Unravelling the Anti- Defection Law in India: A Critical Examination of its Constitutionality

This paper critically examines India’s Anti-Defection Law by exploring its inception, evolution, impacts, legislative design, judicial interventions, key challenges, and proposed reforms. The Introduction outlines the Tenth Schedule’s objectives enacted in 1985 to uphold the electorate’s mandate and deter opportunistic defections while acknowledging emerging complexities in its implementation. The Evolution section traces developments from the 52nd Amendment’s original provisions on individual and group defections to the 91st Amendment’s removal of the split exception and introduction of ministerial disqualification clauses, highlighting factors that shaped the law’s present form. The Impacts segment analyses changes in party cohesion, legislative behaviour and political stability, noting a decline in individual defections but a rise in orchestrated group defections that challenge representative autonomy. The Legislative Framework section details the constitutional provisions Articles 102, 191 and the Tenth Schedule’s key paragraphs, amendments governing exemption thresholds and ministerial bans, clarifying the roles of Speakers, Chairpersons, and the scope for judicial review. The Judicial Response portion reviews landmark rulings such as Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, which affirmed judicial oversight over Speaker decisions and Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana, which imposed strict timelines for defection petitions. It also examines high court decisions like Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Legislative Assembly and Anosh Ekka v. Alamgir Alam, illustrating efforts to prevent undue delays and uphold natural justice in defection adjudication. The Challenges section identifies persistent shortcomings exploitation of the merger exception, procedural delays by presiding officers, a broad scope that stifles free legislative debate and inherent conflicts of interest when partisan Speakers adjudicate cases. The Conclusion recognises the law’s contributions to stability but underscores its limitations in protecting legislative independence. Finally, the Recommendations propose narrowing merger thresholds, establishing an independent tribunal for defection disputes and limiting the law’s application to confidence and financial votes.

Are anti-defection laws efficient? Many parliamentary democracies have enacted anti-defection laws to prevent frequent government collapses and political instability. Using the anti-defection law in India as a reference, I argue that the party-based anti-defection laws enacted in many Westminster-style Parliamentary democracies do not achieve their goals, yet drastically impact representative decision-making. I show how the entitlements and protections granted by anti-defection laws to political parties and legislators do not achieve the purpose of maintaining government stability and suggest two options to improve it.

Institutional theories of party cohesion may be divided into "nomination theories" and "structure of the executive theories". The former seek explanations of cohesion in the way nominations are conducted, predicting that de-centralized and inclusive nominations will reduce party cohesion. The latter attempt to explain cohesion by reference to the structure of the executive, and predict that parliamentary government will increase cohesion. Party cohesion in the Icelandic Althingi has, hitherto, not been extensively studied. In this article, large amounts of data are explored to test hypotheses derived from the two theoretical approaches. The analysis is based on roll-call data dating back to 1961 and electronic voting records from 1991 onwards. The main conclusion is that party cohesion is at a high level in Iceland, despite decentralized and inclusive nominations, and hypotheses derived from nomination theories therefore find no support in our data. Hypotheses derived from "structure of the executive theories" fare much better and the main reason for high party cohesion in Iceland seems to be parliamentary government. Various features of our data, however, encourage us not to ignore other contextual features affecting party cohesion, which neither of the two institutional theories can account for satisfactorily.

Regulation failing to keep up with India's trials boom

The Anti-defection statute has a great relevance in Indian democracy. Political defections in India persist despite the Anti-Defection Laws being put into place, which begs the question of how efficient these laws are at preserving political stability and discouraging opportunistic behavior on the part of elected officials. This study looks into the causes of political defections’ continued occurrence in India and assesses how well the Anti-Defection Laws work to solve the problem. The law’s historical context, its clauses, their effects on political parties, and how the legislative process operates will all be examined in this paper. In addition to looking at proposed changes to the current system, the report will also analyze the arguments and complaints made against the law.

