Unleashing the elected members: why states do (not) draft resolutions at the United Nations Security Council

Introduction On 24 September 2003 the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) inaugurated a new agenda item entitled ‘Justice and the Rule of Law’, acknowledging the UNSC’s ‘heavy responsibility to promote justice and the rule of law in its efforts to maintain international peace and security’.1 This book examines how the UNSC has responded to this mandate, particularly in the areas of peacekeeping, sanctions and the use of force. The contributors to this volume discuss both how the concept of the rule of law (ROL) regulates, or influences, UNSC activity and how the UNSC has in turn shaped the notion of the ROL. The UNSC’s designation of the ROL as an important theme offers principled law as the solution to the problem of unprincipled politics, and stable peace as the alternative to destabilising war. The idea is that threats to peace and security should be managed in accordance with the norms and values enshrined in the UN Charter. However, as many contributors to this collection note, the concept of the ROL is famously opaque and contested. Some commentators question the ability of the ROL to guide actions to maintain international peace and security on the basis that it is insufficiently coherent.2 Others criticise attempts to transplant a notion with western origins and an associated suite of western rule-oflaw institutions into other contexts.3 The veto power accorded to the UNSC’s five permanent members by the UN Charter is also regarded as undermining the capacity of the ROL to temper the exercise of raw power in and through the UNSC.4 The relationship between the UNSC and the ROL provides a fascinating case study of how powerful actors both shape and are shaped by powerful ideas. Terence Halliday has pointed to the tension between two different modes of UNSC interaction with the ROL – the external and the internal. Halliday describes the UNSC’s external invocations of the concept as ROL ‘on the offense’ and claims of internal disregard of the ROL placing the UNSC ‘on the defence’.5 It is difficult for the UNSC to claim to act in the name of the ROL externally, without at the same time accepting the concept’s applicability to the internal workings of the UNSC. Given these tensions and weaknesses in the ROL, how does it regulate behaviour in the international arena?

Human rights abuses occurring in Gaza, including civilian casualties, have been countlessly reported. Despite numerous resolutions presented, particularly to the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC), data from the UN reveals that they have unfortunately been vetoed. South Africa initiated a legal action before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing Israel of breaching the 1948 Genocide Convention—a treaty to which both nations are Parties to. Based on doctrinal analysis, this paper raises one big question; whether the UNSC, that is supposed to uphold international peace and security, will become a stumbling block in the quest for justice for the Palestinian and fails to serve its purpose? This paper argues that judging from Netanyahu’s statement that Israel will not follow and perform any ICJ’s decisions and the United States, being one of the UNSC permanent members will use any necessary measures within the UNSC to prevent such decision from being enforced. This paper concludes that the veto power within the UNSC hinders the pursuit of justice for the Palestinians and the ability of certain member states to veto resolutions creates challenges in the Council’s effectiveness and compromises its capacity to address the conflict for the pursuit of justice.

This article examines European Union (EU) military operations from the perspective of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and UN collective security. The EU has supported UN peacekeeping missions through its own military operations within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), based on the authorisation of these operations by the UN Security Council. However, the EU’s military operation on the Mediterranean Sea, Operation Sophia, was established in 2015 without such prior UN Security Council authorisation. Although the UN Security Council authorised the operation subsequently, it was received in a less positive light than previous operations and was criticised not only for the way in which it was established, but also for its performance. The article argues that this break with prior practice does not indicate a new direction being taken by the EU as it has retreated from this approach and established a new military operation in the Mediterranean (Operation Irini), again firmly in line with a mandate issued by the UN Security Council in 2020. The assessment of EU military operations can be complex as there might be other EU agencies involved in the process such as Frontex, and their role in future operations, in particular in the field of migration, should be monitored. Yet this internal complexity does not alter their evaluation under international law. As soon as EU military operations are conducted on the territory of a third State, the EU needs to secure either a UN Security Council authorisation or State consent. Looking at this process from the perspective of the UN Security Council sheds light on the complexity of EU military operations and their position within UN collective security.

