What contributions do anti-insurgent militias produce during armed conflict? Exploring the capabilities of anti-insurgent militias in Colombia and the Philippines

This study investigates how deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) as counterinsurgents affects the risk of conflict recurrence. Militiamen derive material and non-material benefits from fighting in armed conflicts. Since these will likely have diminished after the conflict’s termination, militiamen develop a strong incentive to spoil post-conflict peace. Members of pro-government militias are particularly disadvantaged in post-conflict contexts compared to their role in the government’s counterinsurgency campaign. First, PGMs are usually not present in peace negotiations between rebels and governments. This reduces their commitment to peace agreements. Second, disarmament and reintegration programs tend to exclude PGMs, which lowers their expected and real benefits from peace. Third, PGMs might lose their advantage of pursuing personal interests while being protected by the government, as they become less essential during peacetimes. To empirically test whether conflicts with PGMs as counterinsurgents are more likely to break out again, we identify PGM counterinsurgent activities in conflict episodes between 1981 and 2007. We code whether the same PGM was active in a subsequent conflict between the same actors. Controlling for conflict types, which is associated with both the likelihood of deploying PGMs and the risk of conflict recurrence, we investigate our claims with propensity score matching, statistical simulation, and logistic regression models. The results support our expectation that conflicts in which pro-government militias were used as counterinsurgents are more likely to recur. Our study contributes to an improved understanding of the long-term consequences of employing PGMs as counterinsurgents and highlights the importance of considering non-state actors when crafting peace and evaluating the risk of renewed violence.

The following article discusses the development of Colombia’s paramilitary army, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), beginning in the 1990s and ending with the destruction of the organisation in the late 2000s. The AUC was originally founded by three brothers surnamed Castaño as a private army designed to combat the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and other Columbian revolutionary guerrilla groups. The main argument put forward in the article is that when the AUC was initially founded, the primary goal of its leaders, the Castaño brothers, was a sincere desire to check and, if possible, destroy the power of the FARC. In the process of its development however, the AUC came to depend on the taxation of cocaine to fund its war against the guerrillas. When the Colombian state, which had been too weak to prevent the development of either the AUC or the FARC in the 1990s, strengthened its military power in the 2000s, it demanded the AUC cease its operations, demobilise its military forces, and aid the state in destroying the cocaine industry’s infrastructure in southern Colombia. The Castaño brother who had become the organisation’s sole leader, Carlos, was willing to comply, but his move to end the AUC’s association with the cocaine industry invoked the wrath of his subordinate commanders, resulting in his brutal murder. This event revealed that the AUC had gradually developed into a cocaine cartel in the guise of a paramilitary army despite the intentions of its leader, who was killed because his leadership became a threat to the profitable taxation of cocaine that his former subordinate commanders enjoyed.

State security forces have been locked in an ongoing struggle with the Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army (NPA) for nearly fifty years. Over the course of the conflict, thousands of civilians across generations have taken up arms and participated in the counterinsurgency campaign. Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU) and other pro-government militias have played a key auxiliary role in combatting the insurgency and providing community security. This article draws on survey and interview data collected from CAFGU participants to examine the factors that influence decisions to join, as well as their implications for sustained participation and counterinsurgency strategy. Existing research on joining armed groups recognizes how environmental conditions, group processes, and individual motives interact to help explain participation. We shift our focus to the realm of the household and highlight how considerations related to that site affect participation. Our findings suggest that the need to avoid economic disaster and ensure a secure subsistence can have a notable influence on decisions to enlist and individual experiences as CAFGU. These effects, in turn, have implications for how the Philippine government carries out its counterinsurgency.

