US‐Japan Alliance: Emmeshing Bilateralism Into Broader Multilateralism

This essay examines how Washington’s deep preoccupation with the British-Malayan counterinsurgency tactics–tactics that routed the guerilla fighters of the Malayan Communist Party–shaped US commitment to Vietnam. This US preoccupation, stoked by Britain’s (and Malaya’s) promotion of their counterinsurgency knowledge to US leaders, also influenced the lessons that US analysts and thinkers absorbed from the United States’ defeat in Indochina. Most studies of British-Malayan counterinsurgency and its connection to the Vietnam War fixate upon debating the relevance of the former to the latter and how this bears on US failures in Indochina. However, this essay focuses on the understudied fervor with which US policymakers sought to emulate Britain’s imperialistic methods, how almost obsessively they studied British-Malayan counterinsurgency and pursued British and Malayan experts to acquire their knowledge, intending to appropriate these for application to Vietnam. Equally, Britain and Malaya offered their expertise to the United States to capitalize on US admiration for Malaya’s counterinsurgency record, hoping to enhance their value to the United States. Regardless of whether British-Malayan counterinsurgency tactics were pertinent to Vietnam, US leaders’ confidence in these tactics, fed by British officials, sustained Washington’s ill-fated commitment to the unstable Saigon government. As Saigon spiraled toward collapse, British and US officials concluded, at odds with reality, that Washington had simply not studied British-Malayan tactics meticulously enough to apply them accurately in Vietnam. This myth, strengthened further due to US failures in Vietnam, would ensure the continued idealization of British-Malayan counterinsurgency into the twenty-first century.

There is a basic puzzle with regard to multilateral security and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Both the United States and Japan generally agree on the tenets of multilateralism in Asia. They agree that multilateral security should be inclusive rather than exclusive. They agree that such institutions and practices should be seen as a complement to, and not a replacement of, the bilateral alliance (or for that matter global multilateral institutions).1 They also value the basic norms of multilateralism (e.g., preservation of national sovereignty).2 This general convergence of views should provide the permissive conditions for multilateralism to thrive in the region; however, the empirical record shows otherwise, raising a host of unanswered questions. Why is it that has multilateral and/or regional security been relatively ineffective in East Asia? Why is it that in spite of general agreement on multilateral principles and norms, the participation in such institutions remain problematic for the alliance. Why do some see multilateral institutions as a threat to the alliance? Why do others see multilateralism as impeded by the alliance? And why do yet others see it as irrelevant to the alliance?

The Introduction of the book first sets the scene by characterizing the geostrategic context within which the foreign and security policy towards China of Europe’s major powers have unfolded, identifying three core macro-dynamics: the gradual retrenchment of the United States from Europe since the end of the Cold War—coupled with growing doubts about the credibility of US commitments to the continent—which has incited Europe’s major powers to provide for their own security; China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy behaviour both in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific since the late 2000s/early 2010s; and the rising global competition between the United States and China, which has become a structural feature of great power politics in the twenty-first century. Stuck between a rock and a hard place, Europe’s major powers therefore increasingly doubt the robustness of the US ally’s commitment to their security while grappling with China’s increasingly assertive behaviour in the larger context of mounting Sino-American rivalry, and are thus compelled to define their own position therein. The Introduction then presents the book’s research question and central argument, delineates the study’s intellectual contribution, and details the wide range of primary written and oral sources upon which it is based.

The South Caucasus is the key strategic region between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea and the regional powers of Iran, Turkey and Russia and is the land bridge between Asia and Europe with vital hydrocarbon routes to international markets. This volume examines the resulting geopolitical positioning of Georgia, a pivotal state and lynchpin of the region, illustrating how and why Georgia’s foreign policy is ‘multi-vectored’, facing potential challenges from Russia, int ernal and external nationalisms, the possible break-up of the European project and EU support and uncertainty over the US commitment to the traditional liberal international order.

