Wartime solidarity and sense of belonging to Europe: public support for military aid to NATO allies under attack

From today's viewpoint, 2016 may well represent the end of the post‐Cold War era and the general assumptions that are associated with it. These include the beliefs that the United States remains a European power, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of its European NATO allies, that liberal democracy represents the political system widely seen as the only legitimate normative reference point, and that the future of the European Union will be defined by continued integration into an ‘ever closer Union’. These assumptions have been shaken to the core.

The authors use primary archival records from Lyndon Johnson's presidency to rethink realist theory in international relations concerning leadership of public opinion in foreign policy. Much as the realists expect, Johnson pursued a strategy of opinion leadership that was intended to direct public opinion as he and his administration reacted to the country's international position. Using archival evidence and statistical analysis, the authors examine the relationship between public opinion information that was privately channeled to the White House and several measures of Johnson's behavior including presidential statements and military decisions about bombing and troop deployments. They find that Johnson was unresponsive to public opinion and also generally ineffective in directing public opinion. They conclude that realists' analysis of opinion leadership in representative democracies is inadequate and can lead to impractical prescriptions. What is needed is a theory of foreign policy making that incorporates the complexities of opinion leadership.

In its aim to become a global security actor, the EU is increasingly undertaking civilian and military crisis missions all over the world. These missions are based on the European security and defence policy (ESDP) which forms an integral part of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The Treaty of Lisbon seems to mirror the Union’s global security ambitions as it addresses the European security and defence policy in a whole new treaty section. However, European missions still depend on willing Member States to make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of its security and defence policy. The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between the European Union and the Member States in the fi eld of the common foreign and security policy and the European security and defence policy and whether the Treaty of Lisbon manages to clarify the situation. What constraints, if any, do the common foreign and security policy and the European security and defence policy impose on the Member States regarding the conduct of their national foreign policy? The article argues that the relationship between the EU and the Member States can only be determined after an examination of the binding nature of primary and secondary CFSP law as well as of international agreements concluded by the Union.

Összefoglalás. A KDP keretén belül végzett kutatómunkám fókuszában a biztonság megteremtése és fenntartása állami és nem állami szereplői tevékenységének jelenkori állapotanalízise, a komplementer rendészeti szereplők rendészeti szerveket tehermentesítő, nemzetgazdasági szempontból is meghatározó jelentőségű vizsgálata áll. Jelen tanulmányomban az ezzel megegyező tartalmú PhD-kutatásom eredményeiről számolok be, kutatási jelentés formájában. Summary. The focus of my research within the framework of the KDP is the analysis of the current state of the activities of state and non-state actors in the creation and maintenance of security, and the analysis of the role of complementary law enforcement actors in relieving the burden on law enforcement agencies, which is of crucial importance from a national economic point of view. In this paper I report the results of my PhD research with the same content in the form of a research report. I will point out that law enforcement, and thus the state actors in the creation of our security, and in particular the activities of the police, have been and are being dealt with in many different ways. However, only a small number of police researchers have focused their attention on non-state actors in the field of security, on the specialised bodies and ‘peripheries’ of policing, and on the use of methods other than those that might be called traditional policing. The joint work of state and non-state actors, the complementary and mutually reinforcing role of the police in creating and maintaining our common security, and the possibility of rethinking the respective roles are also areas that have been little researched. My PhD research seeks to fill this gap, bearing in mind the fact that law enforcement practitioners expect the Doctoral School of Police Studies to provide recommendations for applied research that can be used in everyday practice. In my gap-filling research, I will explore my research questions and hypotheses in an unconventional way by drawing on what I consider to be relevant, almost half a thousand domestic and foreign source materials, personal interviews, study trips and the experience of an expert survey. I will reflect on the significance of private security research and then move back in time to examine the development of the concept of policing over time. I will juxtapose key ideas from works that are perhaps little known to many, but which are still of great scientific value today. In a comparative analysis of state and non-state actors in the field of security, I will present the actors of complementary policing, the ‘stepchildren of policing’, and I will focus on the experience of the domestic organisation of a major sporting event, EURO2020, which attracts large crowds. Internationally, I will look at the development of the public and private security sectors in Estonia, Mexico, South Africa, Australia, Bulgaria, England and Canada, and the activities of private military companies. On the basis of all these research experiences, I will interpret the functioning of the security industry, the value added by private security and thus the new structure of policing in the light of the “Security Rethought” questionnaire survey. Based on my research, I will attempt to unpack and explain the mechanisms of the relationship between state and non-state actors in the creation and maintenance of security. By interpreting the path to date and suggesting a possible future, I try to combine an academic approach with the knowledge that emerges from the work of practitioners. Emphasising the scientific need for change and improvement, and the fusion of dogmatics and practice, I seek, in the framework of this research, to address some of the issues that I consider controversial and, as a result of this confrontation, to stimulate further research and the development of alternative solutions for those who are open to the development of the emerging science of policing, by setting out the legislative and theoretical problems of the subject.

