Wages of Extraction: Industry and Political Narratives of Fossil Fuel Production in Canada

We kick off Issue 20-2 with a forum by Kate Neville on the complications of diverting fossil fuel finance. Over the last decade, climate activists have pushed for institutions to shift their investments away from the fossil fuel sector. At a time when international action on climate change has come to a halt, owing not only to the lack of US engagement but also to the COVID-19 pandemic, Neville provides an important account of the role of markets and the private sector in shaping environmental outcomes. She especially highlights their intersection with advocacy for divestments from fossil fuels. In doing so, Neville cautions proponents of fossil fuel divestment also to take into account the unintended social and environmental consequences that can result from reinvestment in other sectors, including in renewable energy technologies.The COVID-19 pandemic is providing an opportunity, albeit from terrible circumstances, for the GEP community to reflect on the state of the global environment and broader issues of sustainability. While the articles in this issue were researched and written before the pandemic hit, the themes and insights that they explore—new ways to measure sustainability, the limits and opportunities of global institutions and cooperation around climate change and carbon pricing—are perhaps even more important as the world looks to recover from the pandemic and plan for recovery in a hopefully more sustainable fashion.The first research article in this issue, by Doris Fuchs, Bernd Schlipphak, Oliver Treib, Le Anh Nguyen Long, and Markus Lederer, tackles ways to measure quality of life through a critical analysis of sustainability and wellbeing indicator sets. Starting with the premise that there is much disagreement about whether it is even possible to quantify a universal quality of life indicator, Fuchs and coauthors examine whether it matters if wellbeing is measured solely in economic terms or whether a broader measurement tool is needed that takes into account social, environmental, and political criteria. The authors offer a new approach that incorporates sustainability dimensions into a quality-of-life measurement. As they underscore, their findings should encourage us to reflect on understandings of well-being, sustainability, and quality of life as we engage in the study and practice of global environmental politics.Two articles in this issue take a critical look at demands for major institutional reforms and strong global governance in response to planetary boundaries and crises. Michael Albert’s critical examination of earth system governance (ESG) argues that while many ESG advocates pay insufficient attention to the capitalist roots of planetary crises, critics fail to consider what a post-capitalist form of ESG might entail. He proposes an Ecological Marxist perspective to bridge this gap, which pays attention to both political-economy structural constraints on Earth system stability and strategies for democratization.The next article examines the specific need for earth system governance of planetary geoengineering to address the climate crisis. Here, Ina Möller explores the existing tension between scientific problem definitions and institutional fit when it comes to geoengineering technologies. With a focus on both carbon dioxide removal technologies and solar radiation management technologies, Möller illuminates the multiplicity of challenges faced by policymakers in creating appropriate governance mechanisms.The question of whether the Paris Agreement can succeed where past multilateral agreements have failed motivates a good deal of global climate politics research. Håkon Sælen provides a fascinating take on this question. He develops an agent-based simulation model to explore the conditions under which reciprocity dynamics among the parties are likely to develop into a ratcheting up of ambition sufficient to fulfill the Paris goals. The results of the simulation model suggest that ratcheting up is possible but only under a set of fairly restrictive conditions, pointing to the important role that extra-Paris dynamics will have to play in achieving global climate goals.The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat is often assumed to play a key role in the ratcheting up of member states’ ambitions that Sælen is modeling. However, the ways in which it can play this role have not been definitively explored. Barbara Saerbeck, Mareike Well, Helge Jörgens, Alexandra Goritz, and Nina Kolleck look to fill this lacuna, undertaking a social network analysis of the secretariat’s interactions with major stakeholders in climate governance. This analysis of the secretariat’s relationships along with interviews with stakeholders suggests it is becoming more proactive in its attempts to influence the direction of climate governance toward more ambition.Anchoring the issue is Sebastian Levi, Christian Flachsland, and Michael Jakob’s study of the social, economic, and political conditions that account for the wide variation in implementation of carbon pricing across states and sub-national jurisdictions. Their results suggest that along with political economy analyses, policy makers should pay more attention to public attitudes and regulatory capacities, which they find are the most important factors in explaining higher carbon prices.