The purpose of this paper is to examine bilateral security cooperation between South Korea and Japan in the foreseeable future. In so doing, the paper discusses four possible patterns of the ROK-Japan security relationship, which vary in accordance with US East Asia policy and the overall level of ROK-Japan relations. The newly evolving security environment in East Asia requires both South Korea and Japan to establish closer bilateral security cooperation than before. For instance, Seoul and Tokyo need to cooperate with each other to deal with the North Korean problem because Pyongyang poses a common threat by recently developing weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. As the newly defined US-Japan alliance, which has been enlarged to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, allows Japan to take an expanded security role around the Korean peninsula, the two countries have to increase bilateral security talks with regard to possible US-Japan joint contingency plans near the peninsula. As a matter of fact, there has been an increase in bilateral security talks and military exchanges between the two countries in recent years. However, there is an important factor that affects the bilateral security relationship between Seoul and Tokyo. Due to the historical fact that the Japanese colonial rule inflicted much pain upon Korea, it has been difficult for the two countries to establish sound and normal relations. This historical legacy has hampered security cooperation between the two countries so far. There are four different scenarios for a future bilateral security relationship between South Korea and Japan: US-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation, loose cooperation under US bilateral alliances, direct bilateral cooperation, and multilateral cooperation. Among these scenarios, it is the trilateral security cooperation that is most likely and most desirable for the future security relationship between Seoul and Tokyo. The US forward presence has been pivotal to maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The US bilateral alliances will continue to function as the foundation of East Asian security for many years to come. South Korea and Japan also need to further their security ties in order to cope with newly emerging security challenges in the post-Cold War period. However, ROK-Japan bilateral security cooperation should be based on their US bilateral alliances. Considering the long-standing historical legacy in the ROK-Japan relations, for the time being they have difficulty establishing direct security ties such as a mutual security treaty or joint military exercises. Consequently, through a trilateral security relationship with the United States as an axis, South Korea and Japan can promote confidence-building measures in each other`s military policies and cooperate with each other to meet common security challenges in the post-Cold War period. Multilateral security cooperation is another form of security cooperation between South Korea and Japan. Through the multilateral security cooperation framework, the two countries can enhance mutual understanding of each other`s security policies and discuss common security issues that cannot be easily solved unilaterally or bilaterally. However, the multilateral framework should supplement, not supplant, the US bilateral alliances which are pivotal to maintaining the overall balance of power in the East Asian region.

: The balance of power assessment in the first section of this article and the analysis of media and other signals in the second are in general agreement. The Chinese are very concerned about the Soviet threat, and they want US forces to remain in the Western Pacific to deter that threat. Private signals to other governments and to foreign visitors show that China is apprehensive about any reduction of the US commitment to East Asian security. Signals and statements indicate that this view extends to the issue of the withdrawal of American troops from Korea. The last American ground troops on the Asian mainland have great symbolic value for China. While Americans will argue that the withdrawal of these troops does not affect the US commitment to defend South Korea, the Chinese are undoubtedly reassured by their presence, especially since they also believe the troops help maintain local tranquility. China cannot overtly support the US presence in Korea. It must couch its arguments in terms of opposing Soviet social-imperialism for fear of driving the Stalinist DPRK leadership closer to Moscow. Nevertheless, security needs have caused the PRC to signal approval of Western defense stands. The People's Republic of China believes the contribution to regional stability made by US forces in the ROK is more important than ideological requirements to oppose capitalist imperialism. Peking would like to see those forces remain.

China and the New Geometry of East Asia Brad Glosserman (bio) The trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and China may be the most important strategic triangle in the world; it is certainly the most dynamic and most confusing. The United States is the world's sole remaining superpower and possessor of national power unmatched by any other nation, now or at any other time. Japan, Asia's leading nation and America's sometime surrogate within the region, has entered a crisis of confidence after a decade of economic stagnation that shows no sign of ending. China appears to be waking from its century-and-a-half long slumber and is reclaiming its rightful place on the regional and international stage. These changes challenge the accepted international order in the Asia-Pacific. While there are uncertainties aplenty, a continuation of existing trends would transform the region's geopolitical landscape. The thoughts that follow assume that current trajectories generally continue.1 For American strategists, this new international environment requires a substantial change in perspective. The instruments of United States foreign policy in Asia can and should continue. A continued United States forward presence in the region that rests upon America's bilateral alliances will continue to play an essential role in guaranteeing peace and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific. The survival of those alliances will depend upon an equally important transformation in United States' thinking about relations with its treaty partners. First, Washington will have to start treating them more like partners and less like subordinates. Burdens, [End Page 103] responsibilities, and, yes, credit will have to be more evenly shared. This means those partners will have to act responsibly as well. Second, the alliances themselves will have to be transformed. In the 21st century, alliances will have to be based upon shared values and interests, rather than shared threat perceptions. Quite simply, alliances will have to be for something rather than merely counters to some external threat. Finally, the alliances will have to reach out to other nations, both friends and potential adversaries, to build a framework for strategic dialogue and the creation of ad hoc coalitions when situations warrant. This paper begins with an examination of American interests and strategic concerns in the Asia-Pacific region. It then assesses Japan's prospects and concludes that they are not good. This poses particular problems for Washington since a pillar of its presence in Asia is its alliance with Tokyo. The paper then turns to China, and American approaches to dealing with Beijing. While hardliners and the media appear eager for a fight, the United States is in fact hedging: hoping for the best, but preparing for the worst. Next, the paper looks at two arenas of geopolitical competition between Japan and China, Northeast and Southeast Asia. In both cases, Beijing's diplomacy is more dynamic and Japan appears to be reacting to Chinese initiatives. The paper concludes with an examination of the trilateral relationship shared by the United States, China, and Japan. The three countries have to escape the zero-sum thinking that has dominated strategic calculations since World War II. United States Interests in Asia The United States is a Pacific power. Hawaii gives the United States a physical presence in the region, but ever-growing parts of the United States look west to Asia when they contemplate the future. An expanding number of Americans — 10.9 million people, or about 4% of the population — cast their eyes in the same direction when they think about their past.2 As Secretary of State Colin Powell pledged in a recent speech, "America's commitment to Asia's security and stability is [End Page 104] an enduring one.… We are a Pacific power. We will not yield our strategic position in Asia."3 The United States has many reasons to remain engaged. The first is economic. As Powell explained, "Under the protection of America's security umbrella, two-way trade between the United States and East Asia and Pacific has risen to $700 billion annually, larger than our trade with Europe. Between 1990 and 2000, exports of American products to Asia grew by over 80% and imports to the United...

