Upper Houses and Financial Legislation

Abstract

This paper examines and compares the relationship between the two houses in bicameral legislatures in relation to financial matters. The examination extends to all countries with a long democratic tradition who still retain bicameral systems, to subordinate bicameral legislatures where they exist in federal systems such as Australia and the USA, and to the historical development of these relationships with particular reference to England and the UK. The countries examined, as well as those already mentioned include Switzerland, Canada and Germany. The different systems examined range from that of the USA where both houses have essential equal powers, and the President must also concur the presidential veto is overridden, and refusal of supply is not a device to remove the government, to systems such as Australia where an acute government crisis can arise from denial of supply. Others such as UK and NSW give the lower house the final say in financial and/or appropriation matters. The concentration is on the relative powers of the upper and lower houses in financial matters and constitutional provisions for resolving deadlocks are a particular focus of attention, and well as any constitutional conventions or practical matters of relevance.