War economy vs European Silicon Valley? The EU's competing sociotechnical imaginaries of defence innovation and industry

The Ukraine war, the aftermath of COVID-19, Brexit and shifting US geostrategic interests are putting pressure on the European defence situation, strategy and budgets. The current crises expose warfare capability gaps in the European armed forces and capacity constraints of the European defence industry after decades of the peace dividend. More nations are calling for stronger engagement of the EU in the defence sector to overcome these challenges and complete the European defence sector integration that started in the late 1990s. It is estimated that more cooperation in defence procurement and research could save up to 30% of the current €290 bn total EU27 defence budgets. Can this combination of recent factors provide new impulses towards a unified European defence market, more cooperation on defence procurement and industry consolidation? We conducted a literature review (‘meta-synthesis’) of 172 journal articles, studies and think-tank papers since 1995 to build a holistic picture. The analysis aims to describe the progress and challenges of European defence market integration from an economic viewpoint. It provides future researchers with a basic understanding of defence industrial challenges, motivations and economic drivers of European defence integration as well as of reasons for resistance and potential scenarios.

Resilience is a dimension with a pronounced multidisciplinary character covering a wide range of areas of society, which gives it a fluid profile and difficult to fit into a conceptual-functional typology. The interest in resilience is undoubtedly one of the trends of the current decade, however precursory elements are found throughout history in the most diverse forms of manifestation. As in the case of other dimensions explored in recent years from the perspective of European cooperation in the field of security and defence, resilience was quickly integrated into the steps carried out under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), becoming one of the key objectives of the European Union’s external action toolkit and, last but not least, of the operational commitments carried out globally by this organization. The contribution of the EU Global Security Strategy (EUGS) in designing resilience as a central element of the European security and defence cooperation agenda was defining. The main direction promoted by the EUGS was to strengthen resilience aspects in external action, while taking a structured approach to exploring options for strengthening internal resilience. Subsequently, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s aggression additionally valued the strategic significance of states’ resilience and, subsequently, the importance of the EU’s contribution in this direction. This study is aiming to bring into light the way in which CSDP answers to the challenge of consolidating the resilience. In this vein, the methodological approach that was implemented responded the multidisciplinary character of this topic. In order to consolidate the comprehensive character of the present study, a historical perspective has been used that correlates the evolution of resilience in EU context with the development of various CSDP instruments. In this sense, an important direction of research is represented by the interaction between resilience and EU’s external action and how the EU response to crisis situations has evolved. To a similar extent, this paper approached the resilience from the perspective of internal security of European Union, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine. A special note is made on how the latest EU strategic document (Strategic Compass) placed resilience as being one of the strategic objectives of CSDP. Given all of these aspects, the main conclusions of the article are emphasising the importance of adequate calibration of national approach in generating resilience, not only in the conceptual area but also on the practical aspects such as capabilities and resources required by a strong resilience. At the same time, a special attention is given to how the partnership and external interaction, especially between EU and NATO, are tailored to enhance and complement the national contributions in the field of resilience.

This article addresses the research problem of analysing the development of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. It examines the extent to which Russia’s military actions against Ukraine, particularly those starting in 2022, have influenced EU and Member State decisions regarding the CSDP. To provide a more comprehensive analysis, this study also explores the evolution of the CSDP, focusing on its foundations and conditions both prior to the full-scale conflict and following Russia’s 2014 aggression in Crimea and Donbas. This broader perspective enables a thorough assessment of the scale and scope of CSDP reforms over time. The objective of this article is to examine the dependencies and impacts of the war in Ukraine on the development and evolution of the CSDP.

Progress made in European defence-industrial integration has been subjected to the hardest test with the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has had profound implications for European defence industries across the board and spurred on massive investment into the sector. Based on extensive analysis of procurements, adopted policies, and shifts in discourse, we argue that the practical steps undertaken by Central and Eastern European (CEE) defence industries in the wake of the conflict are disintegrational. This is contrary to many discernible indicators which align with European integrational initiatives in defence. Moreover, the paper argues that the pattern of decisions taken by Central and Eastern European countries reinforces structural barriers to potential future European defence-industrial integration. The findings are significant to EU-wide, regional, and bilateral defence-industrial co-operation as well as national defence industrial strategies in reaction to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

The paper debates the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It argues that the invasion has changed dramatically Europe’s security landscape, carrying major implications for both organizations and their relationship. After its withdrawal from Afghanistan and deepening frictions between the US and its European allies about burden-sharing, the war instilled a new sense of purpose into NATO, placing renewed emphasis on its core functions of territorial defense and deterrence. However, the war was also a reality check for the EU, raising important questions about the future of the European security architecture, the Union’s role within it, and its relationship with NATO (hereafter also referred to as the Alliance). The aim of this article is to try to answer some of these questions, by providing an initial assessment of the impact of the war on the relationship between NATO and the CSDP, and to sketch out potential avenues for strengthening the EU’s role in transatlantic security. More specifically, the paper will try to answer the following questions: what are the implications of the conflict on the Alliance? How did the war impact on the CSDP and the Union’s aspiration to strategic autonomy? Where is EU-NATO cooperation heading as a result of the war? Will the conflict ramp up cooperation between the two organizations or will European defence efforts be channelled mostly through NATO? Will EU leaders grab the momentum created by the war to further institutional integration also in security and defence and or will the war turn into another missed opportunity to promote a more effective burden-sharing in transatlantic security?

