US–China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific

This chapter summarizes the volume’s findings concerning US–China bilateral relations and its varying impacts on various regions of the world, amidst crisis-ridden world politics. This chapter highlights several conclusions. First, the need to accumulate capital and crucial resources for continued economic growth are crucial factors in shaping the trajectory of the rivalry, although the precise conditions of such a need depends on where this economic conflict occurs. Second, intersubjective interpretations about physical geography and social relations play an important role in the trajectory of great power relations. Third, understanding how intersubjective meanings about physical geography change over time provides important insights in the analysis of US–China rivalry. Fourth, the manifestations of how physical geography emerges as the locus of contestation between great power could be investigated through the developments in institutional structures. Fifth, the formations and transformations of US–China rivalry ultimately depend on one’s positionality in a highly interdependent global order: across various world-regions, temporal conditions, and socioeconomic backgrounds.

The twenty-first-century global arena is profoundly shaped by the intensifying US–China rivalry. While theories in the US, such as the Thucydides’ Trap and the Clash of Civilizations, forecast a prospective ‘Cold War II,’ many experts in China propound a ‘divided peace,’ advocating for the stable coexistence of dual powerhouses. Introducing a nuanced lens, the ‘Security in Context’ (SiC) approach argues for a more interconnected and multi-dimensional understanding of great power dynamics. This study dives into the practicalities of a SiC approach, examining key strategies including the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. As we venture into the era of economic and technological decoupling, epitomized by measures like the Chip Act and Restrict Act, the paper suggests that the SiC framework remains central to deciphering the evolving US–China narrative, even in the face of burgeoning uncertainties.

As a geographical concept, ‘Indo-Pacific’ has existed for decades. As a political and strategic concept, it has since 2010 gradually become established in the foreign policy lexicon of some countries, especially Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, China seems to be reluctant to identify itself as part of the Indo-Pacific; Chinese leaders believe that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims to contain China's rise. While the battle between the two geographical concepts ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia–Pacific’ may be fairly easily settled in the future, US–China strategic competition has just begun. Will the Indo-Pacific become a battlefield for US–China rivalry? How will China cope with the US ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy? How will other regional actors respond to the US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific? What are the strategic implications of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept for regional order transformation? How will the Indo-Pacific be institutionalized, economically, politically and strategically? This article introduces the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs, which aims to address those questions, using both country-specific and regional perspectives. Seven articles focus on the policy responses of major players (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and ASEAN) to the US FOIP strategy and related US–China rivalry in the region. A further three articles examine the profound implications of Indo-Pacific dynamics for regional institution-building and for geopolitical and geo-economic architecture.

Can lesser powers still effectively balance between the United States and China? This question has gained significant attention from policymakers and scholars as US–China rivalry intensifies. This article explores Vietnam's delicate balancing act amidst great power rivalry, arguing that the diplomatic flexibility available to traditional hedgers like Vietnam is shrinking. As ambiguity in various spheres diminishes, Vietnam increasingly finds itself compelled to clarify its stance on key issues. While Vietnam continues to hedge whenever possible, it sometimes resorts to strategic alignment to safeguard its national interests. In navigating the US–China rivalry, Hanoi consistently reassures both powers of its benign intentions while maintaining autonomy in policymaking. Vietnam's stance on issues tied to its core national interests is carefully calibrated to protect its legitimate concerns. Notably, when balancing its relations with the two superpowers, Hanoi tends to adopt a “China first, America later” approach, primarily driven by ideological affinity and threat perceptions.

This chapter analyses the drivers of India’s growing involvement in Southeast Asia and its emerging engagement in the South China Sea dispute in the shadow of US–China rivalry. It traces the evolution of India’s deepening, multi-faceted relationships with East Asia, which have emerged as a result of the “Look East” and “Act East” policies and efforts on the part of states in that region to draw India into its institutional architecture and strategic dynamics. It observes the relatively recent emergence of India’s direct stake in sustaining maritime security and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, as well as commitments to uphold the so-called “rules-based order”. It argues that since the early 1990s India has acquired new interests in the prosperity, stability, and security of the region, as its economy has become more integrated with the ASEAN bloc, as its concerns about Chinese capabilities and intentions have intensified, and as its commitments to new strategic partners in East Asia, including Japan and the United States, have multiplied.

