Understanding the European Union’s Response to the Russian war on Ukraine: The role of the European External Action Service

In the post-cold war era, with the creation of the European Union(EU) that included the Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) as "second pillar", the European security order furnished the basis that led to the development its own foundation. Based on this, the EU started striving for independent military capability, while establishing cooperative relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), establishing a political role in addition to a military role.<BR> With these points in mind, this paper researches the development of the CFSP that the EU executed, and analyzes the external relations and defense capabilities that the EU seeks to strengthen through the Treaty of Lisbon which came into effect recently.<BR> For this purpose, this paper examines the background and refinement process of the EU"s developing the CFSP in the new European security environment, and discusses aspects of promoting cooperation with NATO and striving to establish European Security and Defense Policy(ESDP) and independent military capability.<BR> Also, because the EU switched from ESDP to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in the Treaty of Lisbon to strengthen the European security strategy and established the European External Action Service(EEAS), this paper treats the contents of the CSDP that the EU strengthened within the category of CFSP through the Treaty of Lisbon, and makes a close inquiry into the main role of the “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affaires and Security Policy(HR/VP)” in describing the structure of EEAS.

While significant scholarly work has been dedicated to the institutionalization of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its role in shaping the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy goals, less attention has been given to the Service’s wider competencies and agenda-setting power in the case of the Common Security and Defence Policy. This article aims to assess the growing role of the EEAS in defence and in spearheading new ways of bridging foreign policy and security in a comprehensive manner. In doing so, the research explores how the security and defence dimensions were incorporated into the EEAS, by examining the processes of institutionalization in the EEAS crisis management structures in the post-Lisbon context, and by zooming in on the intergovernmental and supranational dynamics in the European security and defence architecture. The article finds that continued organizational innovation and the reinforcement of supranational mechanisms in the EEAS and the European Commission have had a positive impact on the EU’s security and defence, representing a step further in bridging the foreign policy, security and defence divides at the EU level. European Union, European External Action Service, European Security and Defence, High Representative

The European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a component of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It was established in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which included a provision for the gradual introduction of a common defence policy that could eventually lead to a common defence framework. The CFSP emerged from the need to enhance the EU's political identity on the international arena and assert Europe's independence in the post-Cold War era. Simultaneously, it remains one of the few areas of competence that exclusively belongs to Member States, where proposals to deepen integration processes have met with lukewarm responses. However, the Russo-Ukrainian war has prompted the European forum to strengthen cooperation between Member States, particularly in the defence industry sector. The CSDP is regulated only by the Treaty on EU (TEU), while other EU policies are governed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). The architects of the Lisbon reform aimed to underscore the distinctiveness of the CSDP from other EU policies, as demonstrated by its legal instruments, decision-making mechanisms, and the nature of EU competences. Cooperation under the CSDP does not fit neatly within the traditional treaty rules governing the division of competences between the EU and its Member States. Fundamental competences in the field of security policy are reserved for Member States, which result from both the TEU and the unambiguous content of Declaration No. 13 on the CFSP. The CSDP’s intergovernmental nature CSDP determines its institutional implementation. It is defined and implemented by intergovernmental EU institutions, particularly the European Council and the Council. The High Representative supported by the European External Action Service and Member States play a key role in its implementation, drawing on both EU and national funds. The competences of the EU's supranational institutions, particularly the Court of Justice of European Union, are strictly limited in this area. The relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the EU was institutionalised in the early 21st century, building on initiatives from the 1990s aimed at promoting greater European responsibility in defence matters.

