United States in Global Exports at the Beginning of the Third Decade

Biological invasions are synonymous with international trade. The direct effects of trade have largely been quantified using relationships between imports and the number of alien species in a region or patterns in the global spread of species linked to shipping and air traffic networks. But trade also has an indirect role on biological invasions by transforming the environments and societies of exporting and importing nations. Here, both the direct and indirect roles of trade on biological invasions, as well as their interaction, are examined for the first time. Future trends in international trade, including e-commerce, new trade routes, and major infrastructure developments, will lead to the pressure on national borders soon outstripping the resources available for intervention. The current legislative and scientific tools targeting biological invasions are insufficient to deal with this growing threat and require a new mindset that focuses on curbing the pandemic risk posed by alien species.

Previous articleNext article FreeCommentGeorge M. von FurstenbergGeorge M. von FurstenbergIndiana University Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreI. Introduction, Outline, and Making Up for the Lack of Hypothesis TestingBergin and Lin pick up a venerable distinction that, poorly represented with disaggregated trade data now accessible, has become the dernier cri of trade theory. The general issue of the new literature is what influences the division into intensive and extensive margin of the growth of a country’s share in the global exports going to another country. The specific issue raised in a subset of papers like the one here that is of interest is how, and then why, that division is influenced by the exchange rate regime between pairs of countries.This comment first conveys the essence of the historical distinction and then shows how the data currently used fail to reflect that distinction. This raises the question of what a contemporary implementation of the classical concept, largely preserved in Bergin and Lin’s model but not in its empirical implementation, could imply. It then discusses the absence of substantial uncertainty about future real exchange rates in the model, which detracts from the paper’s main theme. Other aspects that are crucial to the industrial organization of cross‐border trade, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade in components, also are missing from the model. This makes it difficult to test hypotheses with it or to account for its findings.One crude validation test could be to check on the growth of trade shares for Canada and Mexico with the United States since the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement 1988 or the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 1994 and examine how this growth has been divided between the extensive and intensive margins. My hunch is that the expansion of the bilateral trade shares of these countries is about as large and as concentrated at the extensive margin as Bergin and Lin estimated for currency unions sans euroland. But in fact the currencies of all NAFTA countries have been floating against each other, and real exchange rates have swung widely between them since 1994.II. The Classical Definition of Expanding Trade at Extensive and Intensive MarginsFor over 2 centuries, international trade has been rated as beneficial whether expanded at its intensive or extensive margins but for different reasons. The benefits on the intensive margin stem from getting more for producing exportable goods than available in exchange for other goods produced under autarky. Exploiting this margin to raise real income was the subject of the theory of comparative advantage. The extensive margin refers to the benefits of enjoying new goods not produced, and perhaps still too expensive to produce, at home, after the technique for doing so has been learned.Setting the terms of exchange for such natural monopoly goods poses special challenges. The difficulty is that for them there is no bracket on the equilibrium terms of trade that is created by internal relative production‐cost conditions in each of the partner countries, as under incomplete specialization. Classical economists referred to the sagas of the salt, spice, and silk trades, however, to point out that any increase in a unique imported “variety” that a country chooses to enjoy on any terms would have to be at least somewhat beneficial. Variatio delectat, though not without limit: we now have theories of habit goods and rational inattention that explain what to fall back on when variety gets bewildering and the choices too many and complex to think through.Classical economists’ discussions of international trade thus invariably emphasized two benefits: (1) increased abundance and real income through improvement in the terms of exchange for one’s exportable output compared with autarky, and (2) greater variety than available under autarky producing hedonic gain.Adam Smith assigned several different functions to trade, such as providing a vent for “surplus” domestic production and allowing the exploitation of scale economies through specialization since the division of labor was seen as limited by the extent of the market. Yet he chose to emphasize that free trade is essential for the maximum development of wealth for any nation because, through such trade, a variety of goods becomes possible. Ricardo notes that foreign trade “increases the amount and variety of the objects on which revenue may be expended, and affords, by the abundance and cheapness of commodities, incentives to saving, and to the accumulation of capital” (see Ruffin 2002, 741). Being the principal discoverer of the theory of comparative advantage, he thus put more emphasis on benefit 1 than benefit 2. Later theories, such as the Scandinavian theory of comparative advantage that was also based on factor immobility and incomplete specialization as the normal outcome, involved trade as a bringer of variety even less: the production function specific to a good was assumed to be the same in all countries, but factor endowment ratios, and hence the factor content of goods traded, differed between them.The gist of all the classical distinctions is that “extensive” types of goods involved in the expansion of trade are specially made and hence new, based on technical and taste innovations, or firmly identified with a geographic region that can produce them. Trade in “intensive” goods, by contrast, involves standardized auction‐type goods readily available and in continuous and habitual supply from several sources and in general use.III. Lost in Translation to Canned Data CategoriesTo implement their search for differential effects of exchange rate regimes at the two margins, Bergin and Lin rely on a system of Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)—a four–digit classification ending in 2000. Adding proportionately more than competing suppliers from other countries to existing exports within a four‐digit category would expand trade at the intensive margin; exporting in more categories would boost trade at the extensive margin. To see whether such a definition is economically meaningful requires looking into the content of the statistical categories. All these categories, except for unprocessed foods, live animals, and crude materials, relate to manufactured goods. They do not include services, which now account for two‐thirds of personal consumption expenditures and the greatest increase in hedonic variety. Only one of the 10 one‐digit SITC categories starting