Abstract
Cournot and optimal outputs (Proposition 3.1). A Mechanism with efficient outcomes (Proposition 3.2). Entry and social welfare (Propositions 3.3–4). Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry (CEFE) and Walrasian Equilibrium (Proposition 3.5). Relationship between CEFE and optimal allocations (Propositions 3.6–7). A reduction in the active number of firms in CEFE increases social welfare (Propositions 3.8–9). Number of firms and profits in CEFE (Propositions 3.10–11). Cournot equilibrium and Constrained Efficiency (Proposition 3.12). Appendix: Optimal trade policy (Propositions 3.13–17).KeywordsSocial WelfareOptimal AllocationForeign FirmDomestic FirmWelfare LossThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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