Veblen, Sen, and the Formalization of Evolutionary Theory

Abstract

It has been suggested that economics could benefit greatly from recent developments in evolutionary game theory. In fact, key authors in the study of the role of ethical norms in economic behavior like Amartya Sen argue that evolutionary game theory could contribute much to the study of social norms and behavior. Others have suggested that evolutionary game theory could be most helpful for formalizing the work of classic authors in evolutionary and institutional economics like Thorstein Veblen. Here I discuss the behavioral assumptions of evolutionary game theory models, and Jörgen Weibull’s approach in particular. I will argue that Weibull’s models, and evolutionary game theory in general, pose overly strong restrictions on the explanation of human behavior, which limit the potential of evolutionary explanation. I also suggest Tony Lawson’s population-variety-reproduction-selection (PVRS) model as an alternative evolutionary framework that can successfully accommodate developments in behavioral economics, while also providing a solution to important critiques of Darwinian evolutionary analysis made by Richard Nelson, among others.