In the intricate landscape of Indian politics, the phenomenon of defection has long been a subject of critical examination and debate. This abstract provides a glimpse into the forthcoming study, "Defection Game and India's Anti-defection Law – A Reflection," which delves into the complex interplay between political manoeuvring and legislative efforts to curb defection. Defections are one of the banes of the Indian Political System and defectors have decided the fate of many Governments from time to time. It toys with the democratic values enshrined in our country and betrays the faith response upon them by the electorates. Political Leaders for better pay, perks and prized posts often trick their party and switch to other parties. Even though the Anti-Defection Law has been enacted it does not yield results. This study endeavours to provide a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted issue of defection in Indian politics. By critically reflecting on the Anti-defection Law's strengths and weaknesses, it aims to contribute to informed discourse and potential reforms in this critical area of India's democratic governance. This study seeks to critically reflect upon the dynamics of defection in India's political landscape and the efficacy of the Anti-defection Law.

Family Laws in India have been founded on the basis of the personal laws of the religious diaspora which forms Indian society. Lawmaking and adjudication of private laws was seen as a crucial part of the 'rule of law' in India since colonial times. Hence, as the nation and society evolved, family law has undergone a sea of changes. These changes have been in response to a variety of stimuli - from efforts at modernisation and nation building to secularisation. This paper attempts to analyse the trends in the changes in family law through an analysis of case law and legislation. Further, the paper attempts to analyse the debate surrounding the Uniform Civil Code and show, through analysing historical and judicial subtext, how the reforms which UCC advocates have been calling for are being implemented without compromising on the constitutional principles of secularism.

The development in the British parliament, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, of highly cohesive legislative parties is a leading thread in the complex of events marking Britain's passage from an aristocratic to a democratic politics. Since the 1870s, journalists and scholars have attempted to account for the marked increase in the frequency with which MPs voted with their parties, and a number of plausible hypothesis have been advanced. There has not, however, been a systematic exposition of the kinds of factors which might, in theory, have been responsible for the change, nor much in the way of testing those ideas which have been suggested. We argue that most of the explanations in the literature cannot explain the earliest increases in party cohesion -- in the 1860s and 1870s. Sometimes, this is simply because the factors to which the explanation refers are not operative until a later date. In other cases, we devise tests of the hypotheses and find them wanting. In particular, we find no support in the 1870s for the idea, associated with Mosei Ostrogonski, that the new local party associations which developed after the second Reform Act effectively pressured MPs to support their party's leadership. Our theoretical discussion of the determinants of party cohesion leads us to investigate, as an alternative source of legislative change, the effect of electoral voting behavior (or, more properly, anticipations of such behavior) on legislative voting behavior. The bulk of the thesis is devoted to this task, and proceeds as follows: First, extensive use is made of a peculiarly detailed form of electoral documentation available in the double-member districts of pre-1885 Britain to study electoral behavior in the 1841-1880 period. This study reveals clear and marked changes in British electoral behavior in the 1860s and 1870s which have not hitherto been documented in the literature. An expected utility maximization model of the decision problem faced by electors in the double-member districts is developed and used to interpret these behavioral findings. We argue that voters became more party-oriented in the 1860s and 1870s, voting more on the basis of their preferences between the two great parties -- the Liberals and Conservatives -- and less on the basis of their attitudes toward the individual candidates. This shift in the basis of electoral choice, we argue, with electors becoming less responsive to the issue positions adopted by MPs, meant that the electoral benefits to an MP of dissent were smaller relative to the sanctions available to party leaders. Hence, we expect a decline in the influence of constituents over the voting behavior of their MPs (and a concomitant increase in party voting.) A number of approaches to the measurement of the influence of constituents over their MPs' voting behavior are taken, and the findings, on the whole, support the hypothesis.