Public contestation regarding European integration is becoming increasingly important for the future of the European project. While traditionally European Union (EU) scholars deemed public opinion of minor importance for the process of European integration, public support and scepticism is now seen as crucial for the survival of the European project. One important reason for this change in perspective is the increasing politicization of the EU in domestic politics. In recent years, a burgeoning literature on public contestation concerning European integration has developed. Students of public opinion in the EU have primarily focused their attention on the explanations of fluctuations in support and scepticism. This work stresses both interest- and identity-based explanations showing that support for European integration increases with skill levels and more inclusive identities. Less attention has been given to the conceptualization of the precise nature of public opinion and its role in EU politics. When it comes to the politicization of European integration and its effects on public opinion, many scholarly contributions have aimed to explore the conditions under which EU attitudes affect voting behavior in elections and referendums. Yet, the way in which public opinion affects policy making and responsiveness at the EU level has received much less scholarly attention. This suggests that more work needs to be undertaken to understand the conditions under which public contestation of the EU constrains the room to maneuver of domestic and European elites at the EU level, and the extent to which it poses a challenge to, or opportunity for, further integrative steps in Europe. Only by gaining a better understanding about the ways public opinion limits the actions of domestic and European elites or not at the EU level, will scholars be able to make predictions about how public opinion might affect the future of the European project.

Protection of constitutional identity in light of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Poland – a comparative study

With the rise of the democratic state came a strong emphasis on "the public" or "public opinion" in the study of politics. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a number of important works examined the contours of public opinion within a democracy. The study of public opinion since this early period has only intensified. However, recent work on public opinion is problematic: the theoretical and normative concerns and the political / sociological focus of the early works on public opinion are largely missing. Most modern studies of public opinion are psychologically driven and often truncated from broad concerns of American politics and democratic theory. In this article, I explicate the history of public opinion research, paying particular attention to the "early" works and how their concerns and emphases have been neglected by many "later" studies of public opinion. Through this history I aim to highlight the differences between the early and later phases and to suggest that much was lost in neglecting the concerns of the early writers on public opinion. While some contemporary researchers are, in fact, harking back to the early work, I conclude that a more thorough re-acquaintance with the classics of public opinion is necessary.

The Court of Justice of the European Union faces a wide variety of human rights decisions. In common with national courts, it has to ensure that the actions of the European Union administration and legislature comply with human rights. These human rights are found in the general principles of Community law, including, inter alia, those of the European Convention of Human Rights, in addition to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. When doing so, the CJEU may find that it is judging not only the actions of the institutions of the European Union, but also actions of the administration and legislature of the Member States as they implement provisions of EU law, or act as agents of the EU administering EU law. In addition, the CJEU will adjudicate on actions of the Member States when they are acting within the sphere of European Union law. This can occur when Member States derogate from other provisions of EU law on the grounds of protecting human rights, or where Member States fail to implement European Union law provisions that either directly or indirectly protect human rights. This diverse nature of the human rights jurisdiction of the CJEU poses unique problems for human rights adjudication in the EU. The Court is at one and the same time protecting human rights from abuse by its own measures and policing the activities of its Member States. Moreover, the lines between these roles are blurred. For the CJEU to provide a human-rights compatible interpretation of the provisions of a Directive, for example, not only restricts the actions of the EU legislature, but also limits the actions of Member States. In addition, when the CJEU takes on the role of policing the actions of Member States, it does so within the context of the ECHR, given that all Member States, and potentially soon the EU itself, are signatories to the ECHR and the provisions of the ECHR are sources of general principles of Community law as well as being mirrored in the first Chapter of the Charter. Yet for the CJEU to perform the same function as the European Court of Human Rights would lead to replication of roles, as well as cause problems for the CJEU’s assertion of the supremacy of directly effective EU law over national law which would appear to run contrary to the margin of appreciation granted by the ECtHR to its signatory States. This chapter aims to provide the groundwork for developing a theory of human rights adjudication for the CJEU, looking specifically at the complexities that arise when deciding cases that require control over actions of Member States. It builds on consensus found in the literature calling for the need for the CJEU to be sensitive to competing requirements of consensus and divergence in the protection of human rights, drawing on the constitutional pluralism underpinning the EU. It will first explain the need for both uniformity and diversity in human rights protections in the EU. It will then explain how these needs can best be met through a dialogue theory of human rights adjudication, with Article 267 facilitating the provision of varying degrees of authority to determine rights-issues to either the CJEU or the national courts. The final section discusses the factors that should influence whether a rights-issue is more suited for resolution by the CJEU or national authorities, building on Weiler’s theory and explaining its precise application through a series of examples drawn from recent case law.

