US Supreme Court Institutional Integrity in Case Selection

Execution: an unwanted side-effect

PurposeThe purpose of this article is to provide non‐law librarians with two strategies for quickly helping millennials with online US Supreme Court research. The first strategy is to locate law‐librarian authored online research guides on the topic. The second strategy is to jump straight into one of the many free online databases that contain US Supreme Court opinions.Design/methodology/approachThe article demonstrates the abundance of academic law‐librarian authored legal research guides available on the internet and explains how to evaluate them. Additionally, the article provides examples of many free online databases that allow searching, browsing and retrieval of full‐text US Supreme Court opinions.FindingsMillennials looking for US Supreme Court opinions expect to be provided with digital research resources. Online legal research guides can help librarians find the latest online databases with full‐text US Supreme Court opinions. Widespread internet access to the entire run of US Supreme Court opinions is a very recent phenomenon. But today, several new web sites have made the entire run of US Supreme Court opinions available for free, vastly improving librarians' ability to meet millennials' expectations of immediate access to full‐text resources online.Originality/valueThis article provides librarians with two strategies for quickly helping millennials with online US Supreme Court research.

Unequal reproductive justice under the law

The reference to foreign court judgments by the US Supreme Courts - particularly in cases involving the US Constitution - has sparked controversy. This controversy flared in Lawrence v. Texas, where Justice Scalia criticized Justice Kennedy for reference to judgments by the European Court of Human Rights in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion striking down the Texas sodomy statute. This article examines the issue from a different perspective: references to 'foreign' court judgments (including US Supreme Court opinions) by the Supreme Court of Ireland. The article examines the Irish Supreme Court's use of judgments from the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and the US Supreme Court. The article argues that the Irish Supreme Court's attitude to reference to 'foreign' court judgments depends upon whether the Irish Court occupies a vertical or horizontal position with respect to the other court. Where the Irish Court's relationship is horizontal (meaning in essence that the other court cannot overrule or directly criticize the Irish Court), the Irish Court is less reluctant to refer to the foreign judgment. When the relationship is vertical (in the sense that the other court can criticize or overrule the Irish court), the Irish Court is more reluctant to refer to the foreign judgment. The article examines a number of Irish cases in support of this thesis. It concludes that because the relationship with the European Court of Human rights is vertical, the Irish Court is reluctant to refer to these cases in the Irish Court's opinion. On the other hand, because the relationship with the US Supreme Court is horizontal, the Irish Court shows less reluctance in citing US Supreme Court opinions.

The purpose of the article on the topic of judicial lawmaking in the USA, which attempts to invade the educational process and intensify the study of the History of State and Law of Foreign Countries, is devoted to the U.S. Supreme Court – the founder of constitutional justice and one of the pillars in the system of separation of powers. This is a unique judicial institution with an exceptional degree of influence, about which America’s famous political writer Alexis do Tocqueville stated that “never before have any people had such a powerful judicial authority”. The purpose of the research is to identify the features of the law-making activity of the US Supreme Court, since judicial law making in science remains an unsolved problem. To achieve this goal, the methods of scientific research were used, in the form of general methods, complex special methods of jurisprudence. For the reader, the phenomenon of the us Supreme Court is interesting in several aspects. First, from the point of view of the evolution of American law and the judicial system in all its dynamics and contradictions. Secondly, in terms of the implementation of judicial activity, complex thought processes of finding the necessary precedents and arguments in a particular case, achieving (if possible) a compromise between the judges-colleagues. Judicial activity should be interpreted not only as based on law, but also subject to ideological and political influences. The results of the research are very important for researchers of the legal system of foreign countries, and to look at the us Supreme Court through the eyes of American history as an institution that has the potential to enter into conflict with both the legislative and Executive authorities. On the other hand, it is important to understand the logic of filling vacancies in the Supreme Court by the Executive branch. In the ongoing in this country, searches the reasons for negative political and legal phenomena attention is drawn to the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court, in General, the activities of the court performing a legislative function, it is unusual and constitutional loose. However, many issues remain insufficiently studied, including the role of the US Supreme Court in constitutional law making, and the phenomenon of judicial law making itself. Key words: lawmaking, jurisdiction, Supreme Court, USA, legislature.