As is said “Favorite Brussels phrase: global player”, the EU has endeavored to increase its own voice and influence in the world. In this paper, I will inquire into the image of the EU as a Global Actor mainly from the standpoint of the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). I will inspect 4 requirements for a global actor as followed:Firstly, I will examine the problem of consistency. Since 1970 when the European Political Cooperation (EPC) started, the EU has paid attention for consistency between the EC/EU and EPC/CFSP to avoid structural dichotomy and inconsistency among various external policies of the EC/EU. At last under the Lisbon Treaty the EU succeeded in abolishing the structure of so called‘three pillars’. And yet, by the same treaty, EU acquired legal personality for the first time as the natural result of abolishment of the pillars. But I feel there remains some dichotomy even now.Secondly, as for the identity of the EU, Charlotte Bretherton/John Vogler point out two aspects: the EU as a value-based community and the EU as fortress (an exclusive actor). On the context, since 1990’s, the EU has developed the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). On the one side, the EU works for a civilian or normative power and aims to promote European values such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and so on. On the context, in the field of ESDP/CSDP, the EU attaches importance to the image of a civilian power on the rules of ‘Berlin plus’ and ‘Petersberg tasks’ which have been established as a product of compromise between the EU and the USA.On the other hand, the EU has an aspect of ‘fortress Europe’. Sometimes the EU demonstrates its identity, purposely struggling for American values such as the Kyoto Protocol, abolishment of death penalty, the International Criminal Court, the Iraq war and so on.Thirdly, as for the institutional aspec of the CFSP/CSDP, the EU set up the post of the high representative for the CFSP since the Amsterdam Treaty. Under the Lisbon Treaty the EU strengthened its role essentially as a EU foreign minister, and the EU established the European External Action Service (EEAS) which is equivalent to the EU Foreign Ministry. But the EEAS is not free from several restraints.Fourthly, as for the civilian and military operations under the ESDP/CSDP, the EU has deployed 31missioins sihce 2003. I will point out several characteristics among them.Finally I will refer to the future of the CFSP/CSDP. According to Charlotte Bretherton/JohnVogler, lately ‘a new debate has arisen precisely, worrying that the EU might step forward to some kind of a military alliance as a result of the development of the military missions under the CSDP. But the CSDP is not intended to be engaged in territorial defence. The EU never aims to have an integrated European army, but to contribute to the settlement of conflicts as a civilian power through the Petersberg Tasks under the framework of Berlin plus. I am sure there is almost no possibility the EU missions may lead the EU to any kind of a military entity.

ABSTRACTThe European External Action Service (EEAS), specifically mandated with enhancing coherence between the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and non-CFSP bodies on the one hand, and the European Union and member states on the other hand, has the potential to increase CFSP’s contribution to the fight against terrorism and diminish the boundaries between CFSP and other policies. Several of the EEAS’ cooperation and coordination duties, as well as the inclusive composition of the Service, allow for a more coherent approach to counterterrorism policymaking. In practice, coherence is unfolding in diplomatic cooperation with third countries and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, as CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs actors seem to build on one another’s strengths. The picture is more nuanced in the area of intelligence, where the activities of the EU intelligence centre, transferred from the Council of the European Union to the EEAS, are conditional upon member states’ willingness to exchange information. Ultimately, current efforts towards coherence remain subject to a somewhat paradoxical two-speed process: one that encourages the meshing together of institutional actors and policy cultures, while deferring access to justice to national law, thereby yielding a system of protection of individuals à géométrie variable.

After the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) was introduced in Maastricht treaty, the EU continues to find a way to enhance its role as an international actor. In order to achieve this, the EU political actors have realized the urgent need to integrate all of the resources of EU external actions. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) were given birth under this circumstance in Lisbon treaty. The HR is responsible for the implementation of CFSP and the EEAS will assist HR to fulfill her mandate. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS enjoys rights to participate in policy programming and implementation under the authority of the HR. With all these competences in hand, the EEAS is considered as an important part of CFSP. This paper will be aiming at the EEAS and will use Institutionalism as its theoretical basis. First of all, it will describe the structure and organization of the EEAS. Second, it will analyze the role of EEAS in policy programming and implementation. Finally, it will assay EEAS’ potential problems, and answer the question that whether the EEAS can strengthen the collective action of CFSP and CSDP effectively.