Since the Cold War, scholars have debated the strategies of states in the context of great power competition. Recent studies on the US–China rivalry have highlighted the concept of ‘hedging’, where states avoid choosing sides. This article examines hedging theory through the lens of a country’s decision to engage in multilateral economic frameworks led by the USA and China, respectively. Using Singapore as a case study, with its involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), this article argues that a new trend, where countries use multilateralism, a liberal approach, to achieve the realist goal of hedging, is emerging. It identifies three key reasons behind states’ decisions to join international economic frameworks: financial security, risk management and strengthening ties with like-minded countries. This study extends the application of hedging to the real-world scenario by offering a new empirical case and highlighting the political functions of multilateral economic institutions. Ultimately, it calls for a broader understanding of hedging beyond the traditional view of ‘aligning with the USA for security and engaging with China for economic gain’, underscoring the need to study the strategies of middle-power states in great power rivalries.

In this study, we examine South Korea's foreign policy strategy in the context of the increasing strategic rivalry between the United States and China. We ask why South Korea is relatively hesitant to actively balance against China, especially compared to other US allies like Japan. We present a theory that examines how the lack of territorial and maritime disputes between a US ally and China affects an ally's foreign policy strategy in the US–China rivalry, to explain the case of South Korea. In general, when a US ally is engaged in an ongoing, active territorial and/or maritime dispute with China, we expect the US ally to more actively help the US balance against China. Because bilateral relations between the US ally and China are already tense, the US ally can afford to side with the US without being as vulnerable to Chinese retaliation. On the other hand, when a US ally has no ongoing, active territorial and/or maritime dispute with China, the US ally is expected to be more cautious in siding with the US against China because doing so can provoke China to retaliate in ways more costly than if they already had ongoing disputes. We find that without ongoing, active disputes with China, South Korea is more vulnerable to retaliation by China through critical issues like North Korea and trade. As a result, it is difficult for South Korea to side with the US in actively balancing against China.

In recent years, Chinese scholars and policy elites have discussed the ever intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China and its multifaceted implications for Chinese foreign policy. Some even worry about the possibility of a new Cold War between the United States and China. This article aims to offer an analysis of Chinese perspectives on US–China strategic competition. In the view of most Chinese observers, US–China strategic competition is inevitable because China is closing the national power gap between itself and the United States, while the latter resolutely upholds its global primacy. Other factors, including ideological disagreements, may fuel the major power competition that has extended to most aspects of US–China relations. Chinese observers believe that economic and technological rivalry between the United States and China has heightened and that the Western Pacific is the focal point of US–China strategic competition. Meanwhile, certain Chinese scholars attach greater importance to US–China competition over international prestige and leadership. However, Chinese analysts are not overly pessimistic about the prospects for US–China relations and have raised policy recommendations geared to managing US–China strategic competition and restoring a new equilibrium between the two major powers.

PurposeThis study aims to examine the nexus of the US rebalance strategy to Asia and the US–China rivalry in the South China Sea (SCS) from the perspective of the offensive realism theory.Design/methodology/approachThe study depends on the descriptive approach that deals with the analysis and description of the phenomenon. Also, the study uses the qualitative method to analyze the primary sources concerning the rebalance.FindingsThe study has found four results: first, the rebalance strategy to Asia is a comprehensive strategy to contain China’s rise. Second, China’s offensive strategy in the SCS since 2008 has been the main driver of launching the rebalance. Third, offensive realism presents a convenient analysis to understand the rebalance, China’s offensive strategy in the SCS, and the US–China rivalry in the SCS. Forth, SCS is one of the most important venues of the US–China rivalry for global hegemony.Research limitations/implicationsLimited to the period from 2009 to 2016. The Obama Era.Originality/valueThis study highlights the centrality of the SCS in the US–China global rivalry that has not been yet well researched.

Hedging is a collection of tactics that includes bandwagoning, limited resistance and involvement. Put another way, it is an insurance position between the two simple tactics of balancing and bandwagoning. Many states, including India, have adopted hedging as a favoured approach since the end of the Cold War. In light of the US–China rivalry and shifting great power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, India continues to pursue a ‘hedging the bets’ strategy, despite the country and the United States enjoying stronger strategic ties—particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. This article argues that as a rising power with its own ambitions to carve out a strategic space, India’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific seeks to retain a free, open and inclusive regional order. In the short and medium terms, this means forming soft-balancing coalitions and limited hard-balancing relationships with the United States. Strategic hedging still dominates Indian strategy in a broad sense. Forming an alliance with Washington will alienate China and Russia, the two great powers India is attempting not to dissociate completely. India’s somewhat neutral position on the Russian war on Ukraine and reluctance to join active military alliances in the Indo-Pacific indicates that hedging has value for maintaining India’s strategic autonomy and aspirations for great power status in the twenty-first century. India’s continued engagement through institutions such as BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and G20 as well as increased trade with China and Russia suggest the pursuit of a hedging strategy in its relations with other great powers.

