Unravelling the role of foreign aid in Chinese diplomacy under the Xi administration

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a well-acknowledged central economic and diplomatic policy of the Chinese government, which was proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013. This paper intends to discover the relationship between the public diplomacy narratives of the BRI and its implementation. By using content analysis, this paper analyzes Chinese President Xi’s speeches from 2013 to 2020 about the BRI, as well as official statements of the Chinese central government. It identifies the public diplomacy narratives of the BRI: an assemblage of constantly changing policy settings that accommodates various economic and political interests. Also, this paper draws on differences between countries joining the BRI or not, and several case studies to elucidate the implementation of the BRI.Different from repetitive literature that explores either the BRI narratives or its implementation, this paper contributes by combining and comparing the two. Despite positive interpretations of the BRI the Chinese government has adopted, the paper argues that there are no deceptive tricks with skeletons in the closet of the Chinese government, as the BRI public diplomacy narratives are, in general, consistent with its implementation.

Over the years, China has forged and mastered its own distinctive foreign aid practices as an emerging aid donor. China’s approach to foreign assistance has become highly appreciated as the country’s stature as a provider of economic assistance has matured. In 2013, under President Xi Jinping, Beijing introduced the Belt and Road Initiative, which has become a leading component of China’s foreign policy and triggered a new round of policy reform in its foreign aid agenda. In Africa, China’s foreign assistance has kept in line with the policy of equal treatment. It has shared its development experience, helped many African countries to transition from “poor” to “developing”, from “aid recipients” to “wealth creators,” and many African countries are thus turning their interests from the West to the East. Certainly, the European Union as a traditional aid donor, remains the largest aid distributor in the world, especially in Africa. In other words, the EU’s foreign assistance has become an indispensable source of funding for many African countries. However, foreign aid effectiveness remains low on the African continent because of the absence of native African policymakers in aid programs designed and implemented by Beijing and Brussels. Some critics argue that Chinese and European assistance to Africa is not bringing about the best results as expected. This article argues that a new international architecture of foreign assistance through trilateral cooperation is needed to increase Chinese and European aid effectiveness in Africa. Trilateral cooperation will not only increase foreign assistance efficiency in Africa, but also give a chance to African countries to strengthen their own development capacity through assistance and guidance, reduce Africa’s aid dependence, and hopefully guarantee a smooth “graduation” of African countries from official development assistance.

China has a large and professional diplomatic team spread all over the world. Chinese diplomacy mainly relies on soft power in its relations with international partners. Despite the unified outlines, Chinese foreign policy differs from one country to another, depending on the geographical location, the political system and the volume of trade exchange. Chinese foreign policy has gone through many stages, most notably the period of Mao Zedong who strictly applied the rules of socialism, and the period of Deng Xiaoping, known for its reform and openness policy, thus establishing a modern and more flexible Chinese system. 
 President Xi Jinping's term is an extension of Deng Xiaoping's rule of thumb, but with more openness to international partners and economic expansion, especially with the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. This paper deals with China's foreign policy towards Myanmar, and refers to the development of bilateral relations and China's interest in a distinguished relationship with Myanmar. The research indicates the strategic factors that make China interested in developing the relationship with Myanmar.

Introduction More than a decade ago, the World Bank argued that “underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance.” Poor quality institutions, weak rule of law, an absence of accountability, tight controls over information, and high levels of corruption still characterize many African states today. Aid levels have been reduced in many parts of Africa during the past decade. Yet in many of the countries with poor governance records, aid continues to contribute a very high percentage of government budgets. This article explores the institutional impact of these high levels of aid and the way that large amounts of aid are delivered. There are many reasons why governance is poor in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Colonialism did little to develop strong, indigenously rooted institutions that could tackle the development demands of modern states. Economic crisis and unsustainable debt, civil wars, and political instability have all taken their toll over the past 2 decades and more. It is difficult to separate the impact of these problems from the possible impact of foreign aid, which is often high in countries that suffer from precisely these problems. Theory provides conflicting guidance here. On the one hand, aid can release governments from binding revenue constraints, enabling them to strengthen domestic institutions and pay higher salaries to civil servants. Aid can provide training and technical assistance to build legal systems and accounting offices. In many countries, aid personnel (sometimes expatriate) manage important government programs, and the infusion of resources and technical assistance can give an important boost to the efficiency and effectiveness of governance, if only in a partial sense. Yet despite these likely benefits, it is also possible that, continued over

