Abstract
The existing literature assumes that unemployment insurance (UI) affects the labor market through the job finding rate of eligible workers. Recent research has started to broaden the perspective. In this paper, I show evidence for UI effects through three other margins: (i) search externalities; (ii) take-up of other welfare state programs; and (iii) job separations. The evidence suggests that the analysis of optimal UI should take a more comprehensive view of how UI affects the labor market.
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