Federal Indian law forms part of the bedrock of American jurisprudence. Indeed, critical parts of the pre-civil war constitutional canon were defined in federal Indian law cases that simultaneously provided legal justification for American westward expansion onto unceded Indian lands. As a result, federal Indian law makes up an inextricable part of American rule of law. Despite its importance, federal Indian law follows a long and circuitous road that requires “wander[ing] the maze of Indian statutes and case law tracing back [over] 100 years.” That road has long oscillated between two poles, with the Supreme Court sometimes applying foundational principles that view tribes as sovereigns “retaining all their original natural rights,” and at other times treating tribes as mere “wards subject to a [self-imposed] guardian.” Supreme Court respect for tribal sovereignty and self-determination reached its zenith in the so-called “modern era” of federal Indian law, spanning from 1959 through the late 1970s. During this era, the Court tended to adhere to federal Indian jurisprudence and solidified a relatively coherent doctrine based upon the foundational principles developed in the 1830s. The late Dean David Getches described the modern era as a time that “encouraged a reinvigoration of tribal governments throughout the country. During this period, tribes gained political influence and economic security as [the federal government] generally promoted a policy of tribal self-determination.” The Court turned away from its foundational Indian law principles with the onset of the 1980s and the departure intensified as Chief Justice William Rehnquist was appointed chief justice in 1986. Since then, the touchstone of the Supreme Court’s federal Indian jurisprudence has been to employ a “subjectivist” approach whereby it “gauges tribal sovereignty as a function of changing conditions”—demographic, social, political, and economic—and the expectations of non-Indians that may be potentially by the exercise of tribal power. As a result, the Supreme Court became a strikingly hostile place for American Indian tribes as the Court became increasingly willing to divest tribes of governmental powers, not by upholding the enactments of Congress, but through its own interpretation of what tribal inherent governmental rights ought to be. The appointment of Justice Sonia Sotomayor and, more recently, Justice Neil Gorsuch seems to have brought change to the Court’s direction in Indian law cases. Since then, cases have been consistently decided in favor of tribal litigants by reaffirming treaty rights through the application of foundational principles that focus on the plain language of treaties and the application of the Indian canons of construction. However, to be sure, even the Rehnquist Court did “recite[] and sometimes act[] upon foundation principles,” but those cases were limited to situations where “non-Indian interests [were] not seriously threatened.” All of Indian Country waited for, or perhaps dreaded, a true litmus test. That test came to the Supreme Court in the form of two Indian law cases—Sharp v. Murphy and McGirt v. Oklahoma—both of which were framed by non-Indian parties to affect the interests of an estimated 1.8 million people in eastern half Oklahoma. Ready or not, Indian Country found its test case, which squarely placed the Court’s competing jurisprudential philosophies— its foundation principles versus its “subjectivist” approach—on a collision course. In a powerful and uncharacteristically passionate decision, Justice Gorsuch wrote for a 5-4 majority, upholding treaty-based rights to re-recognize the historic reservation boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, the fourth largest Indigenous nation in the United States. The decision was the fourth consecutive treaty-rights victory and seemed to solidify a shift toward a consistent approach rooted in foundational principles. The victory was short-lived. Just weeks after the Court’s decision in McGirt, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away, once again shifting the make-up of the United States Supreme Court. As a result, Federal Indian law once again finds itself at a crossroads. The Murphy and McGirt decisions are landmark decisions that bring change to the legal landscape of much of Oklahoma. It remains to be seen whether the perceived new Supreme Court era in Indian law is here to stay.

Despite being one of the most contested themes of Indian constitutional law, debates on presidential discretion have generally remained inconclusive owing to the fair degree of plausibility of both the contending standpoints on the subject. It is undeniable that Indian parliamentary democratic system has been designed on the model of British parliamentary system in which the crown is absolutely bereft of any discretionary power and has to discharge her duties only on ministerial advice. But at the same time, it is equally true that the circumstantial dynamics of Indian political system is markedly different from the British political system in many respects. Moreover, in interpreting the relevant constitutional provisions and figuring out suitable conventions on presidential powers and functions, the Indian juridical and academic scholarship has not been as inimical to an iota of discretion for the president as has been the British to their crown. Yet, keeping in sync with the spirit of the parliamentary system, the Indian Constitution does not provide any explicit discretionary power to the president. Whatever discretionary power a president may derive is purely circumstantial in nature, and precedents vary widely. The article, therefore, seeks to provide a critical analysis of certain circumstances in which the president in India could exercise powers on his discretion either due to absence of a ministerial advice or, in rarest of the rare cases, to obtain a better outcome than the one coming out of ministerial advice.