Despite the decades of international climate negotiations and several landmark agreements, global efforts to date to restrict fossil fuel production in line with climate targets have been unsuccessful. As national and international policies continue to fall short of phasing out fossil fuels, increasing attention has been paid to non-state actors, like pension funds, as a potential source of more ambitious climate action. As major asset owners, large shareholders in fossil fuel companies, and historically activist investors, pension funds are theoretically well-placed to contribute to phasing out fossil fuels. Despite growing recognition of this potential role for pension funds and other major investors in climate change mitigation, there has been little attention to pension funds’ historical record on climate change, or to how their climate strategies have developed and changed over time. This paper examines how the climate strategies of the largest US and European pension funds have evolved in relation to key developments in international climate agreements and the extent to which these strategies contribute to restricting fossil fuel supply. Through an analysis of the annual, governance, and sustainability reports of 6 pension funds from 1997 to 2022, we examine the strategies pension funds have adopted to address both climate change and fossil fuels. Pension funds have demonstrated responsiveness to the signals of international climate agreements, adopting a range of strategies with respect to climate change (amongst others, integrating ESG principles, increasing their sustainable investments, and setting net zero goals). Their explicit attention to fossil fuels and contribution to supply-side interventions take the form of systematic shareholder engagement, (selective) divestment, and lobbying policymakers. While pension fund climate action is growing , the ambition of their strategies is not aligned with a rapid fossil fuel phaseout; their efforts are often focussed on improving disclosure and transparency and demonstrate complacency with minimal improvements from fossil fuel companies. If pension funds are to significantly contribute to phasing out fossil fuels, redefining pension fund responsibilities and the traditional shareholder role will likely be required.

Legislative responses to climate change vary significantly between countries, often reflecting a combination of political, economic, and social factors. A comparative analysis of Nigeria and the USA reveals distinct approaches shaped by their unique contexts, though both face similar challenges in addressing this global crisis. In Nigeria, a developing nation with a growing population and economy heavily dependent on fossil fuels, legislative efforts to combat climate change have been relatively nascent. The country faces a multitude of environmental challenges, including deforestation, desertification, and pollution, exacerbated by inadequate infrastructure and weak enforcement mechanisms. However, recent years have seen some progress, with the Nigerian government acknowledging the need for action through initiatives like the National Climate Change Policy and Response Strategy. Legislative measures such as the Climate Change Bill aim to institutionalize climate action, although implementation remains a challenge due to limited resources and competing priorities. Conversely, the USA, as one of the world's largest emitters of greenhouse gases, has a long history of climate policy debate and action. While federal efforts have fluctuated depending on the political landscape, individual states have taken significant strides in implementing climate legislation. States like California have enacted ambitious measures to reduce emissions, promote renewable energy, and enhance resilience to climate impacts. At the federal level, policies such as the Clean Air Act and the Paris Agreement (from which the USA had withdrawn but later rejoined) demonstrate a commitment to addressing climate change, although partisan divisions often hinder progress on comprehensive legislation. A key difference between the two countries lies in their levels of development and capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate change. While the USA possesses greater financial and technological resources, Nigeria grapples with structural challenges that impede effective climate action. Additionally, socio-economic disparities within each country influence the distribution of environmental risks and benefits, highlighting the importance of equity in climate policy. While Nigeria and the USA approach legislative responses to climate change from different perspectives, both face common obstacles in transitioning to a sustainable future. Effective climate policy requires not only legislative action but also international cooperation, technological innovation, and socio-economic transformation to mitigate the impacts of climate change and build resilience for future generations.

Legislative responses to climate change vary significantly between countries, often reflecting a combination of political, economic, and social factors. A comparative analysis of Nigeria and the USA reveals distinct approaches shaped by their unique contexts, though both face similar challenges in addressing this global crisis. In Nigeria, a developing nation with a growing population and economy heavily dependent on fossil fuels, legislative efforts to combat climate change have been relatively nascent. The country faces a multitude of environmental challenges, including deforestation, desertification, and pollution, exacerbated by inadequate infrastructure and weak enforcement mechanisms. However, recent years have seen some progress, with the Nigerian government acknowledging the need for action through initiatives like the National Climate Change Policy and Response Strategy. Legislative measures such as the Climate Change Bill aim to institutionalize climate action, although implementation remains a challenge due to limited resources and competing priorities. Conversely, the USA, as one of the world's largest emitters of greenhouse gases, has a long history of climate policy debate and action. While federal efforts have fluctuated depending on the political landscape, individual states have taken significant strides in implementing climate legislation. States like California have enacted ambitious measures to reduce emissions, promote renewable energy, and enhance resilience to climate impacts. At the federal level, policies such as the Clean Air Act and the Paris Agreement (from which the USA had withdrawn but later rejoined) demonstrate a commitment to addressing climate change, although partisan divisions often hinder progress on comprehensive legislation. A key difference between the two countries lies in their levels of development and capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate change. While the USA possesses greater financial and technological resources, Nigeria grapples with structural challenges that impede effective climate action. Additionally, socio-economic disparities within each country influence the distribution of environmental risks and benefits, highlighting the importance of equity in climate policy. While Nigeria and the USA approach legislative responses to climate change from different perspectives, both face common obstacles in transitioning to a sustainable future. Effective climate policy requires not only legislative action but also international cooperation, technological innovation, and socio-economic transformation to mitigate the impacts of climate change and build resilience for future generations.