The United States (‘US’) Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen v AnimalFeeds (2010) shook up the American arbitration landscape. First, when justifying the annulment of the arbitral award, the Court’s ambiguous interpretation of section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) (under which courts may vacate an arbitral award where the arbitral panel exceeded its powers) raised doubts as to whether it departed from precedent by reviewing errors of law under this ground. Second, by narrowly approaching the power of arbitrators to order class proceedings, the Court indicated a new movement in the case law on class arbitration, fed by scepticism and hostility against this procedure. The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter (2013) clarified that an arbitrator’s erroneous interpretation of the parties' contract did not amount to an ‘excess of power’ under the FAA. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Oxford Health raised new questions, and certainly did not restore the pro-class arbitration approach previously adopted in Green Tree v Bazzle (2003). This article explores the concept of ‘excess of arbitral power’ so as to understand its purpose, content, and limits in light of recent decisions of the Supreme Court on class arbitration. Based on a thorough analysis of the case law and on a comparative law approach to the extent of arbitrators’ powers, it spells out where the limits of arbitrators’ power to order class arbitration are likely to stand in the US. US Federal Arbitration Act, Title 9 Arbitration (1925) Green Tree Financial Corp, Conseco Finance Corp v Bazzle and ors, US Supreme Court (2003) Stolt-Nielsen SA and ors v AnimalFeeds International Corporation, US Supreme Court (2010) AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, US Supreme Court (2011) American Express Co and ors v Italian Colors Restaurant and ors, US Supreme Court (2013) Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter, US Supreme Court (2013)

The US Supreme Court and Affirmative Action: The Negative Impact on the Physician Workforce

This paper will compare the US Supreme Court with the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). Both are courts of general jurisdiction of federal systems. Typically in continental Europe national courts are divided into three quite separate systems: a civil court system that hears disputes between private parties and criminal prosecutions, an administrative court system dealing with challenges to the lawfulness of acts of government administration, and a single constitutional court which is the only court that may deal with issues of constitutionality and deals solely with such issues. In the United States most courts, both state and federal, undertake private, criminal, and administrative adjudication and have the power to declare laws or other government actions unconstitutional.

On 28 June 2010 — the end of that Term — the US Supreme Court issued its much awaited decision on patent-eligible subject matter in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (‘Bilski III’). In Bilski III, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, confirmed the continued viability of so-called ‘business method’ patents. Prior Current Intelligences have reported on the progress of the Bilski cases at the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (‘Federal Circuit’) and at the Supreme Court. See Charles R. Macedo, US Supreme Court Returns Patent-Eligibility Test to Fundamental Principles, JIPLP (2010) 5 (11):757-762 (discussing US Supreme Court decision); Charles R. Macedo, Processes must be tied to machine or transform matter to be patent-eligible in the US, JIPLP (2009) 4 (3):151-153 (discussing Federal Circuit en banc decision). Now that a year has passed, JIPLP has commissioned this article to take a look at how Bilski III has been used by the US patent system stakeholders and to provide an initial review of its impact on US patent law. Significantly, over the past year, the US Supreme Court, US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, US District Courts, and the US Patent & Trademark Office (‘PTO’) have all issued decisions impacting the scope of patent-eligible subject matter in the US. Further, the US Congress has likewise considered legislation which could impact the type of subject matter capable of obtaining patent protection in the US. In this article, the developments in each of these venues is discussed.

You Can't Make Me Stay Home! Medical and Legal Aspects of the COVID-19 Pandemic

This paper examines the 2012 US Supreme Court consideration of the Affordable Care Act, and the resulting judgment, with a view to learning what lessons this landmark case can afford us into the way in which the US Supreme Court works, so helping us forecast its decisions. Although this is simply one judgment among many, a case is advanced here that the details of the way that the judgment was made can be used to help arbitrate between conflicting interpretations in the literature as to the way that the US Supreme Court reaches its decisions. It is argued that consideration of this case does provide particular insights which might usefully improve forecasts of future Supreme Court decisions.