Presidents vs. ParliamentsComparing Democratic Systems Donald L. Horowitz (bio) In "The Perils of Presidentialism" [Journal of Democracy 1 (Winter 1990): 51-69], Professor Juan Linz makes the claim that parliamentary systems are "more conducive to stable democracy" than are presidential systems. "This conclusion," he continues, "applies especially to nations with deep political cleavages and numerous political parties." This theme forms a leitmotiv in Professor Linz's recent works, has been picked up by other scholars, and runs the risk of becoming conventional wisdom before it receives searching scrutiny. Linz argues that the presidential office introduces an undesirable element of winner-take-all politics into societies that need mechanisms of conciliation instead. A presidential candidate is either elected or not, whereas in parliamentary systems many shades of outcome are possible. Moreover, a directly elected president may think he has a popular "mandate," even if he has been elected with only a small plurality of the vote, perhaps even less than 40 percent. The potential for conflict is accordingly enhanced. Conflict is promoted, in Linz's view, by the separation of powers that divides the legislature from the president. The fixed term of a separately elected president makes for rigidity between elections. By contrast, parliamentary systems are able to resolve crises at any time simply by changing leaders or governments. Separate presidential election also produces weak cabinets and fosters electoral contests in which extremists either have too much influence or the whole society becomes polarized. This is a powerful indictment, supported by an abiding concern for [End Page 73] the stability of precarious democratizing regimes. Linz's claims, however, are not sustainable. First, they are based on a regionally skewed and highly selective sample of comparative experience, principally from Latin America. Second, they rest on a mechanistic, even caricatured, view of the presidency. Third, they assume a particular system of electing the president, which is not necessarily the best system. Finally, by ignoring the functions that a separately elected president can perform for a divided society, they defeat Linz's own admirable purposes. Presidentialism and Political Instability As frequent references to Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Chile attest, Linz believes that presidentialism has contributed to instability in Latin America. If, however, his focus had been on instability in postcolonial Asia and Africa, the institutional villain would surely have been parliamentary systems. Indeed, Sir Arthur Lewis argued 25 years ago in his lectures on Politics in West Africa that the inherited Westminster system of parliamentary democracy was responsible for much of the authoritarianism then emerging in English-speaking Africa. What Lewis emphasized was the winner-take-all features of the Westminster model, in which anyone with a parliamentary majority was able to seize the state. Lewis's understanding conforms to that of many Africans seeking to restore democratic rule. The most impressive efforts at redemocratization, those of Nigeria in 1978-79 and again at the present time, involve adoption of a presidential system to mitigate societal divisions. Under the parliamentary system inherited at independence, a cluster of ethnic groups from the north had managed to secure a majority of seats and shut all other groups out of power. This game of total inclusion and exclusion characterized Nigerian politics after 1960, precipitating the military coups of 1966 and the war of Biafran secession from 1967 to 1970. By choosing a separation of powers, the Nigerians aimed to prevent any group from controlling the country by controlling parliament. Now it is possible that parliamentary systems helped stifle democracy in Africa while presidential systems helped stifle it in Latin America, but there are grounds for doubt. Linz refers to the emergence of conciliatory practices in the presidential systems of Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil, but he dismisses them as "deviations." Chile under Salvador Allende, on the other hand, is regarded as closer to the norm, with presidentialism exacerbating social conflict. Yet at least some research by Arturo Valenzuela suggests that, before Allende, many Chilean presidents actually bolstered centrist, moderating tendencies. The experience of the presidency in the United States, where the presidency was invented, is also explained away as "an exception." Consequently, Chile's exacerbated conflict is traced to its presidency, while the moderated conflict of the...