Despite widespread calls to action from the scientific community and beyond, a concerning climate action gap exists. This paper aims to enhance our understanding of the role of connectedness to nature in promoting individual-level climate action in a unique setting where climate research and action are lacking: Canada’s Provincial North. To begin to understand possible pathways, we also examined whether climate worry and talking about climate change with family and friends mediate the relationship between connectedness to nature and climate action. We used data collected via postal surveys in two Provincial North communities, Thunder Bay (Ontario), and Prince George (British Columbia) (n = 628). Results show that connectedness to nature has a direct positive association with individual-level climate action, controlling for gender and education. Results of parallel mediation analyses further show that connectedness to nature is indirectly associated with individual-level climate action, mediated by both climate worry and talking about climate change with family and friends. Finally, results suggest that climate worry and talking about climate change with family and friends serially mediate the relationship between connectedness to nature and with individual-level climate action. These findings are relevant for climate change engagement and action, especially across Canada’s Provincial North, but also in similar settings characterized by marginalization, heightened vulnerability to climate change, urban islands within vast rural and remote landscapes, and economies and social identities tied to resource extraction. Drawing on these findings, we argue that cultivating stronger connections with nature in the places where people live, learn, work, and play is an important and currently underutilized leverage point for promoting individual-level climate action. This study therefore adds to the current and increasingly relevant calls for (re-)connecting with nature that have been made by others across a range of disciplinary and sectoral divides.

Limiting global warming to 1.5 °C requires drastically reducing fossil fuel production and use. Institutional investors who invest in fossil fuels can potentially influence the energy transition. However, few papers investigate how investors can leverage their collective resources to accelerate a transition away from fossil fuels. Hence, this paper asks: How do investor initiatives inform or shape efforts of institutional investors to align with the Paris Agreement and what are the implications of these for a goal of leaving fossil fuels underground? We identify 41 investor initiatives through a document analysis and use a sectoral governance perspective to analyse initiative strategies and policies. We then examine in depth one of the largest initiatives, Climate Action 100+, supported by analysis of 55 newspaper articles. Findings indicate that while initiatives are active in providing resources to investors to assist with aligning their investments with the Paris Agreement, coordinating investor engagement, and have been successful in uniting a critical mass of investors behind climate goals ($500 billion - $106 trillion), there exist many gaps in their capacity to achieve ambitious action on climate from companies or their investor members. A lack of internal accountability, minimal transparency into their goals and timelines, and limited ambition threaten to undermine the potential for investor initiatives to be agents of climate action. Furthermore, loopholes in the net zero policies promoted by initiatives risk diluting their effectiveness in limiting fossil fuel extraction.

Climate change is a crisis in our midst. This scoping review examines practices to transition away from fossil fuels in the social work literature, to inform social work engagement in climate mitigation and in support of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) and 13 (Climate Action). We searched peer-reviewed and grey literature, applying the inclusion criteria: (1) published on or since 1 January 2005; (2) social work literature; (3) examines at least one topic related to the transition away from fossil fuels; and (4) describes, examines, or evaluates a specific form of practice for the transition away from fossil fuels that occurred or is occurring. Fifty-eight items met the inclusion criteria, containing 79 practices. The most frequent practice types were “organizing or advocacy” and “energy at home”. Common targets of change were individuals/households and private industry. The most organizing against private industry was led by Indigenous or Tribal nations. More social work engagement in the transition away from fossil fuels is needed, including engagement that embraces an ecosocial approach. Local organizing, advocacy, and program development are an area of strength and an intervention scale at which social workers can influence multi-prong efforts to transition away from fossil fuels. New social work policy analysis and advocacy at global, national, and state levels is also recommended.

