West Africa's Quest for Regional Stability: A Study of the Efficacy of Operation Gama Aiki's Military Joint Task Force

This article assessed security architecture for counter-insurgency against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). The paper diagnosed the impact of conflicting national interests of contributing nations on the performance of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as a regional security architecture in the LCB. Some scholars and analysts cite corruption, historical contradictions among LCB members, poor funding, and complex nature of the insurgency, as factors responsible for failure of counter-insurgency operations in the LCB. Others contend that resource geopolitics, linguistic differences, and hegemonic politics have impacted negatively on the capacity of the MNJTF to decimate terrorists in the region. This is a qualitative study that draws from the Fund for Peace, International Crisis Group (ICG), Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), and research literature dealing with national interest and military alliances, while using content analysis to argue that conflicts in national interests, more than any other factor, have hampered the collaborative efforts of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and weakened the capacity of the MNJTF to engage in robust counterinsurgency against Boko Haram in the LCB.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is the major collaborative military initiative among the countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) saddled with the responsibility of combating Boko Haram Terrorism (BHT) within the region. Although the body seems to have achieved some successes, they have however, over the years, been involved in seemingly clandestine activities such as torture, extra-judicial execution, gender-based violence, etc., which, according to international humanitarian law, if committed during non-international armed conflict, are regarded as war crimes. This study seeks to investigate the nature and pattern of war crimes committed by some Nigerian military forces under the MNJTF in the course of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations against Boko Haram terrorists in north-east Nigeria between 2012 and 2019. It also investigates the implications of these travesties on victims, the war against terrorism and Nigeria in general. It analyses the various war crimes committed by the MNJTF. It also examines the measures for curbing the criminal activities of some members of the MNJTF. This study engages the following issues: what are the war crimes committed by the Nigerian soldiers under the MNJTF or why is the latter accused of gross human rights violations? What are the implications of the criminality of the MNJTF? What measures should be taken to curb the criminality of the MNJTF in north-east Nigeria? This study uses both primary and secondary sources. It anchors on Biological and Cultural Transmission Theories of criminology. The study reveals that the statutory body in charge of countering terrorism and also securing human lives, is also, like the Boko Haram terrorists, terrorising innocent civilians and promoting insecurity in north-east Nigeria. The conclusion is that the MNJTF is smudged with the brush of brutality and terrorism.

According to the UN Charter (Article 26), the UN Security Council is the primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Nuclear states agreed to the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution that provided positive security assurances. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution №255 on June 19, 1968, was of particular significance. This resolution stipulated that instances of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state would require immediate action by the UN Security Council and its permanent members, who are nuclear-armed states. The aim of the work is to determine the role of the UN Security Council in the system of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The methodological basis of the study will focus on the analysis and understanding of the impact of the UN Security Council on strategies and measures aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the international context. The results of our research have shown that the role of the UN Security Council in the disarmament of Iraq’s nuclear program, which could have led to the development of nuclear weapons, proved to be significant. To achieve this, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution №687 adopted on April 3, 1991, the Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established. During an extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council at the highest level on September 24, 2009, Resolution UN Security Council Resolution № 1887 was adopted, aimed at supporting nuclear non-proliferation, criticizing Iran and North Korea. Resolution №1887 outlines measures to strengthen control and the rights of nuclear-weapon states to demand the return of nuclear materials and equipment in case of violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or withdrawal from it. It also involves enhancing security measures for the storage of nuclear materials and strict export controls. Conclusions. In our opinion, the powers of the UN Security Council in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be utilized more promptly and effectively. The insufficient effectiveness of this international mechanism in preventing proliferation remains a cause for serious concern among UN members worldwide. To enhance the effectiveness of the UN Security Council, we propose the adoption of a comprehensive resolution that includes provisions on the procedure for a state’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its violation of commitments to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. This resolution should stipulate the imposition of sanctions against such a state based on a special report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Such a mechanism can ensure an effective impact of the international community on states that withdraw from the NPT.

Will Ebola change the game? Ten essential reforms before the next pandemic. The report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is engaged in active combat operations against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, but the latter remains very resilient and continues to launch lethal attacks. Yet, scholarship has failed to examine the institutional circumstances that account for the lack of success by the MNJTF. This article explores the influence of the counterinsurgency frameworks of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU), Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) on the operations of the MNJTF. It takes a critical look at how the MNJTF’s states’ affiliation to separate sub-regional blocs influences military and intelligence cooperation among them. The article argues that the AU, ECOWAS, and ECCAS institutional counterinsurgency frameworks severely limit military and intelligence collaboration among its member nations, therefore impeding the MNJTF’s operations.