While United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions are widely studied, there is only limited information about their authors. Previous studies have argued that the states that draft resolutions exert sizeable influence over their content, but the lack of comprehensive data has hindered any systematic investigations into their agency, role and motivation when authoring resolutions. This article introduces the United Nations Security Council Resolution Authors (UNSCRA) dataset, which collects information on sponsors (1990–2023) and lead negotiators (2008–2023) for 2,179 drafts tabled at the United Nations Security Council, and illustrates its value through descriptive analysis. UNSCRA provides unique insights on drafts (e.g. agenda items and votes) and author profiles (e.g. numbers and regional distribution). The data coded on a draft-specific level open new avenues for research on states’ influence and interests at the UNSC.

IntroductionOn July 5, 2006, North Korea test-launched an array of missiles, which ended a self-imposed moratorium of eight years. Ten days after the missile test (on July 15, 2006), in its toughest official response to North Korean actions since 1994, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1695. This resolution condemned the missile tests, demanded North Korea cease all activities related to its ballistic mi - ssile program, and required all member states to comply with measures limiting North Korea's access to missile-tested materials or technology. On October 9, 2006, North Korea set offits first nuclear test. The UN Security Council voted unanimously on October 14 to slap North Korea with trade, travel, and other as punishment for its claimed nuclear weapons test. This resolution (1718) is much stronger than the earlier resolutions; it calls for inspection of North Korea cargoes, bars the travel to UN member states of North Koreans responsible for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, requires UN member states to freeze the financial assets of North Korean people or entities designated by the UN as engaged in North Korean WMD activities, and requires the establishment of an oversight committee.Under the latest resolution (2094), tougher impose penalties on North Korean banking, travel, and trade, and were passed in a 15-0 vote that reflected the country's increased international isolation. China, the North's longtime benefactor, helped the United States draftthe resolution, in what outside experts called a sign of Beijing's growing annoyance with Pyongyang's defiant behavior on the nuclear issue. The Chinese had entreated the North Koreans not to proceed with the February 12, 2013, underground nuclear test, their third. It is questionable whether these new will work. In other words, will the compel North Korean leaders to comply fully with UN demands, or will they lead the North Korean masses to rebel against their leaders? This article discusses reasons for the possible failure of these new against North Korea, the consequences of their failure to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, and policy options on a nuclear North Korea.The Effectiveness of Sanctions Against Outlaw CountriesThe term sanctions means restrictions on normal commercial relations with a target country, including trade, investment, and other cross-border activities. Economic are either unilateral or multilateral. A unilateral sanction is imposed by one country, such as the U.S., against another country, such as North Korea. Multilateral require the cooperation of at least two nations. The clearest examples of multilateral are those imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations.Multinational were relatively rare before 1990. The UN Security Council, obviously incapacitated due to Cold War-related veto powers, imposed only twice (Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977) in the 45 years of its existence prior to the August 1990 embargo of Iraq.1 Since 1990, however, the UN Security Council has increasingly imposed economic to prevent, manage, or resolve violent conflict. When a UN sanction is imposed, all UN member nations are required to comply with the order and to enforce the sanction against the outlaw country.2The active utilization of as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy dates back to the aftermath of World War I, when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson suggested that the adoption of was a method that could keep the world free of war. However, empirical studies on the effectiveness of economic by Pape3 and others found that historically, have a poor track record. The rare success of cases such as South Africa is associated with unique factors that are unlikely to be found elsewhere. …

Zooming in on the serving European Union (EU) Member States and exploring the legal parameters defining regional actorness both directly and indirectly, this article analyzes the EU's representation at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Looking at the theory and practice behind Articles 52, 23 and 103 of the UN Charter, we shed fresh light on the only provision in the European Treaties that explicitly referred to the UN Security Council, i.e. the former Article 19 of the EU Treaty. We define that provision as a regional interpretation of Article 103 of the UN Charter and discuss its implementation in day-to-day decision-making, especially as for economic and financial sanctions measures. Hereby, we focus on the negotiations leading to UN Security Council Resolution 1822(2008).

The article examines the impact of history problems on Japan’s long-lasting efforts to gain permanent membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. It analyzes both the domestic stimuli behind Tokyo’s stance on the UN reform and the external constraints on the UN Security Council enlargement. It is argued that while problems with Japan’s bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council stemmed mainly from divergent interests of member states, history issues constituted an additional obstacle that weakened Tokyo’s position in negotiations on the UN reform. The discourse on lack of repentance by Japan for the atrocities committed during the Second World War was instrumentally used by the country’s rivals, mainly China and South Korea, all in the effort to hinder Tokyo’s efforts on the international arena.