Although the existing literature on Pro-Government Militias (PGMs) is rife with studies on various aspects of government-militia relations, not much is known about specific approaches that governments employ to ensure loyalty of their semi-formal proxies. Lessons from recent civil war in Sudan and other cases of PGMs turning their arms against their former patrons further enhance the importance of understanding which mechanisms (if any) incumbents deploy to prevent militias from “going rogue.” In this study, we examine three mechanisms employed by governments to guarantee loyalty of their militia allies. We emphasize the importance of personal, sectarian and other ideological fractionalization within rebel groups; deployment of extreme violence by PGMs against co-ethnic civilians; and formation of rival militias as the most effective PGM loyalty assurance tools available to the incumbents. We test these theoretical assumptions on the case study of the Second Chechen War to elucidate how each of these mechanisms was implemented in practice during the decades-long counterinsurgency campaign waged by Moscow.

Despite efforts employed by the Colombian state to demobilize paramilitary groups and to tackle organized crime structures since 2003, Colombia today remains characterized by a repressive apparatus of social control by paramilitary successor groups in certain sectors of the population. Drawing on information from Colombia’s second-largest city – Medellín – and various rural areas of the Department of Antioquia, this work offers a characterization of the legacies of the paramilitary phenomenon, and its continuities and transformations in relation to one particular paramilitary confederation, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). In many regions, the AUC gained territorial, economic, and social control by managing the illegal drug economy and perpetrating political violence against leftist parties and social organizations. Paramilitaries have thus exerted what we refer to as status quo-oriented violence. As we illustrate for the case of Medellín, mechanisms of territorial, economic, and social control, as well as the particular manifestations of violence related to these mechanisms, have been transferred to paramilitary successor groups. The findings are mainly based on the outcomes of qualitative field research carried out in Medellín in mid-2015. Keywords: Medellín, Department of Antioquia, social, economic, and territorial control, paramilitary successor groups, organized crime, Colombia. Resumen: Paramilitarismo en un contexto post-desmovilización? Perspectivas desde el Departamento de Antioquia en ColombiaA pesar de los esfuerzos desplegados desde el año 2003 por el Estado colombiano para desmovilizar a los grupos paramilitares y hacer frente a las estructuras de crimen organizado, la Colombia de hoy sigue estando caracterizada por la existencia de un aparato represivo de control social ejercido por los grupos sucesores del paramilitarismo sobre ciertos sectores de la población. Partiendo de fuentes informativas procedentes de la segunda ciudad más grande de Colombia – Medellín – y de algunas zonas rurales del Departamento de Antioquia, este trabajo ofrece una caracterización de los legados del fenómeno paramilitar, sus continuidades y transformaciones en relación a una confederación paramilitar en particular, las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). En muchas regiones del país, las AUC lograron establecer un control territorial, económico y social por medio de la gestión de la economía ilegal del narcotráfico y la perpetración de una violencia política contra partidos de izquierda y organizaciones sociales. Así, los paramilitares ejercieron lo que nosotros denominamos una violencia orientada al mantenimiento del status quo. Tal como ilustramos para el caso de la ciudad de Medellín, tales mecanismos de control territorial, económico y social, así como sus manifestaciones particulares de violencia inherentes a dichos dispositivos, han sido transferidos a los grupos sucesores del paramilitarismo. Los hallazgos de este estudio se basan principalmente en los resultados de una investigación de campo de carácter cualitativo llevada a cabo en Medellín a mediados del año 2015. Palabras clave: Medellín, Departamento de Antioquia, control territorial, económico y social, grupos sucesores del paramilitarismo, crimen organizado, Colombia.

This article examines how civilian defense militias shape violence during civil war. We define civilian defense forces as a sedentary and defensive form of pro-government militia that incumbents often use to harness the participation of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign. We argue that civilian defense forces reduce the problem of insurgent identification. This leads to a reduction in state violence against civilians. However, we also claim that these actors undermine civilian support for insurgents, which leads to an increase in rebel violence against civilians and overall intensification of conflict. A statistical analysis of government and rebel violence against civilians from 1981 to 2005 and a qualitative assessment of a civilian defense force operating in Iraq from 2005 to 2009 offer strong support for our theoretical claims. These findings provide further insight into pro-government militias and their effects on violence. They also have wider ethical implications for the use of civilian collaborators during civil war.