The subject of the study is the role of the UN Security Council in the international system of countering money laundering and terrorist financing. The author pays special attention to the historical component, identifying the reasons for the transformation of the UN approach to money laundering and terrorist financing and tracing the link between the globalization of terrorist acts and the development of counteraction by the UN Security Council. The main functions of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC of the UN Security Council) and the Executive Directorate (CTED of the UN Security Council) are outlined. The article reveals the role of a number of UN Security Council documents as a systemically significant source of law in the context of the international system for countering money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as individual problems faced by states implementing the norms of resolutions into their national legislation. The methodological basis of the study was a combination of general scientific (logical method and analysis) and private scientific methods (comparative legal, historical legal, historical and sociological). The article systematically details the development of the UN Security Council's approach to the problem of money laundering and terrorist financing. Through careful consideration of individual provisions of the resolutions, the role of this UN Security Council and its bodies in developing measures and countering ML/FT is being specified. Based on the results of the study, the author concludes that the UN Security Council has played a systemically significant role in the formation of an international system for countering money laundering and terrorist financing, consolidating a number of advanced international standards developed by international organizations, para-organizations and other institutions. In addition, the author clarifies that it is thanks to the UN Security Council that it is possible to further "solidify" the FATF Recommendations and their full implementation into the international legal system.

The use of force� /no matter how benevolent, enlightened, or impartial in intent� /has dramatic consequences. It shapes the struggle for power and helps to determine the outcome of political contests, which is why it is inherently controversial. It is why international debates about Libya� /the first road test of the Responsibility to Protect’s (R2P) coercive element (also known as Pillar Three)� /were understandably contentious. Pillar Three is defined as ‘‘the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide ... / protection.’’ 1 While peaceful means of response are primarily preferred, should that prove inadequate to ensure protection, the international community should use more robust action: ‘‘no strategy for fulfilling the responsibility to protect would be complete without the possibility of collective enforcement measures, including through sanctions or coercive military action in extreme cases.’’ 2

Introduction: Effectiveness of Multilateralism in the Field of Collective Security, Joachim Krause and Natalino Ronzitti Part I: Theoretical Approaches to and Historical Developments of Global Governance in the Field of Collective Security 1. Global Governance in the Field of Collective Security - How to Make Multilateralism more Effective, Joachim Krause 2. Effectiveness and Ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council in the Last 20 Years: a European Perspective, David Hannay 3. Effectiveness and Ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council in the Last 20 Years: a US Perspective, John van Oudenaren Part II: The UN Security Council 4. The reform of the UN Security Council, Natalino Ronzitti 5. The EU's Contribution to the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council between Presence and Impact, Nicoletta Pirozzi Part III: UN Peacekeeping 6. UN Peacekeeping Missions during the Past Two Decades - How Effective Have They Been?, Denis Tull 7. Options for Improving EU-UN Cooperation in the Field Of Peacekeeping, Alexandra Novosseloff Part IV: International Peacebuilding and State-building 8. International Peacebuilding and State-building Efforts: How Effective Have They Been?, Keith Crane 9. Building Peace in Post-Conflict Environments: Why and How the UN and the EU Interact, Thierry Tardy 10. Constructing a Framework of Effective Multilateralism: Conclusions for the Field of Collective Security, Inna Melnykovska and Nicoletta Pirozzi Appendices Appendix 1. The UN Security Council Reform Process: Recent Developments, Elisabetta Martini Appendix 2. Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management Appendix 3. Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management Appendix 4. Major Stages of the Institutionalization of the UN-EU Cooperation Appendix 5. Contributions of European States to UN Peacekeeping Operations Appendix 6. EU Autonomous Operation in Support of a UN Peace Operations Appendix 7. Operations Involving UN-EU Cooperation since 2003

