Unilateral divorce laws affect women's welfare.

Abstract

This paper studies whether unilateral divorce affects women's welfare. Unilateral divorce refers to a divorce regime where each of the spouses can dissolve the marriage unilaterally (i.e. without mutual consent). First, it builds a simple theoretical model that finds that women are better off under unilateral divorce than under mutual consent. Second, it makes use of data from the U.S. between 2003 and 2014 to explore empirically whether unilateral divorce affects the amount of time women devote to three different activities that might be seen as proxies of their level of welfare, such as, housework, leisure and relaxing activities, and personal care. We find causal evidence suggesting that unilateral divorce improves women's welfare. Namely, it reduces housework carried out by women, while it increases their amount of time devoted to leisure and relaxing activities, and personal care. Further results suggest these changes are not due to improvements in gender equality per se. Moreover, we find that the decrease in housework and the surges in leisure and relaxing activities are permanent, whereas the increase in personal care is temporary. These findings are important from a policy perspective to motivate the introduction of unilateral divorce laws.