What determines the type and quantity of overseas aid given by individual donor countries? Answers to this question in the existing literature are polarized into two groups. One of them offers a theoretical treatment based on the theory of public goods which is not consistent with the available data, and the other offers empirical correlations without any explanatory theory. The first group-for example, Pincus and Olson and Zeckhauser-treats aid, like defense, as an "international public good." Small countries, on this approach, are free riders, spending relatively little themselves while deriving benefits from the expenditures of larger countries.' But this approach is not consistent with even a casual scrutiny of the OECD aid community in which, broadly speaking, the smallest countries are the most generous donors.2 The second group-for example, Hoadley and Beenstockdiscover correlations between a country's ratio of aid to GNP and certain independent variables which may be expected to influence it (e.g., that country's GNP, its dependence on foreign trade, its government's position in the ideological spectrum, and the state of the domestic economy).3 However, these findings are not fitted into any theoretical framework, so that it is difficult to work out what they really mean.4 The approach of this paper is to treat foreign aid as a public good for which there is a market, albeit a highly imperfect one because the consumers-donor country taxpayers-are ignorant about the very nature, let alone the price, of the commodity they are buying. On this view, factors on the demand side (i.e., taxpayers' response to their country's aid program) will help to determine the quantity of aid disbursed as well as factors on the supply side such as the donor government's desire to obtain strategic or trading benefits from aid. This view

In this study, the authors describe the evolution of the People's Republic of China's global health activities and related policies in Africa from the 1960s through the present and provide field case studies of two African nations-Sierra Leone and Kenya-that have received health aid from China. They then analyze China's use of global health support in Africa as a tool of soft power. The need to understand China's global health activities has intensified, given that Western, particularly U.S., foreign health aid policies are changing, prompting questions about whether China will shift its policies to strengthen its soft power in Africa and away from the decade-old Belt and Road Initiative's overarching Sino-centric trade focus. This analysis of China's health aid history, its current role in African health aid, and its recent reform called for by President Xi Jinping's Global Development Initiative is intended to help U.S. policymakers understand China's decisionmaking and implementation strategy for foreign aid. The analysis of the advantages and weaknesses of China's approaches can offer lessons to both donor countries and African countries that receive global health aid from China. The authors offer policy recommendations for the United States and for African countries.

The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative was announced in 2013 during China's President Xi Jinping's visit to Kazakhstan. Since its official announcement in 2013, China's OBOR initiative became a singularly important catchword in Chinese diplomacy and an important aspect of Chinese economic policy. Chinese investment started from purchasing Israeli technology and patents, then moved to investment in Israel high-tech companies focusing on research and development (R&D), and then to overall acquisition of major Israel companies, most notably Tnuva. China's OBOR vision may lead to the most ambitious investment in infrastructure in human history. China has participated in various Israeli infrastructure construction projects. Economic relations aside, recent years have witnessed a significant upsurge in cultural, educational, and most notably academic exchanges between China and Israel. Jewish and Israeli studies began quite late in China. In the 1980s there were some signs that the relations between China and Israel were warming up, but no academic programme was launched.

Empirical Evidence on Development Effectiveness: From Macroeconomic Structures to Micro-Level Implementation

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a well-acknowledged central economic and diplomatic policy of the Chinese government, which was proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013. By using content analysis and interviews, this paper analyzes Chinese President Xi’s speeches from 2013 to 2020 about the BRI, as well as official statements of the Chinese central government. It identifies at least five competing diplomatic narratives of the BRI. Different from repetitive literature that explores either the economic or political implications of the BRI, this paper contributes by exploring the original story that the Chinese government tries to tell the world. It concludes that initially, the narrative of the BRI has not been portrayed well from the Chinese side.

International development assistance is an integral part of the foreign economic and foreign policy activities of the US government. International aid is one of the largest components of US foreign relations spending and is regarded by many members of Congress as one of the most important foreign policy instruments. However, many US citizens and members of Congress feel that the US cannot afford such international aid spending, given the current budget deficit and competing budgetary priorities. As one of the largest donors of international development aid, the United States is of considerable interest to many researchers, including those who study trends in the polarization of attitudes toward foreign policy, including international aid. This article is devoted to the current US policy in the field of international development cooperation at the beginning of the presidency of Joe Biden. It examines the economic component of US government assistance: the total amount of US economic assistance, as well as the structure of international aid spending and country priorities for US economic assistance, are considered. An assessment of the prospects for US assistance is presented based on an analysis of the Joint Strategic Plan of the State Department and the Agency for International Assistance 2022-2026 and the US National Security Strategy 2022. Despite the stability and relative inertia of the international aid system, one can observe an increase in US interest in development assistance after the transition of power to President Biden, including in the context of competition with China.

