Understanding expectations formation for hand‐to‐mouth households: lessons from the financial crisis

Japan’s encounter with deflation and near‐zero‐interest short‐term interest rates in the 1990s led to a surge in research on the implications of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates for monetary policy around the end of that decade. Based on model simulations, the literature at that time identified a number of key implications of the ZLB (see Orphanides and Wieland [2000], Reifschneider and Williams [2000, 2002], Eggertsson and Woodford [2003], and references therein). First, with low inflation targets of the kind followed by many central banks, the ZLB will frequently be a binding constraint on monetary policy. That is, Japan’s example is not an outlier but rather a harbinger for the future. Second, at inflation targets of 1% or lower, lowering the inflation target comes at a cost of higher variability of output and inflation, although the effects on inflation variability are relatively small. This analysis provides an argument for maintaining a positive inflation target cushion above 1%. Third, in rare instances of severe prolonged recessions accompanied by deflation, standard open market operations will be insufficient to bring the inflation rate back to target, andalternative sources of stimulus to the economy, such as fiscal policy, will be needed. Fourth, central banks can significantly reduce the effects of the ZLB onmacroeconomic stability by modifying their policy actions and communication to the public when the ZLB threatens to constrain policy. Specifically, policies that cut rates aggressively when deflation is a risk and promise to temporarily target a higher rate of inflation following episodes where the ZLB binds were found to greatly reduce the effects of the ZLB in model simulations. In the decade since this researchwas initiated, the ZLB has gone froma theoretical issue applying to Japan to one that plagues many industrialized economies. Indeed, an era of overwhelming confidence in monetary policy’s power to tame the business cycle while delivering low and stable inflation has been replaced by fears that the global economy could

Editors’ Introduction

Editors’ Introduction

Forward Guidance and Household Expectations

Forward Guidance and Household Expectations

In this paper, the effect of market and macroeconomic uncertainties on corporate investment decisions was examined using the real option investment theory. Two types of uncertainties were investigated: macroeconomic uncertainties (exchange, interest and inflation rates) and market uncertainty (stock market volatility) while corporate investments were measured as the sum of the changes in capital stock and depreciation. Data were obtained for the period 2005-2019 and the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) estimation technique was employed. The results showed a significant difference between the effects of macroeconomic and market uncertainties on corporate investment decisions. We found that macroeconomic uncertainty of inflation rate has positive relationship with corporate investments, with a coefficient of 0.35071, and interest rate uncertainty (0.15567) and exchange rate uncertainty (-0.07852) were also statistically significant, whereas the linear market uncertainty has a negative value of -0.00173 and the quadratic market uncertainty (0.00520) was statistically insignificant. Therefore, interest rate volatility and inflation expectations are not factors constraining investment growth; however, exchange rate uncertainty exerts a substantial negative influence on corporate investment in Nigeria. Given the findings, the study recommends, among others, an appropriate and stable exchange rate policy that makes for easy business planning and forecasting by rational investors. To achieve a stable exchange rate that would bring about increased investment, the government should implement efficient macroeconomic policies, such as those that minimize the structural rigidities in the economy.

Last week, we witnessed one of the most exciting developments in monetary policymaking since the 1930s. The Japanese central bank staged an honest-to-goodness regime shift. The Bank of Japan went beyond vague promises and cheap talk. As I will describe in more detail later, it took dramatic actions and pledged convincingly to do whatever it takes to end deflation in Japan. The theoretical reasons why this regime shift may be important are well understood by economists. Persistent deflation and anemic growth suggest that Japan continues to suffer from a shortfall of demand. But their policy interest rate is already at the zero lower bound. Furthermore, riskier, long-term rates are also very low— suggesting that unconventional policies such as large-scale asset purchases are unlikely to do much to further reduce nominal rates. As discussed by Paul Krugman, Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford, and others, if unconventional monetary policy can raise expected inflation, this can push down real interest rates even though nominal rates cannot fall. 1 This, in turn, can raise aggregate demand by stimulating interest