Introduction: Why strategic uncertainty? Elena Atanassova-Cornelis and Frans-Paul Van der Putten PART I: EVOLVING REGIONAL SECURITY ORDER IN EAST ASIA - KEY PERSPECTIVES 1. Theoretical Approaches to Asia's Changing Security Order Nick Bisley 2. East Asian Security, Policy Debates and American Leadership Robert Sutter 3. China's Approach to the US Role in East Asia: The Dynamics of Volatile Competition Shi Yinhong PART II: EAST ASIAN RESPONSES TO STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY 4. 'Keeping the United States In': Japan and Regional Order in East Asia Kuniko Ashizawa 5. The US Security Role in South Korea: Issues that Test South Korean Confidence in the US Commitment Larry Niksch 6. Political Resolve and Strategic Uncertainty in Taiwan-US Relations Alexis Littlefield 7. New Strategic Uncertainty and Security Order in Southeast Asia Carlyle A. Thayer PART III: ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF REGIONAL SECURITY ORDER 8. A US-China Dual Leadership in East Asia? Quansheng Zhao 9. Non-Traditional Security Cooperation and Northeast Asian Regional Order Jaewoo Choo 10. Power Bumps on the Way to Regional Community: Asia's Mixed Security Logics Alice Ba Conclusion: A post-US regional order in the making? East Asia's security futures Frans-Paul van der Putten and Elena Atanassova-Corne

Background: Technological breakthroughs, geopolitical realignments, and shifting consumer tastes have all contributed to a radical change in the environment of global trade networks in recent years. A new geography of international trade has emerged as a result of the reshaping of traditional trade routes and patterns. Objective: The purpose of this scholarly paper is to examine and assess the major elements that have contributed to the formation of the new global trade network geography. The goal is to provide light on the changing nature of international commerce and the consequences it has for scholars, corporations, and governments by comprehending the underlying processes. Methods: A thorough study approach that combined case studies, literature reviews, and quantitative data analysis was used. The reconfiguration of global trade networks was influenced by infrastructural advances, geopolitical events, and trade data from key economies. These factors were investigated to find patterns and trends. Results: There has been a noticeable change in the trade routes, with developing economies taking on a more significant role. The emergence of new trade corridors has been aided by developments in infrastructure, logistics, and digital connection, posing challenges to conventional routes. The reorganization holds noteworthy consequences for tactics related to supply chains and market entry. Conclusion: The results highlight how critical it is to adjust to how international trade is changing. To take advantage of new possibilities and minimize risks, businesses and politicians must understand and manage the new terrain. Understanding the mechanics of this transition is essential for promoting sustainable economic growth and developing international collaboration as established centers of business give way to new participants.

The rapid development of informatization worldwide, specifically in the USA, China and Russia, and its penetration into all spheres of the vital interests of an individual, society and the state, have caused, besides doubtless advantages, the emergence of a number of significant problems. The urgent necessity to protect the information along with being protected from it has become one of them. The geopolitical confrontation and information warfare between the United States and China will be a major factor in world politics in the twenty-first century. This increasing tendency is pushing Russia towards further increasing the development of information warfare along with ensuring national security; the formation of an open dialogue between civilizations; and resistance to the threat of conflict in the field of information. Exhaustion of natural resources of the planet, their consumption and growth of the population do not contribute to the reduction of information warfare. Therefore, the positions of Russia, the United States and China will be strengthened due to deeper integration into the world information space. This paper has highlighted the quintessence of what causes the great thirst towards reaching information comfort and leadership, along with information warfare terrifying serious threats and modern global geopolitical tendencies.