at 0—number 8, Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles—contains a high proportion of finished consumer goods. Lower categories include intermediate and capital goods traded between firms.The SITC classification scheme does not establish categories that deserve to be called varieties or composite products in a hedonic sense but uses quite different principles of grouping. For example, 8427 is the category for blouses, shirts, and shirt‐blouses for women and girls of woven textile fabrics, while 8447 is for the same but of knitted or crocheted textile fabrics. Growth at the extensive margin of trade thus would be produced by expanding the types of processed fabric used in exported blouses, not by providing a greater range of quality or variety of design. So if a country that previously exported only blouses of woven fabric started to export knitted blouses of the same design and intended for a similar occasion, it would be expanding trade at the extensive margin under Bergin and Lin’s measure. If the country instead started also to export blouses of a stunning new design and for different occasions, but still of woven fabric, it would expand trade at the intensive margin. This example shows that whether trade is boosted inside a four‐digit category or in different categories depends entirely on the configuration of these boxes and does not relate to any distinguishing consumer or producer economics that I can recognize. Certainly classical economics would be more inclined to credit the design innovation with creating benefits at the extensive margin than at the intensive margin, for it would distinguish between the upscale trade that contributes to variety and the downscale trade in basic, fairly standardized, goods contributing to abundance.One more example to drive home the point: children’s toys is category 8942, and 8947 is sporting goods. Assume that a firm that had specialized in exporting gloves and mittens used in sports (89477) decided to apply its facility in working specialty fabrics to also manufacture outfits and accessories for dragons, dolls, and knights for export. Once again, by entering the toy category in which the country had not exported before, it would expand trade at the extensive margin according to Bergin and Lin’s measure. If the firm instead had decided to take up the production of fishing rods (89471), an entirely unrelated new venture, it would have increased trade at the intensive margin since the country was exporting appreciably in the associated four‐digit category already before.Hence, the more one looks into the categories, the less suitable they appear to convey the “classical” or any other predictable economic content or difference that Bergin and Lin are seeking—or simply asserting as if such a relevant difference did not first need to be constructed in the categories they work with. Contrary to what Bergin and Lin presume, many different goods are bunched together in four‐digit categories according to noneconomic and incoherent principles of classification. Hence, innovation and augmentation of variety in exports can occur within, as well as between, SITC categories without obvious distinction.Depending on what theme researchers pursue, they must first obtain a relevant grouping of goods. Grouping criteria might include R&D and factor intensity or might serve to distinguish knowledge goods, IPR‐protected goods, ICT goods, design‐intensive goods, fashion goods, goods tied to geographic origin, customized goods, differentiated goods, and standardized goods with ISO number, and so forth. Investigating how various degrees of integration and types of regimes affect the volume and distribution of trade in such goods may prove insightful. For instance, exchange rate regimes could be among the factors that differentially affect the growth of exports by such industry characteristics. If so, this might give a clue to why such regimes matter for the structure of export growth. Such a structured approach would avoid pressing economic interpretations on exports expanding within and between SITC product categories that these categories cannot support.There are at least three other match‐up problems between economic theory and data:a Bergin and Lin’s model variety refers only to finished consumer goods and their “AL” (a nod to the labor theory of value?) production function does not take in semi‐finished inputs or capital. However, the data used are not nearly so exclusive: both France and Germany, for instance, export more capital goods than consumer goods, and the import content of Germany’s export goods is 40%. Goods other than consumer goods account for the lion’s share of the data and dominate the results, but these are to be understood with a model not containing such goods.b Classical economists did not consider fragmentation trade nor do Bergin and Lin. Yet an explosion of such back‐and‐forth trade inside Europe is likely to register as a big expansion of trade at the extensive margin in the authors’ scheme. For the representative consumer in their model, trade in more categories of components could add to variety only to the extent that these components were incorporated in variety‐enhancing final products. Fragmentation trade in components is governed by considerations of cost efficiency and greater abundance, not hedonic variety.c There is more in the data than appears in the model. Conversely, firms, whose number is endogenously determined in the model, do not appear in the data. Berthou and Fontagné (2008, 15) estimate with French firm data (collected at the HS‐8 level) that the market share of the 10% largest exporters was 95% in the period 2000–2003. Hence, if French exports to country N become significant in additional categories, large established firms already exporting in many categories to country N are more likely to be involved than small firms exporting for the first time. By dwelling on set‐up costs, Bergin and Lin imply the opposite. Discussions of set‐up costs for entering foreign markets also do not distinguish among those involving preparations in production (e.g., producing with higher productivity and quality), distribution (logistics), and final sales abroad (retail outlets and marketing). Retail giants like Carrefour or Wal‐Mart and regional producer cooperatives mediate between the small and the large by scaling up and cutting costs in the latter stages of the export business. Deutsche Bundesbank (2007) estimates that, in 2005, 87.5% of German enterprises with an annual turnover of more than €50 million were directly engaged in the export business but that only 10.5% of those with an annual turnover of less than €10 million were so engaged. IV. On Their Own TermsI have gone beyond the Bergin and Lin paper in places. Taking the paper on its own terms, there is more that can move the two margins of export trade than the paper lets on. The operational definition used by Bergin and Lin is to break country J’s export (JX) share in global exports (GX) to country N, JXN/GXN, into two factors that are positive and not greater than one. Only one additional variable is used in the denominator and the numerator of these margins: it is that subset of GXN, GX[J]N, that consists of global exports to N in only those categories in which J participates appreciably by some binary criterion. The multiplicative decomposition is Now any increase in J’s share of the value of global exports to N that is due to improvement in the terms of trade in the categories in which J exports to N would (under short‐run inelasticity of demand) raise JXN and GX(J)N equiproportionately and by more than GXN. Such a development