Fossil energy production not only aggravates water depletion but also severely contaminates water resources. This study employed a mixed-unit input–output model to give a life cycle assessment of national average water degradation in production of common types of fossil fuels in China. The results show that the amount of grey water generated is much more than that of consumptive and withdrawn water in all cases. Although there is a high discharge amount of chemical oxygen demand (COD) in fossil fuel production, the pollutants of petroleum (PE) and volatile phenols (VP) require more dilution water than COD. PE is the greatest contributor to water degradation caused by primary fossil fuels, while VP pollution is prominent in production of upgraded fossil fuels. Basically, the main causes of water degradation, PE and VP discharge, occurs at coal mines, oil fields, refinery plants, and coking factories, rather than in the upstream sectors. A scenario analysis showed that water pollution can be significantly reduced if VP discharge in the coking process is controlled to be at the standard concentration. PE requires a standard withalower discharge concentration in order to further mitigate water pollution in production of fossil fuels. The coal production industry has a much lower pollutant removal rate but spends more on wastewater treatment, up to 12% of its profit. The other fossil fuel industries have high removal rates of PE and VP (97%–99%) and thus demand technological renovation to further remove those pollutants at a low concentration.

In Search of a Slingshot:Climate Action’s David and the Goliath of Deregulated Capitalism Emily Walz (bio) Klein, Naomi. This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2014. In the middle of the Pacific Ocean, the island of Nauru is a gutted shell, its interior rock, primarily phosphate of lime, long ago hauled away to be used as agricultural fertilizer in Australia and New Zealand. Financially and ecologically bankrupt, Nauru’s population has been reduced to living on an ever-shrinking strip of land. They are part of what author Naomi Klein calls the expanding “sacrifice zone,” those areas of the planet suffering the harshest development-related ecological degradation and the worst effects of climate change. Caught between the costs of rampant extractivism—the large-scale removal of minerals and raw materials from the earth, often for export—and a coming climate crisis, Nauru’s leaders have gone public, using their story as a cautionary tale so that other nations might act to avoid similar fates. Nauru is one of the cases in Klein’s 2014 book This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate, a wide-ranging exploration of the intersection of climate science and the dynamics of the international political and economic systems that prevent climate issues from meriting top billing on the global political agenda. In Klein’s view, climate change is not just another issue; it is the issue to end all issues, with links to the anti-globalization and anti-corporation arguments at the center of her other books, The Shock Doctrine (2007) and No Logo (1999). Deregulated capitalism, as the world’s dominant economic system with its attendant demands for continual growth, is on a collision course with the finitelyresourced planet that houses it. Klein makes clear that only one of these factors can change: nature or the economic model; and it will not be nature. The litany of climate change casualties is familiar: rising sea levels, intensifying severe weather patterns, acidifying oceans, disruption to harvests and supply chains, and swells of climate migrants and refugees. Those who agree that danger [End Page 205] is imminent and that now is the time for action include more than scientists and small island nations; the International Energy Agency wrote in 2012, “the climate goal of limiting warming to 2°C is becoming more difficult and more costly with each year that passes.”1 The World Bank too has sounded alarms, warning that there is “no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.”2 Even Catholic bishops have called for halts at 1.5°C—a more progressive emissions target than negotiators within the international system have ever incorporated into proposals for ratification by member states.3 Meanwhile, the fossil fuel industry is working to bring extraction to new extremes, pulling crude bitumen from Alberta’s Athabasca oil sands and suing to overturn local bans on hydraulic fracturing. The major energy companies already hold enough conventional fossil fuel in reserves to far exceed estimates of the planet’s atmospheric capacity to absorb carbon, meaning that the addition of these new, unconventional methods for obtaining further supplies—which extrexact a higher environmental cost in extraction than their conventional counterparts—may push potential carbon consumption far beyond pivotal thresholds. The irreconcilability of the shrinking emissions needed to avoid disastrous climate consequences with these growing pools of exploitable fossil fuels is exacerbated by an economic system not built to take environmental externalities into account and incapable of holding polluters fully accountable. Separate from fossil fuel sector interests, Klein cites whole industries of “disaster capitalists” preparing to seize profit opportunities. Disaster insurers, climate futures traders, weapons manufacturers, security corporations, upscale disaster-ready housing construction firms, and multinational agrochemical and biotechnology companies preparing “climate-ready” seed varietals are among those poised to benefit from climate change-related dramatic environmental events. The dismal picture Klein paints is enough for overload; even she admits to having indulged the impulse to look away when faced with evidence of the gravity of the situation. But in This Changes Everything, Klein confronts these issues head on, grappling with the question “What is really preventing us from putting out the fire...

