Verendlichung (Finitization)

Abstract

Like so many written during last fifty years, this text attempts to think Heidegger and beyond Heidegger. To think Heidegger means that we must still concern ourselves task of overcoming metaphysics. is metaphysics? From Heidegger, we know that metaphysics consists in a persistent confusion between beings and being. If we want to overcome metaphysics, this confusion must be dispelled; beings and being must be dis-ambiguated; in other words, ontological difference must be established. But, we can make concept of metaphysics more precise. In history of metaphysics, confusion appears in two general forms: Platonism and Cartesianism. In Platonism, confusion occurs in copying relation of particulars and universal forms; in Cartesianism, confusion occurs in recognition relation of particulars and general representations. Therefore, overcoming of metaphysics can occur only through a re-conceptualization of particulars below level of both universal formality and general representation. They, that is, beings, must be conceived no longer as particular, but as singular. In order to be truly different, they must no longer be recognizable as copies of something general. But, we are going to attempt to go beyond Heidegger.1 In order to do this, I am going to follow an insight that Michel Haar has given us in his Heidegger and Essence of Man. Haar tells us that there is an opening in Heidegger's thought beyond metaphysics and indeed beyond thought of being.2 The opening, according to Haar, is contained in following sentence: are so finite that we cannot even bring ourselves originally before nothing through our own determination and will. So abyssaly [abgrundig] does finitization [Verendlichung] entrench itself that our most proper and deepest limitation [Endlichkeit] refuses to yield to our freedom.3 In order, however, to pursue opening in Heidegger's thought, and this is my thesis here, it is necessary to understand by means of a new notion of life. The thesis is: we can overcome metaphysics only life. As we are going to see, this turn to life does not consist in a return to vitalism or to Lebensphilosophie, its concept of Erlebnis. Instead, overcoming of metaphysics life results in, coining a new English word, life-ism.4 Now quote that I just presented containing word Verendlichung comes from Heidegger's 1929 inaugural address What is We are going to start this text. But, in order to go through this opening, we are going to follow Foucault. Heidegger calls Verendlichung, in What is Metaphysics, it seems to me, refers us to a process of life that only Foucault has described. This description occurs in The Birth of Clinic? when Foucault discusses French early nineteenth century biologist Xavier Bichat. Thus, after examining Heidegger's What is in order to find opening, we shall look at Foucault's discussions of Bichat in order to go beyond Heidegger to life. As I said at beginning, this text attempts to think Heidegger and beyond him. One might wonder what unifies this with and beyond, in other words, what unifies Heidegger and Foucault. It seems to me that both of these great thinkers are unified by attempt to keep question of who we are open. They are both concerned to transform us. As we are going to see, at very end, opening that presents transforms us into being les suivants, literally, the followers. Confusion (Verwechslung) Before turning to Heidegger's 1929 inaugural address, What is we must assemble three points from other Heidegger texts surrounding What is Metaphyscs? These texts are On Essence of Grounds, written in 1928; lecture course from academic year 1929-30 called The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude;6 Postscript that Heidegger added to What is Metaphysics? …