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This study first identified types of change in the size of the personal network over a period of 12 years following divorce. Second, differences in network change were explained by taking into account divorce characteristics, personal capacities, and structural conditions. Personal interviews were conducted in three waves of a 12-year longitudinal study with 40 men and 64 women who divorced in 1987 or 1988. Most divorcees experienced network losses shortly after the divorce and in half of the cases these losses were not compensated for in the later years after divorce. For some, divorce brought merely network gains, albeit in the longer term. Personal capacities and structural conditions did not differ significantly across participants in different types of network change. Characteristics of the divorce (attitude toward divorce and conflicts with the ex-partner after divorce) partly explained differences in network change after divorce.

U.S.-India Relations under President Trump:Promise and Peril Rajesh Rajagopalan (bio) The structural conditions in Asia are ripe for closer U.S.-India strategic relations. China's rise and aggressive behavior, coupled with the massive imbalance of power between China and India, leaves India with little choice but to attempt to balance China. Moreover, its choice of partners is limited. India could attempt to create a regional balance by banding together with the many other Asian states that share its concerns about China, but this promises to be difficult and may not work. The United States' dominance over Asia, an essential component of its global role, is also under threat from China. Though the United States can probably still counter China by itself, it would be a lot easier to do this in concert with other Asian powers such as India. This strategic picture suggests significant promise for U.S.-India relations in the longer term. But whether this will lead to a closer relationship during the presidency of Donald Trump is less clear. The Trump administration's transactional approach to its strategic partners, the nonstrategic focus on Pakistan by both India and the United States, economic nationalism in both countries, and the potential for deepening domestic political chaos in the United States all complicate the outlook for U.S.-India relations over the next four years. The following essay will first examine the strategic rationale for closer ties and then assess the challenges confronting the partnership under the Trump administration. The Strategic Rationale China's rise is the central strategic challenge facing India. India's economy was larger than China's in 1962, the year that India suffered a devastating military defeat at China's hands. By the late 1970s, however, China had overtaken India. The Chinese economy had become twice as large as India's by 1995 and is now four times the size.1 This gross imbalance itself should be worrisome for India, but what makes the situation even more [End Page 39] troubling is that it is married to many active disagreements between the two sides. India and China have a significant unresolved territorial dispute that simmers and occasionally boils, which more than a dozen rounds of negotiations over two decades have not brought any closer to resolution. China's relationship with Pakistan is seen in New Delhi as not just political balancing but as a military threat so grave that Indian defense planners are now seriously considering a two-front war contingency.2 China's relations with India's other South Asian neighbors are likewise interpreted as an effort to undermine India. New Delhi refused to send a delegation to the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May because it regards the initiative as a Chinese design for Asian dominance. China's scuttling of India's bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and its refusal to support India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council are also seen in New Delhi as part of China's efforts to undermine India.3 India's options to balance China are limited. China's defense budget is at least four times as large as India's and its infrastructure in Tibet is far superior, allowing China much greater ease in military operations along the disputed border. To balance China, India has improved defense relations with other countries in Asia. It is developing a trilateral partnership with Japan and Australia, which seeks to enhance defense ties between the three and is clearly focused on China. India is also stepping up defense cooperation with Vietnam and Singapore. But though these efforts can supplement India's other balancing efforts, they cannot by themselves provide sufficient ballast to right the Asian balance of power. For one, even when these countries' capabilities are combined, China still significantly outmatches them in defense spending. For another, the geography of the region is an obstacle to mutual support because of the great distance of these secondary powers from each other. Finally, there is no history of mutual security cooperation between India and these countries, and it will take a while for cooperation to reach a level that can provide domestic...

This chapter develops a theory of land reform in several steps. First, it outlines the political process of land reform. It then details how the chief political actors interact within this process to either push for or block land reform. Finally, it formalizes the logic in a game theoretic model that captures the dynamic decision making of key actors and demonstrates how changes in key parameters impact redistributive land reform outcomes. The discussion shows that large-scale changes in redistributive policy such as land redistribution are more difficult to achieve when there are more institutional constraints to political rule. The opposition of a small number of institutional actors can jeopardize reform: if the executive opposes reform, the legislature cuts off funding, or the bureaucracy is corrupt or unorganized, redistributive land reform efforts will fall flat. Because land redistribution requires significant political concentration and administrative capacity, it is more likely to occur under autocratic rule. Only when democracy is highly majoritarian – a rare circumstance – can democratic political elites implement land redistribution. That the structural conditions for land redistribution are more propitious under autocracy, however, does not imply that reform is deterministic under these regimes. Landed elites may wield considerable political power. For land redistribution to be implemented on a large scale, there must therefore be a coalitional split between ruling political elites and landed elites that spurs ruling political elites to attack the foundations of landed elite power. Destroying landed elites can reduce the potential threat they pose to ruling political elites over the longer term if their interests are not satisfied or if they fear the intentions of political elites. It also signals the ruling political elite's reliance on their support coalition – the group that brings them into power – instead of on landed elites, thereby reducing the threat of an insider coup. Granting land from former landed elites to the rural poor can then undercut the threat of instability from below by buying the support of key groups of the population that have the capacity to organize anti-regime resistance. These political origins of redistribution captured by the theory therefore provide an explanation for the targets and the beneficiaries of land redistribution.

