Abstract
Muth's model is adapted to determine the effects of generic advertising on upstream factor markets in a competitive industry where funds for promotion are raised through a feed tax. Optimality conditions indicate that a feed tax is an inferior funding mechanism. That is, the resulting promotion budget, in general, is too small to maximize producer surplus at the farm level. Applying the model to the U.S. catfish industry, results suggest that raising the feed tax from $5 to $6 per ton is welfare increasing for farm, feed, and non-feed sectors alike. Distributional analysis suggests that the processing sector captures most of the long-term benefits (51%), followed by the non-feed sector (42%). Despite the feed sector's modest share of total benefits (7%), owing to tax shifting its long-run benefit-cost ratio (1.8:1) is favorable. Because feed and non-feed inputs are gross substitutes, the feed tax generates a positive externality for non-feed suppliers. Accounting for this externality raises the non-feed sector's net benefit by 36%. Overall, about one-half of the program's long-term net benefits accrue to input suppliers.
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