In studies of the Australian press, a wide range of American influences—on news genres, on notions of newsworthiness and presentation, and on the language in which stories are written—has been larg...

Essays on the political economy of European integration

This paper analyses German foreign and security policy under the Merkel government, especially Germany's role and involvement in European security architectures. By comparing NATO out-of-area deployment of Bundeswehr, German forces, in EU and NATO operations, the study discusses challenges and dilemmas that Germany has faced in cooperating with these organizations. As Europe's own security policies such as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and then European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have developed, Germany has been actively involved in operations in the framework of these policies. Germany has also participated in emerging EU operations; the Merkel government eventually led Operation EUFOR RD Congo in 2006. As European operations have evolved in the areas of peacekeeping and crisis management so far, Germany has not encountered dilemmas in dispatching armed forces overseas. It rather welcomed EU operations that have civilian character as German Basic Law sets a certain conditions in deploying its forces overseas. Because of this limitation, Germany is referred as ‘civilian power’ that has strategic culture of ‘anti-militarism’. Thus, Germany will actively support further evolution of the European security architecture with such a civilian character. On the contrary, Germany under the Merkel government has encountered dilemmas in dispatching forces to NATO operations. In particular, German behaviours in International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan have increasingly attracted criticism from other NATO member states after a failure in Operation Medusa in 2006. Since then, Germany has been under pressure of sending units to the southern area of Afghanistan that is considered to be more dangerous and of engaging in combat operations. So far, German government has expanded its military commitments in Afghanistan in a series of small steps. For example, Berlin has decided to dispatch Tornado jets to the south. Pressure for increasing presence of the German forces in the south has not halt, although Germany has avoided combat operations because of the Basic Law. While increased presence would highlight continued German engagement and thus mitigate criticism from NATO allies, it would prove unpopular among Germans who have registered significant public opposition to the Afghan campaign. Germany under the Merkel government confronts with the dilemmas between maintaining solidarity and credibility with the allies and managing domestic public opinion.

As dinâmicas raciais no Brasil estão mudando. Antes considerado um país em que o danoso legado do comércio de escravos não era admitido, hoje esse gigante da América Latina começou a reconhecer oficialmente a discriminação étnico-racial, tanto como fenômeno histórico, quanto como questão contemporânea. Parte desse processo envolve um afastamento da celebração da ambiguidade racial e a adoção de status raciais bem delimitados: o termo relativo à miscigenação “moreno” cede lugar, em muitas esferas, ao termo afirmativo “negro”, que passa a ocupar lugar central. Mais significativo ainda é o fato de atores estatais terem implementado cotas raciais no país inteiro, cuja importância maior se dê, talvez, na educação superior. O motor por trás dessas dinâmicas em transformação parece ser a conjunção de atores estatais e dos movimentos negros para estabelecer uma estratégia de mudança legal. É importante observar que pesquisas de opinião pública sugerem que a maioria dos brasileiros apoiam os elementos centrais das novas políticas raciais do Estado. Na segunda metade do século XX, os trabalhos acadêmicos associavam o Brasil a uma falta de consciência racial; já nas primeiras décadas do século XXI essa associação é indefensável.