The anti-defection law in India is in shambles. It has failed to keep up the expectations of the electorate. The political dramas in the recent assembly election in Maharashtra, Karnataka, Goa and Madhya Pradesh amplify this claim. The fractured verdicts in these elections and otherwise also makes the coalition inevitable. Unless this political reality is reflected in the anti-defection law the crisis of defection can’t be resolved. Therefore, the central issue which this paper address is whether the expression political party can be interpreted to include coalitions. The paper answers the issue in affirmative but, as a precursor to it advises certain other legal and other structural changes in the Indian polity. It has been contended that an integrated approach is needed to be taken which not just ensures the stability of the government but, also upholds the democratic spirit of the parliamentary democracy. It is suggested that it can be achieved by resolving the crisis of governability, strengthening the legal regime, bringing internal democracy in political parties and evolving the coalition dharma.

The Pacific Island microstate of Tuvalu has acquired a reputation for having a ‘high degree of political stability’ (Somoza 2001, p. 832), and has a top Freedom House ranking for civil rights and political liberties (Freedom House 2007). Yet, despite regular elections and the absence of severe social crises, there has been since 1993 an increasing frequency of ‘no confidence’ challenges in parliament and resulting defeats of governments. Following an early postindependence phase of relative executive stability, Prime Ministers proved much less able to sustain majorities in parliament. Seven different governments took office between 1998 and 2006, and none lasted more than two years. One analysis of the 2004 parliament found that all but two of the then incumbent MPs had defected from one group to another at some point during their tenures (Taafaki 2004, p. 17). ‘Political stability’ was a principle concern encountered during the deliberations of the 2000 Constitutional Review Committee (CRC). Its absence, linked to the manoeuvres of aspiring politicians and defecting government backbenchers, has sparked strengthening popular hostility and growing cynicism about parliamentary processes. At the 2006 election, all the incumbent ministers lost their seats, with the exception of the Prime Minister and the Speaker, and the turnover of MPs was higher than at any previous election in Tuvalu’s history. In response to long-run government instability, the new government introduced a constitutional amendment in 2007 increasing the size of cabinet by two, aiming to bring to an end an era where government majorities depended on sustaining a single progovernment backbencher.

From constitutional revolution (1907) to Islamic revolution (1979), Iranian governments had been fluctuated sharply (longevity of government from 3 days to more than 12 years). This situation was the result of permanent competition between the king, parliament, government, interest groups and also international political conditions. In this paper, we study the effect of mentioned conditions on economic growth. For this purpose, we define 7 political instability indices and examine the best definition for political instability that was suitable for Iranian condition in mentioned duration. Using Solow growth model and OLS approach, we find that when the longevity of government was smaller than four years, or the longevity of two of three sequential governments were smaller than one year, then Iran experienced the political instability and it shrinks the economic growth. Finally, we find that when government was politically stable, and institutional constrains on government by other branches were strong, then Iranian economy experienced positive and reliable economic growth. These conditions had been experienced in three periods of time: 1927-1939, 1955-1960, and 1964-1977. It means that duration of 1907-1979 can be divided into two major parts: duration of political stability with remarkable economic growth (for three mentioned periods), and duration of political instability with high economic fluctuations or recession.

This research paper provides information that gender discrimination, and deep-rooted backward mentality, social norms, and practices increase crime related to women like female feticide, teenage pregnancy, child domestic work, child marriage poor education and health, sexual abuse, exploitation, and violence. Many of these manifestations will not change unless girls are valued more.3 This research paper also provides deep knowledge about the legislation which is provided by the government to curb the problem related to female feticide, immoral trafficking, or other related crimes. This research paper also deals with some important case laws related to these crimes. Female feticide is the reason because the mortality rate of girls is higher than boys, according to the data released by National Crime Records Bureau for the year 2019, In Madhya Pradesh, every month at least 3 girls were killed before they were born. In 2019, Madhya Pradesh had earned the lead in the list of states in female feticide because M.P. reported thirty-two cases of feticide, Rajasthan-twenty-two, Haryana-seventeen, Gujarat- fifteen and Bihar –fifteen in a year. There are many incidents related to female feticide, immoral trafficking, and other women- related crimes faced by the government of India. Legislations made by the government to prevent these problems and these legislations have some loopholes because of that these Acts.