With an increased focus on the role of pro-government militias in understanding intra-state conflict, scholars have primarily argued that states use militias as a proxy of the government because of low capacity or as a means of avoiding responsibility for violence against civilians. However, states with both high capacity and a willingness to commit violence against civilians have also relied upon pro-government militias in counterinsurgency operations. This paper argues that states involved in enduring interstate rivalries are more likely to use pro-government militias in order to reserve conventional military forces for potential conflict with their rival. Based on a case study of India’s Kashmir insurgency and logit analysis of pro-government militia data from 1981 to 2001, the findings provide empirical support for this theory and are robust to alternative measures and model specifications.

Pro-government militias are a prominent feature of civil wars. Governments in Ukraine, Russia, Syria, and Sudan recruit irregular forces in their armed struggle against insurgents. The United States collaborated with Awakening groups to counter the insurgency in Iraq, just as colonizers used local armed groups to fight rebellions in their colonies. A now quite wide and established cross-disciplinary literature on pro-government nonstate armed groups has generated a variety of research questions for scholars interested in conflict, political violence, and political stability: Does the presence of such groups indicate a new type of conflict? What are the dynamics that drive governments to align with informal armed groups and that make armed groups choose to side with the government? Given the risks entailed in surrendering a monopoly of violence, is there a turning point in a conflict when governments enlist these groups? How successful are these groups? Why do governments use these nonstate armed actors to shape foreign conflicts, whether as insurgents or counterinsurgents abroad? Are these nonstate armed actors always useful to governments or perhaps even an indicator of state failure? How do pro-government militias affect the safety and security of civilians? The enduring pattern of collaboration between governments and pro-government armed groups challenges conventional theory and the idea of an evolutionary process of the modern state consolidating the means of violence. Research on these groups and their consequences began with case studies, and these continue to yield valuable insights. More recently, survey work and cross-national quantitative research have contributed to our knowledge. This mix of methods is opening new lines of inquiry for research on insurgencies and the delivery of the core public good of effective security.

This article presents version 2.0 of the Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD). It is increasingly clear that it is untenable to assume a unified security sector, as states often rely on militias to carry out security tasks. The PGMD 2.0 provides new opportunities for studying questions such as when states rely on militias, how they chose among different types and the consequences for stability and peace. We detail how the PGMD 2.0 provides new information on the characteristics, behaviour, life cycle and organization of 504 pro-government militias across the globe between 1981 and 2014.

El presente artículo es producto del estudio exploratorio “Estrategias personales en hombres y mujeres excombatientes de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia y resignificación de su proyecto de vida” realizado en la ciudad de Medellín, Colombia, el cual a partir de los testimonios de dos excombatientes, identificó y analizó las estrategias de afrontamiento incorporadas en su proceso y que han incidido en la resignificación de sus experiencias de vida en la guerra. La investigación usó la metodología del estudio de caso, aplicada en un hombre y una mujer excombatientes de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) que culminaron su proceso de reintegración −promovido por la Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración− y que decidieron participar de la investigación voluntariamente. A partir de sus testimonios se realizó un acercamiento a algunas experiencias compartidas por hombres y mujeres en la guerra y se dio cuenta de la influencia que tienen las condiciones socio-históricas y de género para reconstruir un proyecto de vida en la legalidad. Finalmente, como producto de este diálogo se formulan algunas propuestas para las intervenciones de excombatientes del conflicto armado en Colombia como aportes al proceso de reincorporación actual.

