V

Abstract

A potentially misleading translation of the German expression Wertfreiheit, which conveys a statement's negative property, its not being derived from or affected by a value judgment, value freedom is perhaps the most misunderstood concept in sociological methodology. One reason for the confusion is that the term originated in an argument by Max Weber that is as subtle as it is disorganized. A second reason has to do with the fact that, besides its literal meaning, indicated above, in methodological parlance value freedom has also come to imply the proposition that empirical facts have a reality that is independent of any value-laden theory we employ. Thus, value freedom has not one but two antitheses. The first antithesis to value freedom is value judgment, a moral evaluation of a social phenomenon as good or evil, just or unjust, and so forth. The second antithesis to value freedom is methodological relativism, a doctrine which holds that facts are valid only given certain value-laden theoretical assumptions. In other words, methodological relativism maintains that facts have no value-free reality. These two antitheses complement one another in the following way: if facts depend upon valueladen theories, then any value judgments at issue in those theories cannot be refuted by empirical evidence. The principle of value freedom maintains that theories can be refuted by independent evidence. Social scientific theories are not in the business of making or defending value judgments. But values are still relevant to how theories are formed.