This article examines the latest trends in the US Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the right to artificial termination of pregnancy (abortion). It is stated that the right to abortion is not an integral part of the text of the US Constitution - it was not provided for in the original text, nor in the Bill of Rights, nor in subsequent amendments. However, the regulation of the right to abortion has been the subject of litigation and a number of decisions of the US Supreme Court. The issue is not only legal, but also political - in particular, the attitude to the regulation of the right to abortion, the question of whether it should be resolved at the federal level or at the level of individual states, what discretion should be given to the states, etc. This issue is a part of the debate, a public discussion, in almost every US election. Main decisions of the US Supreme Court in this area are reviewed, in particular Roe v. Wade, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine v. FDA. It is concluded that the right to abortion in the United States is not enshrined in the Constitution, and this creates certain problems, since it allows some theorists and practitioners to appeal to the fact that the absence of such constitutional enshrinement indicates an unwillingness to grant this right the status of a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. It is argued that this argument should be disagreed with, since in the US legal tradition a significant number of rights are somehow derived from the text of the Constitution in judicial practice, and therefore the understanding of the right to abortion as such which is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution is fully justified. It is pointed out that recent trends, in particular, the cases which have been heard or are pending in 2022-2024, indicate that the stability of legal regulation of the right to abortion in the United States has been shaken. Almost 50 years of Roe v. Wade precedent were not enough to convince some in the community that the right to abortion is truly firmly rooted in American history and tradition. By depriving it of constitutional protection, it allowed for considerable discretion to be given to the states, which could impose various types of regulation, up to and including a complete ban. Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine further extended the «attack» on this right, which may also affect the interests of a significant number of women in the United States. To summarize, the recent trends are more political than legal, caused rather by ideological motives, as there were not enough convincing arguments to abandon the previous practice established by Roe v Wade. Enshrining the right to abortion at the level of the US Constitution (through an amendment) could help, but seems unrealistic given the polarization of society.

Mark Garnett compares and contrasts the new UK Supreme Court with its older, more illustrious American counterpart. Since 2009, Britain, like the US, has had a Supreme Court as its highest judicial body. Mark Garnett compares the two institutions, and finds that while the US Supreme Court is a much more powerful body, the UK incarnation could have considerable significance in the future.

term action3'-first used by the Roosevelt Administration in an executive order in 1941 barring defense contractors from discriminating against minorities-was revived by President John F. Kennedy in civil rights speech in 1961. Subsequently it was included in the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but it was through Lyndon B. Johnson's Executive Order 11246 (1965) concerning nondiscrimination in government employment that it became central political and legal concept: The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.l Initially the term was taken to mean a positive effort to end discriminatory practices in employment situations. Since then the concept has undergone long process of reinterpretation and redefinition, primarily by the Executive Branch and the courts. This article will address the role of the US Supreme Court in this process, analyzing the Court's affirmative action decisions from 1978 to 1990. Four aspects of two main areas-education and employment-will be dealt with: admission, hiring, promotion, and lay-offs.

Do the judges of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) and the US Supreme Court communicate with each other and, if so, what does this communication consist of? This question has become pertinent in the globalised legal context, where legal systems and actors within these legal systems are increasingly interconnected. These interconnections have brought an increasing number of cases with international or foreign aspects to the courts on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Moreover, systemic changes, such as the development of the legal order of the European Union (EU) and the increase in the number of international legal instruments, have obliged the courts to develop expertise concerning the application of legal sources elaborated outside of their national legal systems. At the same time, meetings in transnational judicial networks and the availability of foreign legal sources, for example through internet databases, have made it easier and natural for judges to take an interest in developments outside of their national borders. Starting from these observations, this chapter explores the relations between the highest courts in the USA and in Europe, and the impact of these relations on judicial decision-making in the US and European legal orders. What kind of contacts exist between the US Supreme Court and the ECJ, and how do these contacts influence judicial decision-making in the US and EU legal orders? This central research question can be divided in several sub-questions: what examples of transatlantic communication can be identified in the relations between the US Supreme Court and the ECJ? What motives do the two courts have for engaging in this communication? Does the communication between the courts constitute a real 'dialogue', involving an aspect of deliberation? To what extent does this communication have an influence on the decision-making of the courts?