Plessy versus Lochner: The Berea College Case DAVID E. BERNSTEIN1 Legal scholars and historians have often claimed to find intellectual affinities between the U.S. Supreme Court’s notorious opinions in Plessy v. Ferguson2 and Lochner v. New York.2 In Plessy, the Court upheld a law requiring private railroads to enforce segregation, while in Lochner the Court invalidated a maximum hours law for bakers. Bruce Ackerman asserts that Plessy had its intellectual roots “in the laissez-faire theories expressed one decade later in cases like Lochner.In support of his thesis, Ackerman relies on the Plessy Court’s statement that if the two races are to mingle, it must be “the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.”5 Brook Thomas also blames the Plessy ruling on laissez-faire ideology. He argues that lais­ sez-faire theory led the Court to seek to encourage the “natural” forces of segregation.6 Owen Fiss, meanwhile, contends that the Supreme Court upheld the segregation statute at issue in Plessy because it “codified and strengthened existing social practices.” The Court objected to the statute at issue in Loch­ ner, meanwhile, because that law “tried to re­ verse social practices that were driven by mar­ ket competition.”7 Cass Sunstein makes the similar argument that Lochner and Plessy are consistent in that both “relied on a conception of neutrality taking existing distributions as the starting point for analysis.”8 Derrick Bell finds that the decisions are congruous because they both “protected existing property and political arrangements, while ignoring the dis­ advantages to the powerless caught in those relationships: the exploited whites (in Loch­ ner) and the segregated blacks (in Plessy).”9 Recently, several commentators have per­ suasively challenged the purported affinities between Plessy and Lochner. Michael Klarman , for example, asserts that “[t]he outcome in Plessy is mainly attributable to the virulent racism ofthe Gilded Age, not to the era’s skep­ ticism of activist government.”10 Richard Epstein, meanwhile, makes the bolder revi­ 94 JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY sionist argument that the holdings and reason­ ing ofPlessy and Lochner are at odds. Accord­ ing to Epstein, “[t]he statute sustained in Plessy was flatly inconsistent with lais­ sez-faire principles.... By no stretch do Plessy and Lochner represent different applications of a common jurisprudence. Plessy repre­ sented the expansionist view of the police power that Lochner repudiated.”11 Mark Tushnet also argues that Plessy and Lochner were jurisprudentially at odds, because Plessy was a statist opinion while Lochner reflected a far more libertarian viewpoint.12 Finally, I have argued that Lochner repre­ sented a triumph of “traditional” jurispru­ dence. This jurisprudence required courts to enforce the limitations on government power enshrined by the Constitution’s Framers and ratifiers, regardless of public opinion, short­ lived enthusiasms, and social science evi­ dence.13 By contrast, Plessy relied at least in part on racist social science, public opinion fa­ voring segregation, and a negation ofthe Four­ teenth Amendment’s clear distinction between state and private action. Consistent with Ep­ stein and Tushnet’s observations, I also note that Plessy reflected a view that the results of unregulated market processes are somehow unnatural and should therefore be corrected by state action, a view not reflected in Lochner.14 Just three years after it decided Lochner, the Supreme Court confronted the conflict be­ tween libertarian and traditionalist Lochnerism and statist and sociological Plessyism in Berea College v. Kentucky.15 Berea College involved a private, integrated college’s consti­ tutional challenge to a Kentucky law requiring segregation in private schools. If Lochner and Plessy were intellectually entwined, one would expect that the state would have relied on both opinions to support the constitutional­ ity of the segregation law, while the college would try to assert that neither opinion ap­ plied. Instead, Berea College challenged the law on constitutional grounds, relying on Lochner and allied doctrines in arguing that the law violated the rights of liberty and prop­ erty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend­ ment. Kentucky, meanwhile, relied on Plessy and the purported public interest in preventing miscegenation—supported by contemporary social science evidence—in defending the law...

In the course of the last decade, the IBSA states (India, Brazil, South Africa) have increased their weight in the shifting global order, particularly in economic affairs. Can the same be said about the IBSA states’ position in the international security hierarchy? After locating the IBSA coalition in the shifting world order, we analyze its member states’ willingness and capacity to coordinate their security policies and build a common global security agenda. In addition, we explore the state of and perspectives on bi‐ and trilateral collaboration initiatives on defense and armaments between India, Brazil and South Africa. A key reason for the mostly modest results of global security agenda coordination and cross‐regional defense collaboration is that the prevailing security concerns of each country are located at the regional level. Therefore, the starting point of an assessment of the prospects of IBSA’s security cooperation and its potential impact on the strategic global landscape has to be a comparative evaluation of the regional security environments, focusing on overlaps and potential synergies between the national security policies of the three state actors.

The rise and influence of public opinion on Chinese foreign policy reveals a remarkable evolution in authoritarian responses to social turmoil. This book shows how Chinese leaders have responded to popular demands for political participation with a sophisticated strategy of tolerance, responsiveness, persuasion, and repression—a successful approach that helps explain how and why the Communist Party continues to rule China. Through a detailed examination of China's relations with Japan from 1980 to 2010, the book reveals the populist origins of a wave of anti-Japanese public mobilization that swept across China in the early 2000s. Popular protests, sensationalist media content, and emotional public opinion combined to impede diplomatic negotiations, interrupt economic cooperation, spur belligerent rhetoric, and reshape public debates. Facing a mounting domestic and diplomatic crisis, Chinese leaders responded with a remarkable reversal, curtailing protests and cooling public anger toward Japan. Far from being a fragile state overwhelmed by popular nationalism, market forces, or information technology, China has emerged as a robust and flexible regime that has adapted to its new environment with remarkable speed and effectiveness. The book's study of public opinion's influence on foreign policy extends beyond democratic states. It reveals how persuasion and responsiveness sustain Communist Party rule in China and develops a method for examining similar dynamics in different authoritarian regimes. It draws upon public opinion surveys, interviews with Chinese activists, quantitative media analysis, and internal government documents to support its findings, joining theories in international relations, social movements, and public opinion.