Following the fall of Gaddafi, Libya has fallen apart, and this vast and resource-rich country with around 1,800 km coastline to the southern side of the central Mediterranean has become a failed state. The crisis stemming from Libya has significant impact on the EU: Not only for irregular migration but also due to its security, economic and geopolitical importance to EU. Despite this multifaceted significance, EU Libya poli- cies have been focusing on the migration dimension of the crisis and making use of non-functioning Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions as the primary policy tool. That is why the EU missed the oppor- tunity to solve the crisis from an early age and has been sidelined with the escalating conflict. In the absence of EU, rival international actors took over the Libya dossier and started to shape the developments per their interests. If the EU does not take lessons from previous mistakes, it will soon lose its influence over Libya, which might turn out to be quite detrimental for its interests. As this is a multifaceted and multi-dimensional web of relations, the policy paper at hand focuses explicitly on the “migration” dimension and makes infer- ences based on this narrower scope. Interest Groups (IGs) are prominent actors in the migration dimension of the Libya crisis. This policy paper depicts that there are at least 738 IGs concerned with European or global level migration &amp; asylum policies, and they have had hundreds of interactions with members of the EU Commission and Parliament. IGs have been spending money, energy and other resources to influence the EU policies in this field. However, up to now, just like EU Libya policies, their efforts on migration-related problems stemming from Libya has failed. Following a comprehensive description of the current status of migration dimension of EU Libya policies together with the role of various IGs, this policy brief examines the causes of (in)effectiveness of IGs’ efforts in influencing EU policies. It argues that public salience, internal security concerns of the member states and highly politicised nature of the migration issue makes it difficult for IGs to be influence. Irregular migration is not a matter on its own; it is a consequence of a causal link. In solving the issue, the EU needs a multifaceted approach, which considers IGs an integral partner and utilises IGs soft power, knowledge and expertise to increase the EU’s leverage. The policy paper at hand recommends EU and IGs to develop a partnership model which requires coordi- nation and assistance in Libya matters, without damaging the neutral interlocutor position of the IGs. This new model foresees IG support in handling IDPs, refugees/irregular migrants, training and monitoring of the Libyan officials, or in reporting about the humanitarian aspects. Requires EU to utilise IGs in addressing the sources of grievances between local ethnic, tribal and religious groups, or facilitating the truth-seeking ven- tures and repairing the relations between rival groups. IGs can support EU policies by providing mentorship to sovereign economic, financial, auditing institutions or misfunctioning judiciary, public health or education institutions. EU should benefit from IGs in the prevention of radicalisation/extremism, as well. For the sake of preventing the emergence of several and conflicting member state Libya policies, EU su- pranational bodies should lead to the process vis á vis overall EU interests. To save IGs from the complex power-sharing structure, European External Action Service should undertake the one single coordinator role with IGs. EU officials should encourage or —if need be— stipulate Libyan authorities to cooperate with IGs in their operations for Libya. EU may consider using military CSDP operations or EU battlegroup to protect the peace process from spoilers or destructive foreign meddling or defend the governing institutions from the impact of various militia groups and enforce the arms embargo. EU should also activate a competent sanctions policy against the spoilers of the process. Another crucial task for the EU will be the construction of a unified and reliable security apparatus. IGs can build the support that the EU requires on the ground. EU requirements overlap with IGs interests; they both need to construct a thriving society, inclusive politics, and good governance, which will make Libya a hard-to-find neighbour/ally to the EU.

This chapter looks at the conceptual innovations and bureaucratic struggles that led to the partial integration of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) structures in the European External Action Service (EEAS).1 What we call the ‘EEAS project’ is not only an attempt at creating a European foreign ministry; it is also spearheading a new way of bringing together diplomacy, defence and development in a ‘comprehensive approach’ to crisis management. In analysing the birth of the EEAS, we get a better picture of the organisational hurdles that get in the way of dealing with today’s complex security challenges. Many of them arise from the institutional set-up of the Westphalian state model, a spectre which continues to haunt EU diplomacy.