The war in Ukraine has triggered a profound transformation in European defense policies, compelling European Union member states to reassess their defense industrial strategies. In this context, Spain faces a critical challenge: balancing strategic national autonomy with international defense cooperation. This article examines how the Ukraine conflict has influenced this balance in Spain's defense industrial policy, assessing whether the country has prioritized strengthening its national defense industry while deepening its integration into European and transatlantic defense frameworks. Through a systematic analysis of government policies, defense budgets, procurement strategies, and multinational defense initiatives, this study identifies key trends in Spain's evolving defense industrial approach. While Spain has significantly increased national defense spending and reinforced industrial capabilities, its deep engagement in European cooperation initiatives suggests a concurrent push for enhanced international collaboration. The findings indicate that Spain has not fully committed to either strategic national autonomy or cooperation but has pursued a hybrid approach, leveraging European mechanisms while maintaining key national industrial capabilities. By exploring the tensions and synergies between these two strategic orientations, this article contributes to the broader debate on the future of European defense integration and the role of national industries in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape.

The European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a component of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It was established in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which included a provision for the gradual introduction of a common defence policy that could eventually lead to a common defence framework. The CFSP emerged from the need to enhance the EU's political identity on the international arena and assert Europe's independence in the post-Cold War era. Simultaneously, it remains one of the few areas of competence that exclusively belongs to Member States, where proposals to deepen integration processes have met with lukewarm responses. However, the Russo-Ukrainian war has prompted the European forum to strengthen cooperation between Member States, particularly in the defence industry sector. The CSDP is regulated only by the Treaty on EU (TEU), while other EU policies are governed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). The architects of the Lisbon reform aimed to underscore the distinctiveness of the CSDP from other EU policies, as demonstrated by its legal instruments, decision-making mechanisms, and the nature of EU competences. Cooperation under the CSDP does not fit neatly within the traditional treaty rules governing the division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Fundamental competences in the field of security policy are reserved for Member States, which result from both the TEU and the unambiguous content of Declaration No. 13 on the CFSP. The CSDP’s intergovernmental nature CSDP determines its institutional implementation. It is defined and implemented by intergovernmental EU institutions, particularly the European Council and the Council. The High Representative supported by the European External Action Service and Member States play a key role in its implementation, drawing on both EU and national funds. The competences of the EU's supranational institutions, particularly the Court of Justice of European Union, are strictly limited in this area. The relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the EU was institutionalised in the early 21st century, building on initiatives from the 1990s aimed at promoting greater European responsibility in defence matters.

The purpose of the study is to analyze the development of the European common security and defense policy during the Obama and Trump administrations by determining the specifics of its formation, trends and causes. It is observed the preconditions and principles for the formation of European CSDP; tendencies of its evolution in the post-bipolar era are considered; the EU CSDP is explored as a part of transatlantic system in the times of Obama administration; the trends and changes in the CSDP are examined in correlation with NATO policy under the Trump administration. The research emphasizes a significance of the European defense policy, which has been creating in two following ways: as a united force within NATO and as a unique initiative in parallel to the transatlantic cooperation (mostly, after the destruction of the bipolar system). However, the Euro-Atlantic defense ties never crashes, despite the periodic abatements. The article notes that Europe has substantially strengthened its positions at the end of the era of bipolarity, demonstrating its intention to create the own security system. It was found that in 2010–2016 there was a tendency weakening of American influence on the European community defense integration. According to Western European researchers, the EU defence initiatives became a matter of concern to both American presidents. However, during the Obama period, European governments failed in realizing their intentions (despite the desire to create their own army) due to the lack of mutual understanding on the issue and unwillingness to bear the additional costs of implementing the CSDP. However, such an opportunity has arisen during Trump’s presidency. It is stated that the foundation of a new stage of European defence integration was laid in 2016. Since 2017, European countries have taken new steps by creating the European Defense Fund (EDF) and starting the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). In addition, the article notes that in 2017–2018 there was an increase in the participation of national contingents in NATO. Moreover, the EU considers its defense system as «autonomous», but not absolutely independent of existing and effective structures. It is concluded that transatlantic relations matter and the further cooperation between European governments and the United States could be enhanced.

