Abstract
We consider randomized public good mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions. We show that every welfare-maximizing mechanism entices participation and that the converse holds under additional assumptions. As a corollary, we obtain a characterization of an attractive randomized voting rule that satisfies Condorcet-consistency and entices participation. This stands in contrast to Moulin's well-known no-show paradox (Moulin, 1988), which shows that no deterministic voting rule can satisfy both properties simultaneously.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
