Abstract
By using a longitudinal bi-annual dataset (2012–2018) from the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (Cepej) for 22 EU countries, this study tests four hypotheses that have been derived from rational choice theory at individual and aggregated level. The positive associations between caseload and productivity support the hypothesis that judges sacrifice leisure or the quality of their decisions to achieve a reduction in backlogs. While the lack of association between the number of assistants and judge’s productivity supports the hypothesis that appointing new staff reduces caseload, thereby inducing judges to substitute time they spend on resolving cases for leisure or improving the quality of their decisions, while the positive association between the number of judges and productivity contradicts this hypothesis. The finding that assistant’s caseload negatively moderates the relationship between judge’s caseload and judge’s productivity supports the hypothesis that as the caseload of assistants increases, judges are releaved of more administrative tasks, thereby allowing judges to spend more time on leisure or improving the quality of their decisions rather than on resolving cases. Our findings suggest that assistants use similar trade-offs as judges and affect judges’ utility maximizing behaviour.
Highlights
Rational choice theory, which is applied to judges by Cooter[1] and Posner,[2] suggests that judges want to maximize utility
The finding that assistant’s caseload negatively moderates the relationship between judge’s caseload and judge’s productivity supports the hypothesis that as the caseload of assistants increases, judges are releaved of more administrative tasks, thereby allowing judges to spend more time on leisure or improving the quality of their decisions rather than on resolving cases
Similar findings that support rational choice theory have been achieved based on studies of the Slovenian[10] and Bulgarian[11] judiciary. These studies indicate that productivity is endogenous in the sense that incumbent judges complete fewer cases in the presence of new judicial appointments and that judges’ productivity increases with caseload
Summary
Rational choice theory, which is applied to judges by Cooter[1] and Posner,[2] suggests that judges want to maximize utility. Judge’s utility function contains benefits such as time for leisure, prestige, reputation and popularity as well as costs such as training to become. Utility Maximizing Judges and Judicial Assistants a judge and work efforts. According to this theory, the rational judge aspires leisure,[3] while at the same time she does not want to undermine her prestige or reputation by resolving less cases than is expected of her and causing delays or congestion. Rational choice theory is used to explain the trade-offs that judges make between the different costs and benefits within time-limits. There is a whole body of literature that is dedicated to the application of rational choice theory to judge’s utility maximizing behaviour
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