This paper considers the role of urban agriculture in addressing the practical and strategic needs of African women, and assesses the gender implications of embracing urban agriculture as a development intervention strategy. Empirical evidence from Botswana and Zimbabwe points to the multi-faceted role of urban agriculture whereby some women use this activity to support their households on a daily basis, and others use it as an avenue for social and economic empowerment over the longer term. In order to benefit rather than burden women, the promotion and support of urban agriculture must take on an emancipatory agenda, which supports individual, practical and strategic goals, and ultimately challenges the structural conditions that give rise to women's involvement in the activity in the first place.

We identify a set of “rules of thumb” that characterise economic, financial and structural conditions preceding the onset of banking and currency crises in 36 advanced economies over 1970-2010. We use the Classification and Regression Tree methodology (CART) and its Random Forest (RF) extension, which permits the detection of key variables driving binary crisis outcomes, allows for interactions among key variables and determines critical tipping points. We distinguish between basic country conditions, country structural characteristics and international developments. We find that crises are more varied than they are similar. For banking crises we find that low net interest rate spreads in the banking sector and a shallow or inverted yield curve are their most important forerunners in the short term, whereas in the longer term it is high house price inflation. For currency crises, high domestic short-term rates coupled with overvalued exchange rates are the most powerful short-term predictors. We find that both country structural characteristics and international developments are relevant banking crisis predictors. Currency crises, however, seem to be driven more by country idiosyncratic, short-term developments. We find that some variables, such as the domestic credit gap, provide important unconditional signals, but it is difficult to use them as conditional signals and, more importantly, to find relevant threshold values.

We identify a set of ‘rules of thumb’ that characterize economic, financial and structural conditions preceding the onset of banking and currency crises in 36 advanced economies over 1970–2010. We use the classification and regression tree methodology and its random forest extension, which permits the detection of key variables driving binary crisis outcomes, allows for interactions among key variables and determines critical tipping points. We distinguish between basic country conditions, country structural characteristics and international developments. We find that crises are more varied than they are similar. For banking crises, we find that low net interest rate spreads in the banking sector and a shallow, or inverted, yield curve is their most important forerunners in the short term. In the longer term, it is high house price inflation. For currency crises, high domestic short‐term rates coupled with overvalued exchange rates are the most powerful short‐term predictors. We find that both country structural characteristics and international developments are relevant banking‐crisis predictors. Currency crises, however, seem to be driven more by country idiosyncratic, short‐term developments. We find that some variables, such as the domestic credit gap, provide important unconditional signals, but it is difficult to use them as conditional signals and, more importantly, to find relevant threshold values. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This response welcomes A. Godley and H. Hang's comment on N. Alexander's recent article. It acknowledges those theoretical issues on which there is broad agreement and explores theoretical issues around which debate is likely to focus in the future. Consideration is given to international retailing in the first and second global economies and the problems surrounding the evaluation of longer term trends. It explores the nature of innovation and the international transfer of retail innovation in an international retail firm and market context. Market structural conditions and their impact on international retail activity are considered. Further areas for historically based research are suggested.

Dimensions of Print

This article explores how risk, moralisation and class intertwine in prevention work targeting parents. The analysis is based on an ethnographic study at three Danish schools, from which two exemplary cases have been selected, consisting of observations of two introductory consultations between families and school health nurses. We focus on how the professional assesses whether a family is at risk. The outcome of the consultations is distinctly different. The privileged family is able to display the legitimate risk practices. In contrast, the disadvantaged family is regarded as irresponsible and at risk. This is not so much due to the complexity of their social situation, but because of what the professional identifies as a major risk: the child’s overweight. Our methodological approach is to explore how the consultations are framed. Our analysis reveals how a focus on ‘lifestyle choices’ results in dismissing the structural conditions that shape not only the hazards facing families, but also their risk practices. Consequently, the privileged parents are celebrated as morally worthwhile, while the disadvantaged parents are judged to be of less moral value. This, we argue, is grounded in symbolic class distinctions, revitalising ‘respectability’ as a central aspect of the discretionary assessment.