The article presents an analytical summary of the XXII International Panarin Readings, held on 19 February 2024 and devoted to one of the most pressing issues: the role of ideas and values in contemporary geopolitical confrontation. The conference was organized by the Faculty of Philosophy of Lomonosov Moscow State University (Department of Philosophy of Politics and Law) in collaboration with the Likhachev Russian Research Institute for Cultural and Natural Heritage. At the Panarin Readings, one of Russia’s influential intellectual platforms, the academic and policy-making community discusses strategies for axiological and civilizational research, focused primarily on questions concerning the development of Russian civilization. The summary concisely examines the substantive points of papers presented by scholars representing various academic institutions from Russia and other countries. The speakers addressed a broad spectrum of issues: the methodology for studying traditional Russian values, bioethical questions, the transformation of the education system, Russia’s civilizational development, and its place in the contemporary world. The conference devoted particular attention to the ideas of A.S. Panarin, who anticipated the key trajectories of global conflicts in the 21 st century and developed a theory of global political forecasting, advancing an alternative vision for a future polycentric world. The participants discussed the challenges of modernization and the preservation of cultural sovereignty, the shift in dominant civilizations and the formation of a multipolar world, the relationship between rights and duties in traditional cultures, the role of Orthodoxy in Russia’s civilizational identity, and civilizational diversity as an intrinsic value. The presenters emphasized the need to formulate a “common idea” for Russian society and to establish a normative-value system capable of ensuring the country’s sustainable development. In their concluding remarks, the organizers underscored the enduring relevance of A.S. Panarin’s legacy, whose works continue to inspire contemporary researchers to seek answers to the acute challenges of our time.

Making Sense of Asia's Crowded Space Alice D. Ba (bio) Asia has become a crowded space. A region once distinguished by the near absence of cooperative security mechanisms is now distinguished by the opposite. Indeed, once upon a time, this was a region where the only cooperative frameworks purposed for regional security were (1) the bilateral alliances between the United States and a select few regional states and (2) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which until the 1990s did not even encompass all the subregion's states. In contrast, the region today consists of a mix of overlapping, crosscutting security frameworks of varying shapes and sizes. Andrew Yeo poses two questions in Asia's Regional Architecture: Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific Century, his recent contribution to the debates about East Asian security. The first is how we explain "the robustness of U.S. bilateral alliances with the rapid proliferation of multilateral institutions in the region" (p. 4). The second is, broadly speaking, what Asia's different security arrangements constitute in toto. There is much to recommend about his discussion. I would emphasize two points, in particular. The first is the "historical institutionalist" perspective the book brings to a policy and analytical space that tends to reduce most outcomes to "strategy," especially the geopolitical and functional challenges faced by states. As Yeo argues, the historical institutionalist approach provides ways to highlight continuity, not just change, as well as the means to capture the complex mix of threat perceptions, ideas, institutions, and domestic politics that go into the construction of elite consensus and, in turn, what he and some others call Asia's regional architecture. The second is his effort to offer a framework that accounts for both the U.S. alliance and multistate institutional dimensions of Asian security. In both instances, the book offers ways to bridge existing accounts that tend to be bifurcated between, on the one hand, those who focus on more conventional (i.e., realist) security drivers associated with traditional security frameworks like U.S. alliances and, on the other hand, those who focus on Asia's regional multilateral endeavors, especially their liberal and sociological drivers. This is important because to consider one without the other is not just to offer an incomplete picture of Asian security but [End Page 131] also, arguably, to miss something even more fundamental going on in the region's international politics. A more accurate picture of Asia consequently demands attention to U.S. bilateral alliances alongside the dramatic growth of nonalliance, multistate arrangements. Andrew Yeo's book thus offers a more complete account than most. Yet, I do have questions. In the spirit of discussion, let me raise two. The first concerns the historical institutionalist approach. In a critical respect, this is the main value the book adds, given that previous studies have detailed similar empirics, processes, and logics of layering associated with Asia's institutions and alliances. One of historical institutionalism's more important insights is the way that past commitments (e.g., cognitive, material, institutional, and policy) bear on conceptualizations of interests (individual and collective), the realm of possible options, and, in turn, the choices made. What is, at times, less clear in the discussion under review, however, is what is doing the work. For example, historical institutionalist approaches highlight the effects of "lock-in" and "feedback" effects associated with particular institutional-ecological contexts, but the processes and mechanisms through which that happens in the cases presented by Yeo are often left underspecified beyond the need to be "cognizant" of the security arrangements created earlier. Part of the challenge is one of scope. Yeo's book is inclusive of nearly all of Asia's actors and a wide range of diverse arrangements—from U.S. alliances to six-party talks to China-Japan-Korea trilateralism to ASEAN configurations. I appreciate the author's attempt. It is very difficult to highlight how past commitments constrain calculations and conclusions in each case over time and across actors without closer examination of either the international or domestic negotiation processes or of their accumulating lock-in processes that, in historical institutionalist accounts, bias one outcome over another. This is, again...

