and climate policies follows welfare regime lines in that this support is the highest among social-democratic countries. However, also some conservative and Mediterranean countries score high in this regard. At the individual level, people with a higher education, employees in socio-cultural professions, and voters of moderate left and green parties display the highest mutual support for welfare and climate policies.

Australia's political engagement on health and climate change: the MJA-Lancet Countdown indicator and implications for the future.

Political polarization of Americans' support for climate policies often impedes the adoption of new, urgently needed climate solutions. However, recent polls suggest that younger conservatives favor adopting pro-climate policies to a greater degree than older conservatives, resulting in less political polarization among younger Americans relative to older Americans. To better understand these patterns, we analyzed Americans' support for various climate policies from 1982-2020, across 16 waves of historical, nationally representative survey data from the American National Election Studies (total N = 29,467). Regression models consistently show that, since 2012, younger Americans have been less politically polarized than older Americans on support for climate policies. Before 2012 and on non-climate policy topics, we did not find consistent statistical evidence for political polarization varying with age. These findings can inform policy debates about climate change and offer hope to environmentalists and policymakers who seek to build broad consensus for climate action at the policy level.

The march of climate policy

While considerable research has investigated the importance of the public’s understanding of the scientific consensus on climate change beliefs and policy support, only recently have scholars begun to evaluate the role of social consensus perceptions, e.g., what others in the same group think. People receive information about these norms directly from social interactions, such as with neighbors and friends, but also indirectly from media, as in reporting on national public opinion statistics. We assess how well the public understands the level of social consensus across different geographic scales—regional, state, and national—and test whether understanding these norms differentially relates to climate and energy policy support. Among a representative sample of Maryland adults surveyed in 2015 (n = 1547), nearly half underestimated the extent of the social consensus about climate change within their region, state, and country. Individuals’ consensus perceptions were significantly related to the true social consensus—estimated through survey data—at the regional scale; however, the size of the relationship was small. We found that consensus perceptions across all geographic levels related to support for climate policy, as mediated by climate belief certainty. But perceptions of social consensus at smaller spatial scales—e.g., regional—appear to have larger effects on public opinion. The results of this study suggest both the importance—and limitations—of geographies of social consensus and the role of attitudinal certainty as a mediator for this relationship. Conveying localized social consensus information may promote public support of climate policy.

ABSTRACTLack of broad public support for climate policies is a major barrier to transitioning to a low‐carbon economy. Multiple studies report higher support for emission‐reducing policies among left‐leaning and climate‐concerned individuals, but the literature is mute about the interaction effects between the two factors. Do left‐leaning individuals with low climate concern support climate policies, and what about right‐leaning individuals with high concern? The answers to these questions will have important implications for political mobilization for climate policies: Increasing concerns for climate change, for instance by highlighting the consequences of climate change, might be a forceful strategy for some audiences but not for others. We examine the potential interaction between climate concern and a composite measure of political value orientation with statistical analyses of Norwegian survey data for the period 2018–2020. As outcome variables, we examine support for both demand‐ and supply‐side policy – fossil fuel pricing and reduced oil production – to provide more general results. Our study indicates a positive relationship between climate concern and policy support across the full political spectrum. Right‐leaning political value orientation moderates but does not deter the relationship between climate concern and support for climate policies. These findings hold for both fossil fuel pricing and reduction in oil production.

It is critical to ensure climate and energy policies are just, equitable and beneficial for communities, both to sustain public support for decarbonisation and address multifaceted societal challenges. Our objective in this article is to examine the diverse social outcomes that have resulted from climate policies, in varying contexts worldwide, over the past few decades. We review 203 ex-post climate policy assessments that analyse social outcomes in the literature. We systematically and comprehensively map out this work, identifying articles on carbon, energy and transport taxes, feed-in-tariffs, subsidies, direct procurement policies, large renewable deployment projects, and other regulatory and market-based interventions. We code each article in terms of their studied social outcomes and effects, with a focus on electricity access, energy affordability, community cohesion, employment, distributional and equity issues, livelihoods and poverty, procedural justice, subjective well-being and drudgery. Our analysis finds that climate and energy policies often fall short of delivering positive social outcomes. Nonetheless, across country contexts and policy types there are manifold examples of climate policymaking that does deliver on both social and climate goals. This requires attending to distributive and procedural justice in policy design, and making use of appropriate mechanisms to ensure that policy costs and benefits are fairly shared. We emphasize the need to further advance ex-post policy assessments and learn about what policies work for a just transition.