would be credited mechanically to expansion at the extensive margin, according to formula (1), as GX(J)N rises by a greater percentage than GXN. Also, under pricing‐to‐market (PTM), exchange‐rate depreciation improves the terms of trade. Then, as the exchange rate fluctuates, PTM could produce fluctuations at the extensive margin of trade without signifying anything for “varieties.” Since no “new” trade would be involved, clearly these assignments of the export share change to the extensive margin would not correspond to the classical definition at all.The same applies if country J had maintained its share of exports to country N in all those categories in which it exports to N but total exports in these categories had simply grown faster than in the other categories: Again, JXN would rise at the same rate as GX[J]N, leaving the intensive margin unchanged, while GX[J]N would grow faster than GXN, raising the extensive margin without increasing the number of varieties consumed.This leaves the case, the only one subsumed in Bergin’s discussion, where GX[J]N/GXN rises because country J participates in more categories of global exports to country N. Here difficulties may be created by Viner’s trade creation for Bergin and Lin’s interpretation. When production of electronics such as home entertainment systems sold in the U.S. market first shifted from the United States to Mexico on account of gains in the competitiveness of using Mexico as an export platform under NAFTA, there was an expansion at the extensive margin of Mexico’s export trade with the United States. But variety in the U.S. market did not increase; only costs fell. Trade in standardized components tends to be directed, and quickly redirected, on the basis of cost efficiency alone. Production and trade flows in differentiated products are more entrenched.V. Lessons from the Failure of Past Predictions and Persistent Exchange Rate ErrorsResearch on the trade effects of a monetary union that is currently of interest relates predominantly to the euro area. Yet it is already well known that data for currency unions collected by Rose mostly for groups of small and frequently backward countries far away from Europe cannot successfully be projected on euroland. Running regressions with data that are dominated by Equatorial and sub‐Saharan countries has produced egregious errors when the regression results were used to predict the effects on the growth of trade within the euro zone. Outside resource‐extraction investments, these African countries got little FDI and were not part of a major regional, let alone global, supply chain. Whatever they achieved from a very low starting base under a currency union has no conceivable relevance for the euro zone for lack of comparability of almost all transmission conditions. The euro is a major international currency and the EMU (European Economic and Monetary Union) is a monetary union, not just a currency union. Currency unions based on a minor currency are usually subject to dollarization/euroization in their financial business and trade contracts. They tend to have no pricing power in international markets, and recurring foreign‐exchange shortages (balance of payment [BOP] crises) may well have a strong effect on the extent of their trade with other members of the union. Any resulting real depreciation of the common currency relative to the rest‐of‐world (ROW) would divert imports from ROW to countries inside the union, thereby strengthening trade between them (cf. Baldwin 2006, 44).Rose and van Wincoop (2001, 389), managed to whittle Rose’s earlier prediction of the trade‐creating effect of currency union down to 58% for the euroland members of that time. This was still several times greater than the range of 5%–10% (up to twice as much in the long run) actually found by Baldwin (2006, 48) when he evaluated the evidence that had emerged for the euro zone in the meantime. Simply adding observations for the euro‐area countries to the Rose data would yield a blend of two very different effects fitting neither African and other such currency union countries nor the euro zone.To analyze data on the development of the intensive and extensive margins of trade in the euro zone in fixed physical categories, one should start with data for Europe and not for the Central African Republic (population 4.5 million), neighboring Chad (10 million), or other frequently troubled and financially backward countries. Their names appear in the list of 65 pairs of currency union countries for Bergin and Lin’s estimation period 1973–2000. Berthou and Fontagné (2008) and several contributions analyzed in Baldwin (2006) have pointed the way in using European data for Europe’s one‐of‐a‐kind experiment. That experiment has created a monetary union over an area of great and diversified trading power, with increasingly integrated banking, finance, and goods and services markets. The technical, regulatory, and legal infrastructure required for such integration is largely in place. Mini–money currency unions in Africa and elsewhere can only contribute sample abnormalities leading to error in predicting the trade consequences of EMU.There can be no doubt that exchange rate regimes and the economic size and level of development of the area they cover matter for the expansion of trade and the location of FDI (see Ethier 1998). The reason is that these regimes also affect the extent and depth of financial integration and the long‐term predictability of real exchange rates among the members of that regime. However, in Bergin and Lin’s model, the real exchange rate expected in year t for any future year after t is known and constant as prices are free to adjust to any money supply shocks after 1 year. Modeling each bilateral exchange rate as a deterministic function of the ratio of the corresponding money supplies is a throwback to the monetarist formulations of the 1970s with puchasing power parity. It provides no room for exchange rate uncertainty per se. Rather, random disturbances in money supplies—which could be neutralized by simply fixing the exchange rate so as to endogenize the money supply of the stabilizing party—in Bergin and Lin’s model cause only temporary disturbances of the real exchange rate under for‐the‐year‐ahead price setting if these disturbances are allowed to stand. Even if the government accepts the consequences of stochastic money supply shocks for exchange rates, common inflation targeting “assuming full symmetry across countries” would seem to guarantee a very close approximation to equilibrium when combined with any exchange rate regime in the monetarist model. Indeed, meaningful differences in exchange rate regimes would cease to exist if exchange rates were tethered to relative money stocks as Bergin and Lin specify.If real exchange rate fluctuations, under floating, were indeed just random to a known that money supply they would out over be to in major and be among the least of for business. It is only of the real exchange rate from what and could have expected that for to into foreign markets through foreign or through cross‐border trade. By not providing for the of real exchange rate only Bergin and Lin’s model does not the subject matter of just as the data do not serve to implement model in other But then that a paper has to author was of economics at the through when this comment was but the are own and not those of Trade European Central in and and the Intensive and Extensive of from French in in Economic in and van as a to International The for Currency American Economic and in of of in Previous articleNext article by by the of Economic All no articles this