The paper comprehensively examines Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula. Its scientific relevance is defined by the unsettled issues on the Korean Peninsula, including the nuclear one, and the peninsula’s geographical proximity to the Russian Far East, the development of which is a priority task for Russia in the 21st century. The aim of the study is to analyze Russian approaches to the Korean settlement. The methodology includes the systemic and geopolitical approaches. Russia is interested in the peaceful situation on the Korean Peninsula, its denuclearization and the development of multilateral economic cooperation there. In principle, Russia would not object to the unification of Korea, provided that the process of unification would occur peacefully in conditions of social stability and it would not cause serious conflicts between the regional powers. However, it is not ready to take any active steps to achieve unification of Korea. The reason is Russia’s unwillingness to exacerbate the existing tensions, irritate friendly China, and, what is especially important in the context of the growing confrontation with the United States, eliminate the DPRK as a potential partner in this confrontation. Russia prioritizes the six-party talks format for a comprehensive settlement of the Korean crisis in the context of reformatting the security architecture in Northeast Asia. It is unlikely that the Russian proposals will be implemented in the medium and long term since, firstly, the DPRK prefers to discuss its nuclear program directly with the United States. Secondly, the United States is seeking to strengthen the existing security structure in the region, based on bilateral alliances. The current acute confrontation between Russia and the United States as well as between the United States and China makes it practically unrealistic to create a united front to achieve denuclearization of the DPRK. The authors believe that resolving the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula without direct Russian participation would be more profitable for Russia than the status quo with the DPRK continuing to build up its nuclear missile potential and no opportunities for Russia to implement trilateral economic projects on the Korean peninsula.

Australia occupies a uniquely strong position in Japan's evolving security partnerships. The two countries' bilateral alliances with the United States, their common desire for U.S. commitment to and presence in the Asia-Pacific region, their common desire to foster regional multilateral security institutions for the purpose of disciplining China through inclusion, and their limited but significant capabilities to respond to security problems beyond the region have caused the two countries to nurture enhanced ties. Although this bilateral partnership has been more closely associated with trilateral cooperation including the United States between 2005 and 2008 (rather than with regional multilateralism), the expanding scope of Australia-Japan cooperation mostly encompasses nontraditional security areas, such as law enforcement, counterterrorism, and humanitarian relief operations. This approach seeks a middle ground between exclusive U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateralism and all-inclusive regional multilateralism.

The study examines the transformation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine from a regional conflict into a globalized geopolitical confrontation, pitting an authoritarian coalition (RF, China, Iran) against Western democracies (NATO, US). The research goal is a comprehensive analysis of the US-China relationship dynamics and its influence on the war’s trajectory, particularly regarding the formation of a bipolar system. The paper highlights that the RF-PRC rapprochement, solidified by 2013, functioned as a balancing alliance against the US, marked by China’s «One Belt, One Road» (OBOR) expansion and Russia’s «Turn to the East» following 2014 sanctions. US policy shifted under the Trump administration, formally designating both nations as «revisionist states» and escalating tensions via a trade war, consistent with offensive realism principles aimed at containing China’s rise. The 2022 full-scale invasion accelerated the geopolitical realignment. The global response, led by the US, established the Ramstein format, which rapidly expanded to include Asia-Pacific Region partners (Australia, Japan, S. Korea), underscoring the conflict’s global nature. Simultaneously, China reinforced its counter-Western influence through BRICS+ expansion and heightened tensions over Taiwan. The research concludes that the war in Ukraine acts as a catalyst, rapidly defining the new structure of international security – a rigid bipolar system where the US-China rivalry determines the global order. The study provides a critical framework for understanding how the local aggression is inextricably linked to the broader, systemic struggle for world dominance.