Nigeria’s geopolitical position and leadership role in West Africa make it a central actor in addressing the growing threat of regional terrorism, particularly in the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions. The persistence of groups such as Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and other transnational insurgent networks underscores the urgent need for a coordinated and sustainable security architecture. This review examines Nigeria’s foreign policy response to regional terrorism, highlighting the evolution of its strategic engagement through frameworks such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), ECOWAS security mechanisms, and bilateral defense accords with neighboring states. It analyzes the interplay between national security objectives and regional diplomatic commitments, emphasizing the balance between sovereignty and collective action. By synthesizing existing literature and policy analyses, the paper identifies institutional, operational, and political constraints undermining effective cooperation. Furthermore, it proposes a cross-border security cooperation model grounded in intelligence-sharing, capacity building, and multilateral diplomacy. The model integrates regional ownership with global partnerships, aligning Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal 16. Ultimately, the study argues that reimagining Nigeria’s foreign policy to prioritize adaptive, data-driven, and collaborative security mechanisms is essential for achieving long-term regional stability and counterterrorism resilience.

The article analyzes main trends in the work of the UN Security Council on the Syrian issues. The author notes that the interaction of the Security Council members fully reflected the modern development of international relations, related to its transformation towards polycentricism. This process is associated with a reduction in the ability of the US to use the UN Security Council to conduct its own narrow-conjuncture policy, with the growing influence of new centers of power, primarily Russia and China. Those actors are ready to uphold the principle of inadmissibility of using the UN Security Council to interfere in the internal affairs of states in order to change regimes. To counter this trend, Washington and its allies pursued a policy of pressure on Moscow, trying to force it to abandon an independent course toward Syria. At the same time, the thesis of the “paralysis” of the UN Security Council with reference to the conflict in Syria was actively used because of Russia’s position. Simultaneously, Russian initiatives in the UN Security Council aimed at de-escalating the situation and launching an inter-Syrian dialogue were rejected. Nevertheless, the consistent position of Russia and China forced the West to gradually realize the non-alternative search for common denominators on the Syrian issue as well as collective partnership efforts to find measures to end the conflict. As a result, it became possible to adopt a number of decisions of the UN Security Council concerning various aspects of the settlement of the crisis. The main principles of the settlement, negotiating formats for the participants in the conflict and external players were agreed upon. Thus, it was the interaction in Syria that gave the UN Security Council the opportunity to become the embodiment and guarantor of a multipolar world, a platform for harmonizing approaches on an equitable collective basis in a changing world.

UN ON THE PATH TO REFORM

ABSTRACTThe persistent violence of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and beyond between 2011 and 2014 is linked to a variety of reasons: the trouble that had the Nigeria’s national army to contain this group, the lack of cooperation between states directly touched by Boko Haram, the difficult coordination between regional organizations as the Lake Chad Basin is overlapping between the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and many other intergovernmental organizations. Faced with the difficult regional cooperation in the area during the above-named period, the atrocities of Boko Haram made at least 30.000 dead, more than 1.6 million refugees and displaced, 4.2 million people facing food insecurity and health problems. However, starting in 2015, there have been a shift in the regional management of the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin. States directly affected by the Boko Haram phenomenon moved forward by pooling their efforts. By using the Regional Security Complex Theory, this paper aim to show that the rise of a new regional leadership stimulated the collective military coalition which led later to the reactivation and gradual deployment of the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Lake Chad Basin. This collective action linked states of West Africa and those of Central Africa region and, sounds like African solutions to African problems.