There has been considerable growth in global meat trade recently in line with globally increasing population and changing diets. The paper analyses competitiveness patterns in global meat trade between 1989 and 2018. The article applies the method of revealed comparative advantages on global meat trade data and reaches a number of conclusions. First, results show top 10 countries in global meat exports and imports as well as most traded products. Global meat exports are dominated by the United States, Brazil and the Netherlands, whole main meat importers were Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper shows that global meat trade is highly concentrated by country and product but this concentration has decreased considerably in the previous 20 years. By analysing specialisation in global meat trade, a diverse picture becomes apparent where export positions and comparative advantages are not always moving together. Last but not least, Hungarian positions are also analysed in context throughout the paper.

The article seeks to explore the drastic changes in the modern economic realia in Ukraine which are characterized by intensification of globalization, elimination of barriers that hinder the development of economic relationships with other actors in the world economy. This opens up new opportunities for domestic enterprises to use external factors of development, attract international financial and technological resources, implement production and management best practices, and expand the existing markets. The purpose of this article is to provide insights on the trends of international trade in goods in Ukraine, identify the key vectors to address the international trade challenges in Ukraine and to specify the prospects for further development of international trade in goods. To attain the research objectives, the general research methods have been employed, in particular, the logical approach and generalization, and the methods of statistical and financial analysis – to assess the indicators of export and import of goods in Ukraine. Special emphasis is put on the significant effect from the drop in Ukraine's external turnover with the CIS countries (from 15.2% in 2015 up to 10.8% in 2019). Among the major reasons for the decline in foreign markets trading are geopolitical issues, complete or partial exclusion of Ukrainian enterprises from their direct participation in foreign economic activities, currency instability and volatility of the national economy, etc. According to the results of the study, it is argued that the lag in creating favorable environment to enhance production and international trading along with expanding the state budget revenues (behind imbalanced structure of exchange trade and its low efficiency) will reinforce the structural and investment crisis and extend the period of economic stagnation. All this reduces the opportunities to boost the national economy competitiveness and expand international trading. Thus, there is a need to reconsider the current approaches and actions to gain a competitive edge, in particular this refers to tackling the crisis challenges and facilitate post-crisis economic recovery. The study pinpoints a significant role of exports in shaping Ukraine's economy. Thus exports must become a driver in structural transformation of Ukraine’s economy, both in the short-run and in the medium term perspective. In this context, it is proposed that to continue to foster economic partnerships with the EU and other countries globally, Ukraine needs to accomplish the reforms within the country, in particular, improve the business climate, eliminate corruption and strengthen self-government. The Ukraine's international trade efforts should be aimed at increasing and accelerating exports of Ukrainian goods, implementing import substitution policies to improve Ukraine's trade balance; promoting the optimization of import structure; generating government to support Ukrainian exports, etc. Hence, further development of Ukraine's international trade and its implications for the national economy should rely on a balanced government policy to enhance domestic manufacturing, mitigate crisis effects, overcome unemployment, and strengthen the national currency.