Two years since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the implementation of the constitutional and institutional changes it introduced is ongoing. This paper examines the potential and actual implications of these novelties for the capacity of the European Union (EU) to act as an effective multilateral security actor, placing special emphasis on coordination, flexibility and coherence in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The structure is twofold. First, the main constitutional changes to the areas of CFSP and CSDP will be examined in a critical light. The legal personality of the EU, its cross-cutting external relations objectives, the status of the CFSP and CSDP, new mechanisms for deepened security solidarity between the Member States and enhanced flexibility for CSFSP and CSDP are the focus of analysis. Second, the paper analyses the main novelties to the institutional framework of the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty, including the permanent President of the European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service and Union Delegations, as well as the Political and Security Committee and the European Defence Agency. This paper argues that the Lisbon Treaty may have provided the constitutional and institutional ingredients for the EU to strengthen its position as a strategic actor in multilateral settings. However, practice shows that the political will of all EU actors involved and of the Member States remains an obstacle in the pursuit to reach the full potential of the novelties introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.

Two years since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the implementation of the constitutional and institutional changes it introduced is ongoing. This paper examines the potential and actual implications of these novelties for the capacity of the European Union (EU) to act as an effective multilateral security actor, placing special emphasis on coordination, flexibility and coherence in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The structure is twofold. First, the main constitutional changes to the areas of CFSP and CSDP will be examined in a critical light. The legal personality of the EU, its cross-cutting external relations objectives, the status of the CFSP and CSDP, new mechanisms for deepened security solidarity between the Member States and enhanced flexibility for CSFSP and CSDP are the focus of analysis. Second, the paper analyses the main novelties to the institutional framework of the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty, including the permanent President of the European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service and Union Delegations, as well as the Political and Security Committee and the European Defence Agency. This paper argues that the Lisbon Treaty may have provided the constitutional and institutional ingredients for the EU to strengthen its position as a strategic actor in multilateral settings. However, practice shows that the political will of all EU actors involved and of the Member States remains an obstacle in the pursuit to reach the full potential of the novelties introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.

The tenth anniversary of the creation of the European External Action Service provides an opportune moment to take stock of the role which the Service has played in forging a more coherent, visible and effective EU foreign and security policy. At the same time, it offers a chance to field ideas on how the Union’s foreign policy actors might chart a course to guide the European External Action Service (EEAS) to what could be tumultuous teenage years. This article contextualizes the contributions to this first European Foreign Affairs Review (EFAR) Issue of 2021, which is devoted entirely to an assessment of where the EEAS’ strengths and opportunities lie, and which weaknesses need to be addressed to fit the Service for future purpose. European External Action Service, Common Foreign and Security Policy, esprit de corps, European Commission, Foreign Affairs Council, representation, EU Global Strategy

European Union – Common Foreign and Security Policy – Changes with the abolition of the pillar structure by the Lisbon Treaty – Common Security and Defence Policy – Executive order of the EU – Between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism – The role of the High Representative – Joint political leadership – The European External Action Service as an administrative infrastructure – Constitutionalisation of foreign affairs

In its aim to become a global security actor, the EU is increasingly undertaking civilian and military crisis missions all over the world. These missions are based on the European security and defence policy (ESDP) which forms an integral part of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The Treaty of Lisbon seems to mirror the Union’s global security ambitions as it addresses the European security and defence policy in a whole new treaty section. However, European missions still depend on willing Member States to make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of its security and defence policy. The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between the European Union and the Member States in the fi eld of the common foreign and security policy and the European security and defence policy and whether the Treaty of Lisbon manages to clarify the situation. What constraints, if any, do the common foreign and security policy and the European security and defence policy impose on the Member States regarding the conduct of their national foreign policy? The article argues that the relationship between the EU and the Member States can only be determined after an examination of the binding nature of primary and secondary CFSP law as well as of international agreements concluded by the Union.