ObjectivesHealth professionals work towards treating illness and preventing disease. Most know that globally we face a health crisis associated with the climate emergency and air pollution, which disproportionately affects those...

Major banks are facing increased public pressure to reduce financing for fossil fuel projects. In this decade of action for the UN Sustainable Development Goals (with a focus on SDG 13 – climate action), all sectors, including the financial sector, are urged to recognize the ways in which they impact these goals and how they can best contribute to their realization. But how are the top 10 most active banks in financing the fossil fuel industry responding to this pressure? Using qualitative textual analysis of these banks’ annual reports and a proposed categorization of how banks are talking about climate change, we highlight how these banks see their role in reducing climate impacts through their financing and whether their response has evolved since the Paris Agreement. We find that while these banks are stating an increasing number of climate change actions since the introduction of the Paris Agreement, there are few clear commitments in relation to their financing of fossil fuels. This absence of commitments in the annual reports may reflect an absence of critical reflection on their responsibility for financing climate change. Key policy insights Climate-related financial disclosures should target banks’ climate impact regarding their client financing; most importantly this should be done in a clear, contextualized way so that regulators and the public can hold the banks accountable based on their disclosures. Effective policies need to explicitly consider how banks should measure and reduce climate impacts in a way that is comparable, aligned with the Paris Agreement, and in relation to banks’ credit financing operations to clients (not only from the direct operations of a bank, as has been the focus of banks’ commitments against climate change to date). Legislation mandating human rights and environmental due diligence with explicit considerations in relation to climate change is an example of a policy that would require banks to consider a broader scope of their impact assessment and disclosure reporting which could potentially establish clearer claims for remedies by impacted communities.

Purpose: This study explores the interaction between youth, climate change, and pastoralism in Turkana County, a climate change hotspot within the IGAD's Karamoja Cluster. The study primarily examines youth's knowledge of climate change, its impacts on their lives, and their involvement in climate action initiatives. Methodology: The study utilizes a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative data from semi-structured questionnaires with qualitative insights gathered from interviews and focus group discussions. Data collection was conducted in both rural and peri-urban areas in Turkana County, supplemented by a review of secondary information from governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in climate action. Findings: The findings reveal a complex association between youth awareness of climate change, its direct impacts on their livelihoods, and their involvement in climate action. Many youths have superficial knowledge of climate issues, and there is, therefore, a critical need for enhanced education and capacity-building to deepen their understanding of climate change, local and national policies, and global climate processes and actions. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice, and Policy: The study is grounded on theoretical frameworks of Social-Ecological Theory and Capability Theory to guide the analysis of youth, climate change, and pastoralist livelihoods. This study makes significant contributions to both academic literature and policy development by providing nuanced insights into the role of youth in climate action within the context of pastoralist communities. It underscores the importance of supporting youth-led initiatives and ensuring access to resources that will support them in promoting resilience in the face of climate change. The study's policy implications are particularly noteworthy, as it recommends integrating climate education into local curricula, prioritizing investment in youth-led climate action, and fostering collaboration among young people, local authorities, NGOs, and international organizations. By addressing the unique challenges faced by the youth in pastoralist settings, the findings aim to inform strategic interventions that improve community climate resilience and sustainable development. This study, therefore, advocates for the inclusion of youth perspectives in climate policy discussions, emphasizing their potential as critical change agents in promoting adaptive capacity and sustainable livelihoods within their communities.

Ecosystem services and climate action from a circular bioeconomy perspective

COP26 in review

Cities can lead the way in tackling climate change through robust climate actions (that is, measures taken to limit climate change or its impacts). However, escalating crises due to pandemics, conflict and climate change pose challenges to ambitious and sustained city climate action. Here we use global data on 793 cities from the Carbon Disclosure Project 2021 platform to assess how the COVID-19 crisis has affected cities’ reported climate commitments and actions and the factors associated with these impacts. We find climate actions persist despite funding shortfalls; yet only 43% of cities have implemented green recovery interventions. Co-benefits of climate action (for example, health outcomes) and early engagement on sustainability issues (for example, via climate networks) are associated with sustained climate action and finance during COVID-19 and green recovery interventions. Cities should strengthen sustainability co-benefits and relationships with coalitions of actors to support durable climate commitments during crises.