We're Number One (Again)

Abstract

IN ITS Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, Geneva-based World Economic Forum (WEF) ranked 75 nations on their global competitiveness. The U.S. finished second, behind only Finland. Well, maybe Nokia had an off year, but in 2002-03 report, 80 countries are ranked, and U.S. ranks number one in global competitiveness, growth competitiveness (the next five years), and microeconomic competitiveness (how well companies are run). The WEF observes that competitiveness remains a concept that is not well understood, despite widespread acceptance of its importance. The most intuitive definition of competitiveness is a country's share of world markets for its products. This makes competitiveness a zero-sum game because one country's gain comes at expense of others. But, WEF argues, world economy is not a zero-sum game. And acting as if it were actually works against a country's economic progress. Low wages, often cited as a reason for shipping American jobs abroad, hold down prosperity. Devaluation of a currency, another common means of increasing exports, means that country is actually taking a collective pay cut. True competitiveness comes from productivity. Productivity allows a nation to support high wages, a strong currency, and attractive returns to capital -- and with them a high standard of living. Of course, WEF reflects a particular world view. And that world view can be seen by looking at regional reports. For instance, in its first-ever separate report on Arab nations, WEF lists three deficits that must be removed to make Arab countries competitive. Removing them requires rebuilding Arab societies so that they are based on following: * full respect for human rights and human freedoms, * complete empowerment of Arab women, and * consolidation of knowledge acquisition and its effective utilization. Given multitude of variables WEF uses, including test scores from international studies, it is easy to see why those test scores don't have much bearing on a nation's competitiveness (See Research, June 2002). The report can be found at www.weforum.org. Ignorantia Affectata THERE were problems with New York Regents Mathematics A examination, and almost 70% of students flunked. New York Education Commissioner Richard Mills threw out results. This story would hold little interest outside New York if it were a rare event, but it is not. The title of a new monograph by Kathleen Rhoades and George Madaus of Boston College puts it clearly: Errors in Standardized Tests: A Systemic Problem. Rhoades and Madaus begin with examples of kinds of decisions -- promotion, graduation, etc. -- that turn on test scores. All of these decisions are based on quantification of performance -- on numbers -- and this bestows on them appearance of fairness, impartiality, authority, and precision. The heavy reliance of reformers on these numbers is a facet of what Thomas Aquinas called a cultivated ignorance, ignorantia affectata. A couple of years ago, Thomas Kane and Douglas Staiger observed that many reformers and state officials do not understand strengths and weaknesses of instruments they use in their accountability programs. Rhoades and Madaus go further and call it a willed ignorance, an ignorance that one protects in order to keep using it. This ignorance is doubly dangerous because the testing industry is shrouded in secrecy. Rhoades and Madaus cite an earlier report: Today those who take and use many tests have less consumer protection than those who buy a toy, a toaster, or a plane ticket. Rarely is an important test or its use subject to formal, systematic, independent professional scrutiny or audit. Civil servants who contract to have a test built, or who purchase commercial tests in education, have only testing companies' assurances that their product is technically sound and appropriate for its stated purpose. …