(Korea's Multilateral Aid: Recent Developments and Future Challenges)

Pakistan is one of the key countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) where the latter is implementing a multibillion-dollar, multiyear investment plan known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). A collection of projects aimed at developing energy, industry and communication infrastructure, costing over USD 46 billion, CPEC is expected to contribute significantly to socio-economic development and poverty reduction in Pakistan. The main research question is, while implementing development projects in Pakistan, to what extent China adheres to its avowed principles of international development cooperation comprising features such as mutual respect, non-conditionality, equality, building local capacity and addressing actual needs of partner countries. Based mainly on the analysis of primary data collected during fieldwork in Pakistan, this research explores the extent to which the official narrative guides and influences the actual practice of China’s development cooperation on the ground. Although still evolving, the BRI and its constituent the CPEC, which is an investment-grant-loan model of financing in Pakistan, is an example of South-South Cooperation (SSC): the form of international development cooperation whereby “two or more developing countries pursue their individual or collective development through cooperative exchange of knowledge, skills, resources and technical expertise” (UNDP, 2007, p. 1). For the analysis of CPEC-related Chinese investment in Pakistan, this study uses an analytical framework developed by researchers from the South Africa chapter of the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST), a group of key research institutions from various developing countries dedicated to generating standardised, systematic and clearly comparable knowledge on SSC (Besharati & Rawhani, 2016; Besharati, Rawhani, & Rios, 2017). Established in 2015, and then refined and finalised in 2017 after a number of expert group meetings and field-based SSC case studies, the framework operationalises various conceptual issues related to the quality and development effectiveness of SSC. The framework, which is discussed later in some detail, comprises five dimensions and a set of 20 indicators. The overall framework and associated dimensions and indicators not only offer valuable parameters to assess the quality and effectiveness of SSC, but these are also closely related to the key principles and features of China’s foreign aid policy. The five key elements of the analytical framework are inclusive national ownership, horizontality, self-reliance and sustainability, accountability and transparency and development efficiency. Within this framework and associated parameters, this research examines the China-Pakistan development partnership under CPEC and explores the extent to which SSC principles are practiced. By systematically examining SSC in the form of Chinese investment and development cooperation projects in Pakistan, this study contributes to the limited body of academic literature on Chinese development cooperation with its key South Asian ally.

China’s role in foreign aid and, more broadly, in development cooperation on the global stage has grown significantly since it began seven decades ago. Particularly in recent years, through such platforms as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s profile and engagement in global governance in foreign aid and related areas has been further enhanced. China’s ambition is taking a more proactive approach in foreign aid and moving towards a model of international development cooperation by linking with the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and by including the BRI as a major platform to achieve key development goals. This paper provides a timely analysis of the evolution of China’s foreign aid policy in the past seven decades with a particular focus on the developments since 2000. It discusses China’s development finance to Africa and the major sectors receiving Chinese aid. It also analyses recent trends of Chinese foreign aid and identifies some of the challenges that China faces as it becomes a major player in international development financing.

This article looks at some of the characteristics of China’s foreign aid system and its development over the years. It discusses China’s foreign aid based on its own development experiences and its view of South–South development cooperation. Both the modalities and narratives of China’s international development cooperation need to be considered in order to better understand the complexities, strengths, and weaknesses of its aid system. As China’s international aid continues to grow and become more prominent, particularly in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, the article calls for a deeper understanding of China’s aid institutions and the need for greater cooperation and capacity building.

Abstract: After Chinese President Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013, China initiated reforms in foreign aid while maintaining its philosophy of non-conditionality. Given China’s role as a donor country for over 70 years, it is important to consider whether the implications of its non-conditionality have evolved. This article examines the evolution of the connotations of this non-conditionality. Using the constructivist theory of international relations, the article argues that China’s evolving national identity—from a communist country to a developing country and, ultimately, a great power—explains the changes in the connotations attached to its non-conditionality. This evolution has transitioned from not attaching economic conditions to aid to not requiring neoliberal reforms. Furthermore, China has increasingly focused on promoting its development model through non-conditionality to contrast its development strategy with that of Western funding sources rather than merely opposing Western neoliberal intervention as such. However, several contradictions are evident in the Xi administration’s approach to non-conditionality.