The United Nations (UN) Security Council is the world's highest political body and the most important actor and facilitator of high-level multilateral diplomacy. It can be argued that virtually all activities of the Security Council involve diplomacy - i.e. an element of negotiation and persuasion. This chapter tries to answer the questions: about the extent to which the Security Council's work concerns human rights; about how willing the Security Council has been to actively pursue human rights issues in its work; about the impact the Council has had on human rights overall; and whether there is potential for the Security Council to achieve more in regard to the promotion and protection of human rights. The chapter focuses on the human rights diplomacy of the UN Security Council that is diplomatic action taking place at the UN Headquarters in New York. Keywords: diplomatic action; human rights diplomacy; political body; protection of human rights; UN Headquarters; United Nations (UN) Security Council

Asset freezes are since 2000 being applied by the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) to non‐state actors. This came about as a ‘mutation’ of the sanctions program initiated by Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1390 (2002): currently the targets are only supected terrorists or terrorism financiers.This ‘mutation’ has created perplexities and problems, namely for the EU, which enforces UN SC Resolutions by a combination of first and second pillar methods. The main problem concerns issues of fundamental rights, currently being litigated.The debate on the compatibility of the current practice of UN SC asset freezing within EU law takes place amidst a fundamental lack of clarity as to the exact purposes and operational objectives of such freezes. It is argued that this practice amounts to an ad hoc (para‐)criminal procedure measure, enacted by political bodies rather than courts, and without judicial oversight.The current UN SC practice of asset freezing against non‐state actors breaches the right to judicial review, as well as the presumption of innocence. If this practice it is to continue at all, methods that make it fully compatible with the rule of law must be adopted. Especially, their renewal ad aeternum should not be possible.

The article highlights the activities of the United Nations and the UN Security Council during the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014-2023 and the activity of Ukrainian diplomacy in defending Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity. The author analyses, in particular, the voting processes at the UN General Assembly and Security Council meetings on issues related to the Russian aggression against Ukraine and points out their ineffectiveness. The author emphasises the need to reform all UN activities in accordance with the current challenges of the global world in the context of the formation of a new, multipolar system of international relations. Particular attention is paid to the acute problem of transforming the most influential body of the United Nations - the Security Council, its structure and decision-making mechanisms, which have been based on the principle of division into permanent and non-permanent members since 1945. The principle of division into permanent and non-permanent members and veto power for the former - the United States, the USSR (and today its illegal successor, the Russian Federation), the People's Republic of China, France and the United Kingdom - no longer corresponds to current realities, as the exclusive possession of veto power by the leading players in world politics is a direct violation of the principle of equality of UN member states. The article also examines the active work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine during the Russian war against Ukraine. It is not only about the realisation of the complex current tasks of expanding an effective pro-Ukrainian coalition in the world, restoring universal respect for the UN Charter and the equal rights of independent states and peoples, but also about the prospects for post-war arrangements in Europe and the world with Ukraine's active participation. It is concluded that Ukrainian diplomacy, in the difficult conditions of martial law and the crisis of the UN and the entire international security system, is quite adequately fulfilling its responsible mission of protecting Ukraine's national interests in the modern global world.

This paper argues that the United Nations (UN) Security Council counterterrorism policies have largely failed because they did not address many of the conditions that make certain parts of the world a fertile ground for the emergence of terrorism, including the historical antecedents that lead to violence; the lingering and pervasive influence and hegemony of UN Security Council Members; the UN Security Council members' self‐serving and morally inconsistent exercise of their power of veto or in condemning violent acts perpetrated by Member States; and the double standard in the implementation of its policies (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Farer, 2002; Glennon, 2003). Utilizing a critical geopolitical perspective, as well as the conceptualizations of the “normative unconscious” (Layton, 2002, 2006) and the “absent referent” (Adams, 1990) of and Benjamin's framework of witnessing and the “moral third” (Benjamin, 2018). The paper further argues that much of what is taken as the status quo in United Nations Security Council counterterrorism policies is derived from ideological principles that were ultimately created in the service of the state apparatuses (and their signature exploitative practices) that governments unconsciously feel compelled to sustain. By making explicit these proclivities, and exposing terrorists as the absent referent of the United Nations Security Council's discussions, the paper offers a psychoanalytic framework to explain the logic behind such counterterrorism policies. Further, following Benjamin, the paper suggests that by moving away from Eurocentric, zero‐sum, and colonial logic, there may be a way to organically recognize populations that are aggrieved by these state apparatuses in a way that could obviate the use of political violence and, inter alia, terrorism.