As the strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, South Korea is facing growing pressure to chart an optimal diplomatic strategy to navigate the convoluted geopolitics and foster lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. At this crucial juncture, this study examines multi‐faceted, capacity‐building measures for peace aimed at precluding Sino–US friction in the East and South China Seas from spilling over into the Korean Peninsula. This article presents a road map to stimulate and reinvigorate security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan and economic cooperation among South Korea, China, and Japan in a virtuous cycle, and by extension to craft a dialogue channel among South Korea, the United States, and China. It also puts forward a three‐stage program for the evolution of the South Korea–US alliance whereby South Korea secures flexibility in its approach to China based on the robust trust of the alliance. This is to enable South Korea to assume a key role in connecting the three trilateral cooperation channels with the development of the Seoul–Washington alliance being a key driver to expand Seoul's diplomatic capacity. In the end, this study envisions a foreign policy model for South Korea that would allow the middle‐power country to punch above its weight by expanding the framework of cooperative security. It aims to ultimately pursue a multilateral, common security architecture in Northeast Asia, including China, which will serve as a multilayered catalyst to promote lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Coordinated policies and effective global environmental governance are needed to address the global biodiversity crisis. Human dimensions like geopolitics influence conservation decision‐making and outcomes. The importance of considering these complex social factors is heightened in an era of renewed great‐power politics, as the intensifying US–China rivalry has direct implications for environmental governance and biodiversity outcomes. Can the US–China rivalry and its confrontational dynamics be channeled into conservation policymaking to improve biodiversity outcomes? Drawing from international relations and policy studies, policy diffusion theory can provide conservationists with useful insights into the interdependency of policy decisions. Here, we examine the four mechanisms—competition, coercion, learning, and emulation—of the classic model of policy diffusion theory in the context of environmental policymaking. We explore a case study for each mechanism to illustrate how it can benefit biodiversity conservation, and point to examples of relevant policies and actions that could improve outcomes. To operationalize this concept for conservation, we present a decision tree that conservationists can use to determine the most relevant policy diffusion mechanism in different policy contexts. Upon determining the appropriate mechanism, conservationists can take further steps to intentionally trigger the mechanism and catalyze conservation policy diffusion across jurisdictions.

Geopolitical rivalry has intensified to a degree not seen since the Cold War. The US and China have embraced interventionist state-capitalist practices in competing attempts to gain control over the transnational networks that underpin globalization. As a result, multinational corporations (MNCs) are exposed to unprecedented levels of geopolitical risk. Most MNCs are responding in one of two ways. Some hedge and try to remain aloof from the US–China rivalry, while others align with the geostrategic objective of states in order to secure patronage (e.g. subsidies and public contracts). If MNCs maintain global production networks bridging the US–China divide they will attenuate the fragmentation of the global economy. Alternatively, if MNCs align with states’ geostrategic objectives, they will accelerate economic fragmentation. We conclude that this emergent meta-context and MNC risk mitigation strategies are shaping what we refer to as geostrategic globalization.

The introduction sets the stage of US–China rivalry and introduces the concept of the infrastructure state. As the chapters in this volume show, the infrastructure state pursues spatial objectives which have necessitated institutional reform or extensive state restructuring. The infrastructure state exhibits significant variation from place to place but, in all cases, it seeks to address longstanding developmental challenges through the enhancement of connectivity. The concept of the infrastructure state, thus, shines a light on the effects of US–China rivalry at multiple scales while it also underscores that decisions by actors in the Global South are influenced by local infrastructural histories and political economic dynamics. Simply, local-level politics are shaped by and shape geopolitical competition.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has made strengthening the alliance relationship with the United States a key part of his foreign policy positions. At the same time, South Korea continues to maintain a decent relationship with China, pursuing a precarious position to decide its role in the context of the growing US–China rivalry. The US has made the trilateral cooperation and close coordination among the US, South Korea, and Japan the centerpiece of its Indo-Pacific strategy, while South Korea and Japan have maintained their contentious relationship. The articles in this special issue address the challenges that South Korea faces today, focusing on two major themes in the contemporary era: first, how the US–China rivalry and power competition affect South Korea’s security and economic foreign policies, and second, how the bilateral tensions between South Korea and Japan affect regional security and alliance capabilities.