Global telecommunications and export of services: The promise and the risk

The article examines the impact of structural changes in trade flows of leading countries on the state of the global economy, trends in its qualitative changes, and the consequences of this process. The analysis of the works of domestic and foreign scientists on this issue gives understanding of the lack of research on certain elements and factors that affect the dynamics of processes occurring in modern trade against the background of global economic events and shifts, such as Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, Russian aggression against Ukraine, etc. Therefore, to understand the general trends in the development of international trade and the world economy as a whole, special attention should be paid to the study of changes occurring in the foreign trade of key players, the leaders of global trade. An analysis of the aggregated geographic structure of world trade shows a clear separation of three regions where the centers of export and import of goods are concentrated: Asia, Europe, and North America. Three other large regions (Africa, South and Central America, Australia and New Zealand) cannot have a significant impact on the overall situation, as their combined share in world trade is only about 7.5%. The last six years have seen continuing trends of changes in the group of leaders, which are connected with the further redistribution of world markets, continue. But, if North America did not manage to achieve a positive trade balance, even during the tough foreign trade policy of D. Trump, Europe and Asia, however, maintained an excess of exports over imports, although imports grew more dynamically. Five leading countries have been identified by the indicator of total turnover in 2021. These five include China, the US, the Netherlands and Japan. They represent the three centers of world trade. Their total share in world exports is 37.4%, and in world imports - 38.0%. This gives reason to hypothesize that the general state and structure of world trade largely depend on the activities of these countries. Examining the changes that have taken place in the product structure of exports, it is possible to highlight several trends that are common to all leading countries. First of all, over the last 6 years, the specific weight of fuel and mineral supplies to the world market has increased in the structure of both global exports and all leading countries’ exports. Secondly, the growth of the specific weight of exports of chemical industry products can be attributed to the general trends of both world trade and certain leading countries. Thirdly, in contrast to the previous two upward trends, the share of trade in telecommunications equipment shows an overall downward trend. To assess the degree of synchronization of the structure of world trade and foreign trade of the leading countries, the correlation coefficients of these structures have been calculated. The most closely related to the world export structure is the US export structure, and the most closely related to the world import structure is the Germany’s import structure. This not only confirms the hypothesis about the decisive influence of these leading countries on world markets, but also provides grounds for forecasting world trends based on the study of foreign trade of individual countries. Thus, the conducted analysis showed that certain changes are taking place in the aggregated geographical structure of world trade, which are associated with the rapid expansion of the specific weight of the Asian region. North America and Europe are losing their positions both in terms of the international trade turnover and in terms of its individual components

This paper presents an analysis of trends in the development of international trade in the context of digitalization. The growing process of digitalization can lead to qualitative changes in all sectors of domestic economy and foreign trade. At the present stage important aspects of growth, development and digitalization of economies of the countries participating in international trade and economic relations are primarily electronic trade, export and import operations and management at the national and the interstate level. The subject of this study is economic relations arising in the process of implementing operations on the international exchange of goods and services in the context of digitalization of the world economy. The purpose of the study is to identify the main trends and tendencies in the development of international trade in the digital transformation of economic and political relations. The study uses the economic and statistical method that reveals the main trends in the development of digitalization and international trade, and the system-structural method that analyzes the structural changes in the impact of digitalization on international trade. As a result, the authors have developed tools to promote digitalization in international trade and international economic relations. The development of international trade in modern conditions is most dependent on digital technologies that have an impact on e-commerce and business processes in international trade.