The challenges of terrorism and insurgency have continued to attract regional response. A significant aspect of such response is the demonstration of shared responsibilities by various nation states in regional cooperation to stamp out the menace of terrorism. The EU member states for instance adopted a regional approach to counter transnational security threats by embracing common standards and unified approach to Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency (CT-COIN). Likewise in West Africa, the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was recently reinvigorated to deal decisively with the cross-border terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin. This is in addition to other regional architecture that constitutes the needed ingredients of regional cooperation in West Africa. The operations and activities of these regional outfits have been destabilized by several challenges due to the peculiarities of security cooperation at a regional scale. Against this background, this article examines regional cooperation within the context of CT-COIN in West Africa with a view to establishing the challenges of such collaboration. The article unbundles the dynamics of terrorism and insurgency in West Africa. It engages the regional architecture for CT-COIN in the region and it underscores the challenges of regional cooperation. The article offers some measures for improving regional cooperation for an improved CT-COIN in West Africa.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I thank Professors David Cameron and Michael Pugh, Megan Keogh and the following UN officials/consultants – Brian Atwood, Peter Barwick, Jamal Benomar, Michelle Brandt, Mario Buil-Merce, Lovemore Chikopa, Jill Cottrell, Surya Dhungel, Filippo Di-Capegra, Dennis Dijkeul, Guido Galli, Yash Ghai, Nicholas Haysom, Robert Husbands, Sakuntala Kagardimar, Katy Le Roy, Gianni Magazenni, William Maley, Fred Mwanthagere, Muna Ndulo, Cristiano Papile, Thusitha Pilapitiya Robert Pulver, Bertrand Ramcharan, Anthony Regan, Alvaro Rodriguez, Charmaine Rodriguez, Roland Rich, Peter Russell, Amos Sawyer, Susanne Schmeidl, Francois Simmards, Ramaswamy Sudarshan, Neçla Tsirgi and John M. Tuhaika – for materials, conversations and comments. Notes UN Security Council Res. UN doc., S/Res/1996, 8 July 2011. UN Security Council Res. UN doc., S/Res/1509, 19 Sept. 2003; UN Security Council res. UN doc., S/Res/1885, 15 Sept. 2009. 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UN Charter, Ch.XIII, Arts.87–8; Katy le Roy, ‘Nauru Constitutional Review: Discussion Paper’, June 2006, p.3. ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization’, UN doc., A/60/1, 2005, p.3. UN Charter, ‘Peaceful Settlement of Disputes’, Ch.VI, Art.33. UN Security Council, ‘Conflict Prevention Historical Chronology’ (at: www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.3462777/). Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, New York: UN, 1992. Ibid. UN Secretary-General, ‘The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa’, 16 Apr. 1998, para.105 (at: www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.html); UN, ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary-General – UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance’, undated. UN Secretary-General (see n.24 above); UN Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Prevention of Armed Conflict’, UN doc. A/55/985–S/2001/574, 7 June 2001, para.78. UN Security Council (see n.1 above), para.18; Bertram I. Spector, Negotiating Peace and Confronting Corruption, Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2011. ‘Comparative Table Regarding the UN Security Council Committees Established Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004)’ (at: www.un.org/es/sc/ctc/pdf/comparative-table-2011-05.pdf). ‘Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’, Ch.1, Art.7, 2004; ‘Permanent Constitution of Iraq’, 2005, §1, Art.7. For an anti-terrorism provision in another UN-assisted constitution, see ‘The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan’ (2008), Art.8(5). UN Millennium Declaration, GA Res.55/2, UN GAOR, UN doc. A/Res/55/2, 18 Sept. 2000, para.6; UN, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’, report of the UN Secretary-General, UN doc., A/Res/59/2005, 21 Mar. 2005. UN doc., S/Res/1325, Oct. 2000. UN (see n.17 above), pp.4–6. Ibid. See ‘Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions’ (Paris Principles), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Office (at: www2.ohchr.org/english/law/parisprinciples.htm). Vijayashri Sripati, ‘UN Constitutional Assistance: A TWAIL Perspective’, PhD thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, 2010, chs.4–5. Ibid.; Spector (see n.26 above), pp.67–71; UNDP, Democracy and Development in the Least Developed Countries, New York: UN, 2006, pp.64–9. Ibid.; Sripati (see n.33 above), ch.5. Edward Newman and Roland Rich (eds), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy – Between Ideals and Reality, Tokyo: UN University Press, 2003, p.3. Secretary-General's remarks to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly on the Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2008–09, New York, 25 Oct. 2007 (at: www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2815). For the nature of the conflict see ‘Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi’, 28 Aug. 2000, Art.4. Ibid. 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Ralph Wilde, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.17; Sergio Viera de Mello (at: www.ohchr.org/EN/ABOUTUS/Pages/Vieira.aspx). Hon. Richard G. Lugar (Sen. Indiana), ‘Kosovo: A Way Forward?’, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations US Senate, 109th Congress, First Session, 8 Nov. 2005, p. 1. Rambouillet Agreement – Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, US State Department, Feb. 1999 (at: www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html). Republic of Kosovo Assembly (at: www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635). ‘United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)’, Fact Sheet, 10 Aug. 2007, pp.1–5.

Seated at the famous horseshoe table in the United Nations Security Council chamber in New York on 25 October 1962, US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson presented fellow Council members with photographic evidence of Soviet missile installations in Cuba. Unveiling the evidence collected by US intelligence services over the previous weeks and months, Stevenson’s performance produced a supreme and memorable moment of Cold War drama. Some 40 years later, Secretary of State Colin Powell, making the case Review Essay