Abstract

Information barriers are trusted measurement systems to confirm the authenticity of nuclear warheads based on their radiation signatures. Traditional inspection systems rely on complex electronics both for data acquisition and processing. Several research efforts have produced prototype systems, but it has proven difficult to demonstrate that hidden switches and side channels do not exist. After almost thirty years of research and development, no viable and widely accepted system has emerged. We pursue a fundamentally different approach: Our prototype of an inspection system uses vintage hardware built around a 6502 processor. The processor uses 8-micron technology and has only about 4,200 transistors. Vintage electronics may have a number of important advantages for applications where two parties need to simultaneously establish trust in the hardware used. CPUs designed in the distant past, at a time when their use for sensitive measurements was never envisioned, drastically reduce concerns that the other party implemented backdoors or hidden switches on the hardware level. We demonstrate the performance of a prototype system using an Apple IIe and a custom-made open-source data-processing board connected to a standard sodium-iodide radiation detector for low-resolution gamma spectroscopy. Data processing and analysis is exclusively done on the Apple IIe hardware. We show that subtle differences in radiation signatures can be detected in 2–3 minutes based on the result of a simple chi-squared test. Vintage electronics may therefore offer a new path toward fieldable, trusted information barriers.

Highlights

  • The design of nuclear weapons remains one of the most closely held secrets today

  • In an attempt to facilitate confidence in verification systems and to resolve the certification/ authentication dilemma, here, we propose the use of vintage electronics from the 1970s, i.e., from a time when integrated circuits first became widely available

  • To demonstrate that vintage computers are capable of carrying out the required computations, we developed the Information Barrier Experimental II or IBX II

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Summary

Introduction

The design of nuclear weapons remains one of the most closely held secrets today. In particular, the amounts and configuration of nuclear materials (namely, plutonium and highly enriched uranium) in a specified warhead type are considered highly sensitive information by all nuclear weapon states. Information barriers are systems, typically part of or connected to a standard radiation detector, that acquire and process sensitive data and display the results of an analysis in a simple, pass/fail manner Both host and inspector need to simultaneously trust the device, creating two separate functional requirements: The host party must be confident that there are no side channels that could leak restricted information, either deliberately or accidentally, for example during a malfunction of the device. The inspector party must be confident that the device presents an output based on true measurement results, which requires, in particular, that the device does not contain any hidden switches or other cheating mechanisms that could be used by the host to manipulate the measurements or the results in an attempt to affect the outcome of the inspection These processes are called certification and authentication of the equipment [7]. 25 MHz ROM-DOS 6.22 66 MHz ROM-DOS 6.22 / Windows n/a Windows XP 12 MHz custom n/a ROM-DOS 6.22 133 MHz ROM-DOS 6.22 16 MHz custom 866 MHz Linux

MHz Apple IIe ROM
Results
Conclusion and future work
24. Development Tools
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