Many economies in Western Europe have experienced a sizeable increase in income inequality since the 1980s, and inequality has grown even more rapidly in the United States. Whereas educated workers in skilled occupations benefited from rising salaries, wages have stagnated for many less educated workers in unskilled occupations. The rising inequality in advanced economies coincided with a period of globalisation that was characterised by rapid growth in international merchandise trade. Basic economic models predict that trade could contribute to greater inequality in skill-abundant advanced economies, as globalisation leads such countries to specialise in skill-intensive industrial sectors, which raises labour demand for skilled workers but reduces demand for unskilled ones. Yet despite this theoretical link between trade and inequality, empirical analyses long concluded that increased trade was not a major cause of increasing inequality in advanced economies. However, this perspective on trade and inequality has evolved during the decade of the 2010s, as a growing body of empirical research found sizeable impacts of trade shocks on labour markets and inequality. During the same period, international trade has become a more contentious subject in political debate, and a many-decades-old trend towards greater trade liberalisation has been broken by new tariffs that resulted in a ‘trade war’ between the US and China. Key findings The last four decades saw rapid growth in global merchandise trade, an extraordinary increase in the importance of low-income countries in world trade, growing trade imbalances across exporting and importing countries, and the growth of global value chains. All of these changes were most evident in the 1990s and 2000s and have slowed since the financial crisis. A common factor contributing to these patterns was the emergence of China as an exporting powerhouse. Evidence from Europe and the United States shows that trade has increased inequality not just between workers of different skill levels, but also between those of different industries and those of different geographic regions. Growing import competition from China caused declines in both employment and wages for workers in trade-exposed industries and locations. Increases in offshoring and in exports were associated with employment and wage gains for at least some workers. Manufacturing employment declined the most in countries that experienced a rising trade deficit in their goods exchange with China. While a rapid increase in imports from China was pervasive across high-income countries, there was much greater international heterogeneity in exports to China. Countries such as Germany and Switzerland strongly expanded exports to China and experienced little decline in domestic manufacturing employment, while the number of manufacturing jobs sharply contracted in countries such as the UK and the US where exports to China lagged behind imports. We provide new evidence on the impact of Chinese import competition on consumer prices in the UK. While consumers benefit from lower prices thanks to increased trade, these benefits are comparably large for low-income and high-income households. Growing import competition and its adverse labour market impacts have also been connected to a range of social problems and measures of discontent. Regions with greater exposure to import competition experienced higher crime rates, a deterioration of health outcomes, a dissolution of traditional family structures, and greater support for far-right political parties. We present evidence that attitudes towards international trade in the general population were deteriorating in the 2000s, but have rebounded over the last decade. New import tariffs such as those imposed by the US in 2018 and 2019 are unlikely to help the losers from globalisation. Instead, displaced workers may be supported by a combination of transfers that avert financial hardship, skills training that facilitates their reintegration into the labour market, and place-based policies that stimulate job creation in depressed locations.

Purpose: Despite the free and lower trade tariff policy, the United States (US) has recorded a persistent trade deficit and trade imbalances in the last four decades ago, therefore, this study empirically investigates the role of trade tariff policy on US supply chain imbalance and trade deficits reduction. Methodology: The study employs simple random and stratified sampling techniques to analyses the trend and univariate. Secondary data from US Census Bureau of Economic Analysis Department of Commerce on US international trade in goods and services from 1852 to 2024 were analysed to drawn inferences. Findings: This study finds that US trade tariff policy is not automatic to reduce supply chain imbalances and trade deficits in the United States. The US trade liberalization policy is associated with supply chain imbalance and trade deficits while the U.S. trade protectionism policy accounted for more trade surplus and supply chain balance. Also the study finds that a minimum threshold of 10 percent US weighted trade tariff rate to reduce the US trade supply chain imbalance and trade deficits Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: This study supports the protectionism trade theory over the trade liberalization theory to aggressively promote exports but reduces imports through a number of trade barriers like tariff rate, imports restriction, and currency depreciation (devaluation) to make trading partners imports dependence while protecting country’s domestic industry from foreign competition. Recommendations to the current US President, Trump is to set a minimum of 10 percent weighted tariff rates on all goods and services to other trading partners while US should imposes a higher weighted tariff rates above 10 to all goods and services from China to swiftly reduce US trade deficits and supply chain imbalance to be more effective than Trump former US President administration and also President Biden administration.

Purpose: Despite the free and lower trade tariff policy, the United States (US) has recorded a persistent trade deficit and trade imbalances in the last four decades ago, therefore, this study empirically investigates the role of trade tariff policy on US supply chain imbalance and trade deficits reduction. Methodology: The study employs simple random and stratified sampling techniques to analyses the trend and univariate. Secondary data from US Census Bureau of Economic Analysis Department of Commerce on US international trade in goods and services from 1852 to 2024 were analysed to drawn inferences. Findings: This study finds that US trade tariff policy is not automatic to reduce supply chain imbalances and trade deficits in the United States. The US trade liberalization policy is associated with supply chain imbalance and trade deficits while the U.S. trade protectionism policy accounted for more trade surplus and supply chain balance. Also the study finds that a minimum threshold of 10 percent US weighted trade tariff rate to reduce the US trade supply chain imbalance and trade deficits Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: This study supports the protectionism trade theory over the trade liberalization theory to aggressively promote exports but reduces imports through a number of trade barriers like tariff rate, imports restriction, and currency depreciation (devaluation) to make trading partners imports dependence while protecting country’s domestic industry from foreign competition. Recommendations to the current US President, Trump is to set a minimum of 10 percent weighted tariff rates on all goods and services to other trading partners while US should imposes a higher weighted tariff rates above 10 to all goods and services from China to swiftly reduce US trade deficits and supply chain imbalance to be more effective than Trump former US President administration and also President Biden administration.