Since the end of the Cold War, the defence industry has emerged as a leader in innovative technologies, and the Russo-Ukrainian war has provided a unique opportunity to test these technologies in a real combat scenario. As a result of the geopolitical events of February 2022, the European defence industry has faced unprecedented political, economic, and technological changes. This study examines these transformations through semi-structured, open-ended, in-depth interviews with twenty-five experts across ten European countries, analysed using qualitative content analysis, with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). While perspectives on the necessity of defence innovations vary, there is considerable market demand for both disruptive innovations and the advancement of conventional technologies. However, despite the theoretical benefits, the current uncertain environment leads policymakers to view international defence collaborations as insecure. Consequently, SMEs develop military technological innovations either independently or with domestic partners. This study's novelty lies in its foundation on real empirical data, contributing practically applicable insights to the existing literature on the subject.

This special issue analyses and reflects on socio-technical futures as core elements in innovation processes and their governance. The special issue assembles twelve contributions that draw on several lines of research mobilizing concepts developed in science and technology studies, such as socio-technical imaginaries and the sociology of expectations, and technology assessment. The papers examine how socio-technical futures are constituted, change and unfold over time, shaped by different practices and in different contexts. Furthermore, they study how different socio-technical futures circulate amongst policy actors and others involved in the governance of innovations, how they shape the governance of innovations and the actual technologies and systems, and how forms of deliberative and reflective future-making can be integrated into policy and innovation processes.

In the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has a central role in the renewed impetus towards a European defence pillar triggered by the changes in the European geopolitical landscape. The EDTIB is a crucial pillar since it is required to produce and supply the weapons systems needed to augment EU states' military capabilities. Recognising its strategic importance, the Commission published the first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy that seeks to increase intra-EU defence industrial cooperation and promote collaborative defence equipment development and procurement. The paper sets out to examine the degree of connectedness among major European defence industries applying a quantile connectedness approach to examine the degree and direction of connectedness among 15 major European defence companies. The estimations span the period from January 2018 to February 2024, which allows for a total of 1453 daily stock price observations per company. Results reported herein suggest the presence of a strong total connectedness among these major European defence industries. The findings reveal three broad groupings with respect to net total directional connectedness: a net-transmitting group, a net-receiving group of defence industries and finally a group that exhibits mixed connectedness.

From today's viewpoint, 2016 may well represent the end of the post‐Cold War era and the general assumptions that are associated with it. These include the beliefs that the United States remains a European power, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of its European NATO allies, that liberal democracy represents the political system widely seen as the only legitimate normative reference point, and that the future of the European Union will be defined by continued integration into an ‘ever closer Union’. These assumptions have been shaken to the core.

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The scientific article identifies the prospects for the development of the defense sector of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the context of Russian aggression. In particular, it is noted that the war in Ukraine has become a catalyst for the search by European countries that have struggled with balancing military power and the social security system. It is emphasized that the policy of upholding common security interests, intensive interaction of allied countries, strengthen the positions of all parties, strengthen the basis for bilateral and multilateral relations, and increase the arsenal of means for responding to common threats. The need to strengthen the European defense budget in general and individual countries of the European continent, the development of their military-industrial capabilities is indicated, and the prospects for deepening internal cooperation in the defense industry, the creation of a European army, subregional alliances of countries, the development of new formats of interaction with NATO and the European Union, and the establishment of partnership relations with the United States and allied countries are identified. The arguments are presented that the construction of joint defense enterprises for the production of ammunition with the help of partner countries, the expansion of their own production of new technical equipment, the involvement of NATO member states in exercises within the framework of the Northern European military alliance, the deployment of new forces of the North Atlantic Alliance in the region in order to prevent the occupation of countries or their parts will contribute to increasing the defense capability of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in modern conditions. The conclusion is made that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe should resist today's changes in the security paradigm through more effective coordination of defense spending, increasing the role of the European Defense Agency and increasing financing of the defense industry.

The European Union's (EU) defence industrial base has undergone an unprecedented wave of integration. The war in Ukraine and Donald Trump's re-election have exposed the EU's long-standing structural weaknesses in meeting military needs, creating a window of opportunity for an EU-centralized defence industry. The European Commission has leveraged this moment to enhance competitiveness and promote joint procurement, laying the foundations for a genuinely EU-wide internal defence market. These initiatives aim both to address Ukraine's urgent military requirements and to bolster Europe's capacity to act independently amid transatlantic uncertainty. Yet supranational momentum clashes with entrenched Member State reluctance to cede sovereignty, constraining the Commission's integrative efforts. This article critically examines the integration of the EU defence industrial base into the European Union’s legal order, highlighting limitations at both constitutional and market levels and the enduring tension between EU strategic autonomy and NATO's US-driven transatlantic defence agenda.