African states and the region as a whole have played important roles in the international system, including peacekeeping contributions, alliances, and a significant influence on global south-south cooperation. However, Africa has been faced with the challenge of underrepresentation in key global organizations due to its late entry as a result of colonialism. The quest for inclusion and proper representation in the United Nations (UN) Security Council has become a life-long pursuit for most African diplomats and heads of state. Thus, this article investigates the growth of Africa’s influence in the global system since the Cold War era. A transition that has revolved from simply being receivers of resolutions and directions from the global order to forming self-governing organisations and subsequently contesting the status quo. The central question is: does Africa have what it takes to get a permanent seat and equitable representation in the UN Security Council? The emergence of a united African agency in the international system has been a development that has given the region a voice in global affairs. Although individual states such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa have made significant contributions to global governance, the focus remains on a united African agency and its ability to achieve full representation in global politics. To this the end, the goal of the entire assessment is to strengthen the argument for African representation in the United Nations Security Council—the most significant body in the world.

Recent practice shows that domestic courts are increasingly confronted with complaints lodged by individuals or entities affected by measures adopted by the United Nations (UN) Security Council. This chapter aims instead at examining the possible role of the European Union (EU) judge in reviewing the international validity of Security Council resolutions or of EU acts implementing such resolutions. It addresses and critically assesses the European Court of Justice (ECJ)'s assertion that it lacks the competence to conduct a review on the basis of international law standard. The chapter examines certain solutions which may help to mitigate some of the inconveniences inherent in the inward looking approach followed by the ECJ in its Kadi judgment, as well as to enhance the role of EU courts in contributing to promote the goals of the international legal order. Keywords:European Court of Justice (ECJ); international law; international legal order; Kadi ; United Nations (UN) Security Council

The paper discusses United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2240 (2015). The Resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorises for a certain period of time UN member states to inspect and seize vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya when they reasonably suspect that these are being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking. The paper sees in resolution 2240 an example of how the UN Security Council may empower states to take action against transnational social phenomena that raise serious concerns from the perspective of human rights – regarding especially the right to life. The idea that transpires from this resolution is that transnational phenomena, such as smuggling of migrants and human trafficking, require (coordinated, as the study argues) action by all involved states and, more generally, international actors (although the focus in the study is on states). Because of their transnational nature, such situations involve a plurality of duty bearers, each one of which is partially connected to the situation and has an obligation to be pro-actively engaged – to the extent that its individual connection with the situation at issue justifies and requires it. This leads to a situation of multiple duty bearers who exercise parallel and, possibly, also overlapping jurisdiction as a means to fulfill their duties under international law – especially regarding the so-called positive dimension of human rights, i.e. the duty to protect. This implies that concurrent state responsibility (in the sense of liability) may arise, if more than one of these duty bearers break their duties. With its resolution, the UNSC contributes to the idea of shared responsibility by multiple states to react against transnational social phenomena that raise concerns from the perspective of human rights and human security. Because human trafficking and smuggling raise issues of human security, the idea of multiple duty bearers and concurrent state responsibility advanced in the study can be associated with the UN human security policy framework. The paper argues that this framework ought to be attuned to fully meet the particular needs, nature and features of transnational phenomena, such as trafficking and smuggling, that threaten the security and well-being of people. For human security to be successful in its goals, it needs to be adjusted to the transnational nature of these phenomena. What is required when a situation necessitating protection exceeds or transcends the borders of a state, is establishing frameworks of cooperation and coordination between the various involved parties. This is an essential precondition for human security to deliver effective results and prosper in the era of inter-connection and globalisation.

Seated at the famous horseshoe table in the United Nations Security Council chamber in New York on 25 October 1962, US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson presented fellow Council members with photographic evidence of Soviet missile installations in Cuba. Unveiling the evidence collected by US intelligence services over the previous weeks and months, Stevenson’s performance produced a supreme and memorable moment of Cold War drama. Some 40 years later, Secretary of State Colin Powell, making the case Review Essay