U.S. Military Strategy After Vietnam

Abstract

Throughout most of the period since the Second World War, American military strategy has been predicated on the assumption that all-out war with the Soviet Union constituted the gravest potential threat to U.S. national security interests. To prepare for this impending conflagration, the United States acquired an awesome arsenal of nuclear weapons, and fielded an army that was primarily designed for thermonuclear warfare. In the prevailing view of the time, it was considered essential to prepare for the "worst case" contingency of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange, even if preparations for lesser contingencies suffered in the process. As noted by Pentagon correspondent John S. Tompkins, "From the end of World War II through the fifties, each crisis, each coup, each revolt was seen as a possible scheme to divert our attention from World War III—the great East-West confrontation that we were sure was coming. The bomb might be unsuitable for such local troubles, but we were going to win World War III with it.This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.