Abstract
Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. According to the strongest version of this claim, there can be no selfless states of consciousness, namely states of consciousness that lack self-consciousness altogether. Disagreements about this claim are likely to remain merely verbal as long as the target notion of self-consciousness is not adequately specified. After distinguishing six notions of self-consciousness commonly discussed in the literature, I argue that none of the corresponding features is necessary for consciousness, because there are states of consciousness in which each of them is plausibly missing. Such states can be said to be at least partially selfless, since they lack at least one of the ways in which one could be self-conscious. Furthermore, I argue that there is also preliminary empirical evidence that some states of consciousness lack all of these six putative forms of self-consciousness. Such states might be totally selfless, insofar as they lack all the ways in which one could be self-conscious. I conclude by addressing four objections to the possibility and reportability of totally selfless states of consciousness.
Highlights
Many authors in philosophy, psychology and neuroscience are sympathetic to the claim that conscious experience involves a sense of self
Showing that each of the six putative forms of self-consciousness can be individually missing in conscious experience is not sufficient to rule out all versions of claim that self-consciousness is necessary for consciousness (NC)
There are a number of disjunctive versions of this claim according to which some form of self-consciousness or other is necessary for consciousness, including the maximally disjunctive claim NCdisj: NCdisj For any subject S, if S is conscious at t, S’s phenomenology involves any of the phenomenal features (1–6) at t
Summary
Psychology and neuroscience are sympathetic to the claim that conscious experience involves a sense of self. The claim that conscious experience involves a sense of self comes in two varieties, depending on the alleged prevalence of the target phenomenon. According to the Typicality Claim (TC), self-consciousness is merely pervasive in ordinary experience.. According to the Typicality Claim (TC), self-consciousness is merely pervasive in ordinary experience.3 These two claims can be formulated more precisely as follows: NC For any subject S, if S is conscious at t, (a) S is self-conscious at t, and (b) S’s being self-conscious at t makes a constitutive contribution to S’s overall phenomenology at t. I conclude by discussing four objections to the possibility and reportability of totally selfless states of consciousness
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