This article traces the evolution of attitudes and policies of Irish political parties towards Irish neutrality and the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) across four decades. The article provides conceptual snapshots of the position of parties' policies along two policy dimensions. The first dimension captures policies of limited ‘military’ neutrality and ‘positive’/‘active’ neutrality. The second dimension captures minimalist EU foreign and security policy, defined as ‘civilian’ or ‘soft’ security policy, to a maximalist EU CFSP/ESDP ‘hard security’ policy amounting to a ‘militarized’ EU. The positioning starts with the campaign for Irish membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), focusing on the accession negotiations and the 1972 referendum campaign and finishes with an analysis of parties' positions on the Security and Defence Policy aspects of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. Evidence shows the positions of the larger parties of Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Labour Party shifted away from fundamental neutrality to embrace treaty‐based progress towards a maximalist EU ESDP. Over the same time period, the smaller parties of Sinn Féin and the Green Party were more consistent in their adherence to positive neutrality and in their opposition to the development of a maximalist EU ESDP. The forces of Europeanization have been evident in influencing evolving party discourses in Ireland. Much of this influence has been occasioned by the impact of participation in government on parties and the sporadic requirement to engage with referendum campaigns. The process of Europeanization has thus been subtle and muted and has interacted in intricate ways with domestic party agendas and objectives.

In an essay originally written in the early 1990s, Weiler wrote that, ‘[i]n some ways, Community law and the European Court were everything an international lawyer could dream about: the Court was creating a new order of international law in which norms were norms, sanctions were sanctions, courts were central and frequently used, and lawyers were important’. This emphasis on law as a motor for integration has been apparent in the extraordinary process of group therapy which the European Union has undergone in the last nine years: the Laeken Declaration of the European Council in December 2001, the establishment of the European Convention, the process of the drafting of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, the fateful story of its ratification, the Intergovernmental Conference which led to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007, the tumultuous process of its ratification and its entry into force on 1 December 2009, all brought the law to the very centre of the debate about the Union’s direction. And as the process got longer and the road to the entry into force of the relevant legal arrangements revealed more roadblocks and turns than their drafters had envisaged, the debate became more heated and its subject-matter wider and more profound. The fate of the legal rules agreed upon first in the Constitutional Treaty and then in the Lisbon Treaty was associated with the very identity of the Union: law was seen as guaranteeing the effectiveness of the Union’s stature on the world scene. It is interesting in this context that, during the Russia–Georgia crisis in 2008, President Sarkozy of France, then holder of the rotating EU Presidency, wrote that, had the Lisbon Treaty entered into force,the Union would have had the appropriate institutions to deal with international crises. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of institutional innovations which provided a focal point for this debate about the role of legal rules in the EU’s foreign affairs. The appointment of the President of the European Council under Article 15(6) TEU, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy under Article 18 TEU had been anticipated eagerly as boosting the ability of the Union to act on the international scene. Similarly, the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under Article 27(3) TEU had been viewed as enhancing the coherence of the EU’s foreign policies. The appointment of Herman van Rompuy, who had been the Prime Minister of Belgium for nine months, as the first President of the European Council, and Baroness Ashton, the Trade Commissioner for a year and a former head of a regional health authority in the United Kingdom, were subsequently viewed as distinctly underwhelming. As for the inter-institutional squabbles which marred the process of setting up the EEAS, they were not only unhelpful but also entirely typical of the internal conflicts which underpin the shaping of the Union’s external posture. The analysis of the institutional innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, the aim of this chapter is to focus on legal rules which govern the Common Security and Defence Policy, and examine the different functions which they may assume in areas which are at the core of national sovereignty. Therefore, the point of reference for this analysis is distinct from that of the quote which began this chapter: by focusing on the CSDP, one moves away from the tighter legal system set out in what used to be the Community legal order. However, it will become apparent that, whilst further away, the subject matter of this chapter is not entirely distinct from that legal order. The choice of topics it will discuss is highly selective, the aim being to highlight different functions that legal rules assume in the CSDP context. The analysis is structured as follows. First, the chapter will examine the mutual assistance clause introduced at Lisbon and will assess its limitations in terms of the legal duties it imposes on Member States. Second, it will outline the provisions on permanent structured cooperation and will comment on the issues which its application raises. Third, it will analyse the only provision of primary law on defence products, namely Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), explain its evolving interpretation and set it out within the broader legal and political CSDP context.