Abstract
ABSTRACT From a theoretical perspective of project-based organising, this study analyses how a deployed military task force heuristically learns. Empirically, learning within Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) in southern Afghanistan, is scrutinised. This contribution of the Netherlands armed forces to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) lasted for four years and saw successive rotations of task forces simultaneously fighting an insurgency and trying to stabilise a part of Afghanistan through reconstruction and development projects. Above all, the study has found that task ambiguity can make it challenging for a task force deployed to deal with varying contingencies at the same time. Two effects are noteworthy. First, learning can become compartmentalised, with different organisational elements following their own learning trajectories. Second, learning can also become short-term focused, responding to the most imminent and familiar threat. Combined, both learning impulses affect organisational coherence in meeting the overarching mission end state.
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