Introduction. International trade is closely related to environmental sustainable development, while promoting trade growth and environmental sustainable development are also the goals pursued by mankind. China's environmental sustainability is affected by both severe shortages of natural resources and severe environmental pollution. In addition, growing populations and rapid economic growth, as well as weak environmental controls, have increased demand for natural resources and affected their pollution. In the past year, in conditions of the complex international situation and the severe impact of COVID-19 pandemic, China’s foreign trade imports and exports have been significantly better than expected, and the scale of foreign trade has once again set a record high. However, how to ensure the growth of international trade while ensuring environmental protection? Sustainable development is one of the problems that the Chinese government needs to solve.Methods. The methodological basis of the study is a set of fundamental provisions of crisis theory, international trade theory, theory of foreign trade of national ecological and economic systems, as well as modern concepts of post pandemic development. The solution of the set tasks was carried out by using a set of general scientific research methods: analysis of scientific literature, method of analogy and comparison, theoretical synthesis, classification, methodological generalization, economic and statistical analysis, expert assessments and scientific abstraction. The authors use the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment, the General Administration of Customs, Baidu academic papers, and relevant documents in the CNKI database as data sources.The purpose of research – to prove the environmental sustainability in the context of China’s international trade development.Results. The research proved the environmental sustainability in the context of China’s international trade development. The research substantiates environmental sustainability in the context of China's international trade development. Related factors of international trade in the context of environmental sustainability have been identified. The formation of modern international trade in the conditions of changing the ecological environment of China is analyzed. Countermeasures on environmental sustainability in the context of China's growing international trade are proposed. Through the summary of research, it is found out the relevance and causality between trade and the environment, analyze and study the changes in relevant data, and summarize the main imbalances in the process of China's response to international trade and environmental sustainable development, so as to put forward corresponding problems in response to these issues solution.Prospects. The results of the research discover the environmental sustainability in the context of China's international trade. The prospect of further research is to apply the impact of the China's international trade development on its environmental sustainability for the development of domestic foreign trade policy.

This paper uses panel regression techniques and trade gravity models to explore the linkages between Open Skies agreement (OSA) signed by the United States and recent bilateral trade development. US bilateral trade in services data is not available; thus only US merchandise trade by air data is used as dependent variable in this paper’s econometric analysis. US merchandise trade by air series has not experienced significant growth since the implementation of numerous Open Skies agreements in 2007. Few studies have analyzed the relationship between OSAs and trade. These provide the motivation for exploring if signing more Open Skies agreements continues to benefit recent US merchandise trade by air development, and if the performance of these policies depends on other macroeconomic factors and on the properties of the agreement itself. Using data between years 2004 and 2009, panel regression models suggest that the performance of Open Skies agreements are not robust to market volatilities. Reductions in air cargo costs and expansions of air markets resulting from OSAs are not strong enough to combat trade declines when the recession hits. On the other hand, free trade agreements exert large, positive influences to US trade by air even during times of economic slowdown. Yet, the duration of the Open Skies agreements and the economic power of the trading partners do influence the performance of these policies. The preferred model specifications are different for exports and imports by air data, which confirms that the performance of OSAs on exports is different from that on imports. Finally, model results indicate that the impact of Open Skies policies on passenger traffic flows indirectly improves US trade by air figures. OSAs have stimulated passenger traffic growth, and model results suggest that lagged passenger traffic is positively related to trade value. Increased business travel opportunities conducted prior to the delivery of the goods help lower information asymmetries and develop trust among the supply chain partners. Combination of these effects aids expansion of trade by air, as well as trade by other modes of transportation.

Shipping Industry in the Twenty-First Century

A FORWARD-LOOKING _________ UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY Clayton Yeutter U,NTiL recently, international trade was not a subject that attracted much interest in the United States. Rich in natural resources, endowed with the world's largest economy, and generally isolated from the rest of the industrialized nations, America produced within its own borders most of the goods it needed. Indeed, as recently as 1960, its combined export-import trade totaled only $35 billion. As the United States usually had a trade surplus, the effects of trade, when they were considered at all, were typically viewed as benign. All that has now changed. Imports and exports today amount to $550 billion, accounting for 21 percent of the U.S. gross national product. One-eighth of all manufacturingjobs depend upon exports and 40 percent of U.S. farm production is sold abroad. As international trade has become vastly more important to the American economy, trade policy has developed into a political issue of considerable controversy. The bipartisan consensus that once existed for the principle of open markets has dissolved into partisan wrangling and posturing. The advantages of open markets were obvious in the postwar period when America consistently ran trade surpluses; exports meantjobs and imports did not seem threatening. Now that the United States is running trade deficits, however, some want to abandon traditional U.S. trade policies in favor of protectionism. There is no question that the trade deficit—$123 billion in 1984 and projected higher for 1985—is troubling and could lead to serious economic dislocations. A long-term trade imbalance of this size would Clayton Yeutter is the U.S. Trade Representative. 2 SAIS REVIEW erode the United States' industrial base, reverse recent employment gains, and shackle U.S. exporters. Yet such protectionist measures as surcharges, quotas, and higher tariffs would be classic examples of cures worse than the disease. The best way to right the trade imbalance is to convince foreign countries to open their markets and accept more U.S. goods. Protectionism would do nothing to open markets; in fact, it would result in higher trade barriers around the world and fewer opportunities for American exporters. Those who favor protectionism forget that as the world's biggest trading nation, the United States would suffer most from a global trade war. A better way to reduce the trade imbalance would be to emphasize freer and fairer trade among all nations. We want other nations to buy more of our goods; we do not want to deny American citizens the right to buy products from our trading partners. President Reagan's trade policy, as articulated on 23 September 1985, recognizes that free and fair trade produces more jobs, results in a more productive use of the nation's resources, stimulates rapid innovation, and leads to a higher standard of living. Open markets also improve national security by strengthening the economic and political systems of U.S. allies. Since World War II the United States has been the world's leading advocate of an open trading system—a system that has helped bring about unparalleled prosperity for the American people. This leadership role is one we cannot now abandon without bringing about the collapse ofthe international trading system as we know it. It is not hard to imagine a scenario in which an American wave of protectionism sets off a worldwide trade war, with one nation after another acting to protect its own domestic industries. In fact, this is exactly what happened in the 1930s, when the United States imposed the restrictive Smoot-Hawley tariffs. Ofcourse, America's role as the leading advocate of an open trading system does not absolve its trading partners of their obligation to support more open markets. Free trade must be reciprocal if it is to survive politically; no democracy can stand by and see jobs lost to a nation that erects trade barriers, subsidizes its industries, or engages in other unfair trade practices. Protectionism in other countries undermines support in America for the international trading system built since World War II. It is incumbent upon all nations to join the United States in working to improve this system and prevent its collapse. To...

