Abstract
We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but dierential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no con‡ict be- tween strategic and sincere behavior. When voting is costless, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting. Even when voting is costly, participa- tion rates are such that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected— that is, information fully aggregates.
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