Abstract
AbstractThe present paper aims to unearth the rudiments of an alternative theory of action in Weber. Centring on salient descriptions of scientific practice found in Weber, I argue that one finds so-called “relational” impulses in these instances, which are at odds with the Kantian, subject-centred and dualist perspectives pervading much of Weber’s thought.The paper consists of two parts. In the first—critical—part, after a short sketch of my relational approach, I cite some well-known “Kantian” passages in Weber’s work and demonstrate their undesirable theoretical and empirical consequences. I investigate Weber’s “official” theory of action and understanding, his concepts of rationality and psychology, and his understanding of technological mediation. In the second—positive—part, I delve into Weber’s understanding ofcreativity, investigating relational traits in Weber’s descriptions of scientific practice and experience. I then demonstrate how Weber’s late concept ofpersonalityis based on relational and object-oriented attitudes. Further, I investigate how the two dimensions of creativity and personality merge in his concept ofSachlichkeit. Finally, I provide certain biographical observations and discuss the conflict between existentialist and relational interpretations of Weber. At the very end of the paper, I discuss some general implications of the relational perspective.
Highlights
The present paper aims to unearth the rudiments of an alternative theory of action in Weber
THISPAPER seeks to unearth impulses in Max Weber’s work that are decisively at odds with Weber’s “official” theory of action, i.e., the theory of action related to his famous brand of “interpretative”— verstehende—sociology [(1922) 1978: 3-62; (1913) 2012: 273-272]
I cannot delve into the many variants of relationalism or the sometimes-violent criticism levelled against these controversial approaches
Summary
I seek to describe various aspects of Weber’s Kantianism and show how it precludes the various forms of objectoriented absorption outlined out above. Instead of being situated inside its actual practices is detached and isolated from them, its powers to relate must be boosted Such passages present a fundamental “empirization” of the original Kantian template in as much as the historical Kant never placed the “transcendental synthesis” on the shoulders of the empirical individual. None of the accounts allot an active role to the intentional object in helping us to place ourselves in relation to it and achieve a “point of view” They either insist on an all-powerful subject capable of doing everything by itself or call in determining structures, values, value relations, laws of value spheres and transcendental processes of “constitution” to help [Oakes 1988: 30ff.; but see Bruun 2007: 14ff.; Burger (1976) 1987]. This emerging mutuality cannot find expression in a dualist perspective
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