WHITHER U.S. TRADE POLICY. BEYOND THE URUGUAY ROUND? IsaiahFmnk LJnitedStatestradepolicymakers indieClintonadministration, preoccupied with the daunting problems of obtaining congressional approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) and the Uruguay Round and dealing with One "Japan problem," have had little opportunity to consider the longer-term future of U.S. trade policy beyond the Uruguay Round. Yet, it is essential to begin public discussion ofthe new issues that have to be addressed globally as theworld tradingsystem approaches theend of the twentieth century. These issues will have to be faced because the world does not stand still. More than a decade has passed since 1982 when the United States took the initiative to propose the agenda for an eighth round ofdie General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt) negotiations as a follow-up to the Tokyo Round that concluded in 1979. During that period, the pace ofchange in the nature and composition of international trade has accelerated. International trade no longer conforms to the textbook model of an exchange of British cloth for Portuguese wine. The specialization ofnational firms in particular products is being increasingly replaced by the globalization of production, in which different processes required for the production ofindividual goods and services are performed in different countries. An American automobile may be designed in Japan, assembled in Canada or Mexico, and consist of parts manufactured in Taiwan, Brazil, or just about anywhere. Isaiah Frank is William L Clayton professor ofinternational economics atthe Paul H. Nitze School ofAdvanced International Studies ofJohns Hopkins University. This article is adapted from a longer paper prepared by the author for the Committee for Economic Development 29 30 SAIS Review SUMMER-FALL 1994 Globalization, therefore, means increased trade in parts, components, and semifinished goods. It also implies an increase in intrafirm trade as single global companies move components and partially finished goods from their facilities in one country to those in anoüher. In short, the traditional horizontal pattern oftrade in final products is being overtaken by a form ofvertical trade in which countries specialize in different parts or stages ofthe production chain for individual products. This globalization of production is made possible by two developments: the rapid advances in transportation and communications technology, which have enabled managers to coordinate widely dispersed activities; and ¿He steady reduction oftrade barriers underthe aegis ofGATT, which has made possible the movement of components and semifinished goods across national frontiers with a minimum of penalties in the form of tariffs or other restrictions. Another major development in international trade is the rapid rise in trade in services. In addition to travel and transportation, it includes a wide range of other services, such as advertising, accounting, financial, insurance, architecture, construction and engineering, education, and medical services. Between 1986 and 1992 U.S. exports of services more man doubled to $179 billion, or 41 percent of the value of U.S. merchandise exports in 1992. In contrast to trade in goods, the service sector has been generating sizeable trade surpluses. The U.S. surplus in service trade in 1992 amounted to $56 billion, offsetting 58 percent of the U.S. merchandise trade deficit of $96 billion.1 Many types of service exports cannot be provided effectively through cross-border exports, but only through the establishment ofa local presence in the foreign countries in which the service is provided. In the service sector, therefore, trade policy and investment policy converge. What globalization implies, therefore, is die need to extend the purview of international negotiations from die liberalization of strictly border measures, such as tariffs and quotas, to ¿He coordination ofvarious areas ofdomestic policy that substantially affect the ability of firms to conduct their operations worldwide . For example, it is difficult to conceive ofa company producing parts ofa complex product in different countries ifeach country accorded widely different treatmentto intellectual property rights or mandated sharply divergenttechnical standards. Nor is it conceivable that international trade in a wide variety of specialized services could flourish if firms encountered exclusionary business practices abroad or if firms were subject to limitations on their right of U.S. Department of Commerce, Summary ofU.S. International Transactions, June 15, 1993. WHITHER U.S. TRADE POLICY 31 establishment or...