Genocide scholarship overwhelmingly identifies states as the primary perpetrators of genocidal violence. While non-state armed groups, particularly pro-government militias, have been implicated in genocide, rebel-perpetrated wartime genocidal violence remains exceedingly rare. This paper argues that state-centric explanations of genocide can be exported to explain these edge cases. I argue that four high-threshold conditions must align for rebels to commit wartime genocidal violence: (1) effective territorial control, (2) the dispensability of civilian support, (3) a rigid and exclusionary ideological program, and (4) perceptions of threat, typically constitutive rather than military, where the target group is framed as incompatible with the nascent political order. These conditions provide rebel groups with both the strategic capacity and ideological justification for genocide. To illustrate this framework, the paper examines ISIS’ genocide against the Yazidis as a case study. ISIS’ state-like governance structures through consolidating territorial control, sectarian ideological rigidity, and strategic logic in targeting the Yazidis for extermination demonstrate how rebels can engage in genocidal violence as part of their state-building and order-making processes. This analysis contributes to understandings of genocide by highlighting that, under specific conditions, rebels can behave like states in their use of systematic mass violence.

Nationalism, racism, violence, and militarism are incarnate in football itself, as indicated through an engagement with the history and theory of the sport. This chapter considers this context to question the identity of the state and who holds a monopoly on legitimate violence, through a case study of Colombia. It focuses on the 1980s and 1990s, an era dominated by putatively progressive guerrilla movements (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC), putatively unofficial right-wing paramilitares (the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or AUC), and putatively populist narcotraficantes/Mafiosi. One aspect was not entirely shared in their tripartite struggle against each other and the state over who could terrorize the population most—the narcos' involvement in football. For while state militarism occupies an important role in the mental map of Colombians, especially since US intervention from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama via "Plan Colombia", it has been largely absent from football, though institutional violence and its symbolism have not.

This article analyzes the organizational structure employed by the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (Gaitanistas Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AGC in its Spanish acronym) to exert control over the Urabá region. Drawing on organizational sociology, the study conceptualizes paramilitarism as a model strategically adopted by specific self-defense groups to assert dominance over Colombian territories. By comparing academic literature with judicial rulings from Colombia's Ley de Justicia y Paz (Justice and Peace Law), the analysis identifies two historical paramilitary models—Puerto Boyacá and Urabá. Examining the distinctions between these models provides a framework for understanding the structural dynamics of the AGC. The article argues that the AGC adopted the paramilitary model established by the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) to sustain territorial control and facilitate illicit activities, including drug trafficking and migrant.

Las víctimas han adquirido una legitimidad social y política inédita en el mundo contemporáneo. A la luz de dicho fenómeno y los debates que ha generado en las ciencias sociales y humanas, en este artículo analizamos cómo se construye la identidad de víctima en Bojayá, un municipio del litoral pacífico colombiano donde fueron masacradas más de ochenta personas en 2002 durante un combate entre las FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo) y las AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia). Apoyados en entrevistas y datos de campo, argumentamos que el trauma social de la masacre y el sufrimiento son el motor de la agencia política de las víctimas y el medio que les permite devenir sujetos políticos. A partir de conceptos del psicoanálisis lacaniano, concluimos que la nominación de víctima en Bojayá posibilita que sus habitantes —antes invisibilizados— existan para el Otro de la nación y del escenario internacional.

This chapter considers the multiple efforts at engaging three armed groups in Colombia: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARC]), the National Liberation Army (Ejercito Liberacion Nacional [ELN]), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [AUC]). I address the various demands for territorial and political control put forth by each of the two key rebel armed groups — the FARC and the ELN — as well as the efforts to either address those demands or simply recognize the security situation on the ground, and to reach cease-fires and engage in demobilization. This engagement appears to have failed, for various reasons, including the possibility that the incentives offered are not of significant interest to groups also engaged in the lucrative narcotics industry, or fearful of the heavy presence of the United States through Plan Colombia. Based on my fieldwork, carried out in summer 2006, I address the key concerns and objections of each armed group. Finally, although the umbrella group of right-wing paramilitaries, the AUC, has distinct historical origins and relations with the government, I address the demobilization of the AUC undertaken with the government’s guarantee of amnesty and a ‘concentration’ zone.