Previous articleNext article FreeTaylor Rule Exchange Rate Forecasting during the Financial CrisisTanya Molodtsova and David H. PapellTanya MolodtsovaEmory University Search for more articles by this author and David H. PapellUniversity of Houston Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreI. IntroductionThe past few years have seen a resurgence of academic interest in out-of-sample exchange rate predictability. Gourinchas and Rey (2007, using an external balance model); Engel, Mark, and West (2008, using monetary, Purchasing Power Parity [PPP], and Taylor rule models); and Molodtsova and Papell (2009, using a variety of Taylor rule models) all report successful results for their models vis-à-vis the random walk null. There has even been the first revisionist response. Rogoff and Stavrakeva (2008) criticize the three abovementioned papers for their reliance on the Clark and West (2006) statistic, arguing that it is not a minimum mean squared forecast error statistic.An important problem with these papers is that none of them use real-time data that was available to market participants.1 Unless real-time data is used, the "forecasts" incorporate information that was not available to market participants, and the results cannot be interpreted as successful out-of-sample forecasting. Faust, Rogers, and Wright (2003) initiated research on out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting with real-time data. Molodtsova, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Papell (2008) use real-time data to estimate Taylor rules for Germany and the United States and forecast the Deutsche mark/dollar exchange rate out-of-sample for 1989:Q1 to 1998:Q4. Molodtsova, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Papell (2011), henceforth MNP (2011), use real-time data to show that inflation and either the output gap or unemployment, variables which normally enter central banks' Taylor rules, can provide evidence of out-of-sample predictability for the US dollar/euro exchange rate from 1999 to 2007. Adrian, Etula, and Shin (2011) show that the growth of US dollar-denominated banking sector liabilities forecasts appreciations of the US dollar from 1997 to 2007, but their results break down in 2008 and 2009.Molodtsova and Papell (2009) conduct out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting with Taylor rule fundamentals, using the variables, including inflation rates and output gaps, that normally comprise Taylor rules. Engel, Mark, and West (2008) propose an alternative methodology for Taylor rule out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting. Using a Taylor rule with prespecified coefficients for the inflation differential, output gap differential, and real exchange rate, they construct the interest rate differential implied by the policy rule and use the resultant differential for exchange rate forecasting. We use a single equation version of their model, which we call the Taylor rule differentials model.2 Since there is no evidence that either the Fed or the European Central Bank (ECB) targets the exchange rate, we do not include the real exchange rate in the forecasting regression for either model.3Out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting with Taylor rule fundamentals received blogosphere, as well as academic, notice in 2008. On July 28 and September 9, Menzie Chinn posted on Econbrowser a discussion of in-sample estimates of one of the specifications used in an early version of MNP (2011).4 On August 17, he posted an article by Michael Rosenberg of Bloomberg, who discussed Taylor rule fundamentals as a foreign currency trading strategy. By December 22, however, optimism had turned to pessimism. Once interest rates hit the zero lower bound, they cannot be lowered further. With zero or near-zero interest rates for Japan and the United States, and predicted near-zero rates for the United Kingdom and the Euro Area, the prospects for Taylor rule exchange rate forecasting were bleak. A second theme of the post, however, was that there was nothing particularly promising on the horizon. Going back to the monetary model, even in a regime of quantitative easing, faced doubtful prospects for success.5The events of 2007 to 2009 focused the attention of economists on the importance of financial conditions. On August 9, 2007, the spread between the dollar London interbank offer rate (Libor) and the overnight index swap (OIS), an indicator of financial stress in the interbank loan market, jumped from 13 to 40 basis points on concerns that problems in the subprime mortgage market were spreading to the broader mortgage market.6 The spreads mostly fluctuated between 50 and 90 basis points until September 17, 2008, when they spiked following the announcement that Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy, peaking on October 10 at over 350 basis points. Following the end of the panic phase of the financial crisis in October, 2008, the spread gradually returned to near precrisis levels in September 2009. The spread increased again, although not nearly as sharply, in mid-2010 and late 2011. The spreads are depicted in figure 1.Fig. 1. Credit spreads and financial stress indexes with their differentialsView Large ImageDownload PowerPointThe deteriorating financial situation in late 2007 and 2008 inspired several proposals for linking monetary policy to financial conditions. Mishkin (2008) argued that, when a financial disruption occurs, the Fed should cut interest rates to offset the negative effects of financial turmoil on aggregate economic activity. McCully and Toloui (2008) suggested that, because of tightened financial conditions, the Fed needed to lower the policy rate by 100 basis points in early February 2008 in order to keep the neutral rate constant. Meyer (2009) argued that the Taylor rule without considerations of financial conditions could not explain aggressive Fed policy in early 2008.Taylor (2008) proposed adjusting the systematic component of monetary policy by subtracting a smoothed version of the Libor-OIS spread from the interest rate target that would otherwise be determined by deviations of inflation and real GDP from their targets according to the Taylor rule. He argued that such an adjustment, which would have been about 50 basis points in late February 2008, would be a more transparent and predictable response to financial market stress than a purely discretionary adjustment.Curdia and Woodford (2010) modify the Taylor rule with an adjustment for changes in interest rate spreads. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with credit frictions, they show that incorporating spreads can improve upon a standard Taylor rule, although the optimal size of the adjustment is smaller than proposed by Taylor and depends on the source of variation in the spreads.The spread between the euro interbank offer rate (Euribor) and the euro OIS also jumped in August 2007 and spiked in September and October 2008, although not by as much as the US spread. While the Euribor-OIS spread came down in September 2009, it did not return to its precrisis levels. During August and December 2010, the spread jumped to as high as 40 basis points and, in December 2011, reached a maximum of 100 basis points. The end-of-quarter Libor-OIS, Euribor- OIS, and the difference between the Libor-OIS and Euribor-OIS spreads are depicted in figure 1. After the gap between the two spreads narrowed in 2008:Q4, the spread turned against the Euro Area, reaching a maximum in 2011:Q3 and 2011:Q4 before narrowing in 2012:Q1.This paper investigates out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting during the financial crisis with Taylor rule-based models that incorporate indicators of financial stress. We use one-quarter-ahead forecasts and estimate models with core inflation and both the output gap and the unemployment gap for the Taylor rule fundamentals and Taylor rule differentials models.7 When the Libor-OIS/Euribor-OIS differential is included in the forecasting regression, we call the models spread-adjusted Taylor rule fundamentals and differentials models. According to these models, when the Libor-OIS spread increases, the Fed would be expected to either lower the interest rate or, if it had already attained the zero lower bound, engage in quantitative expansion, depreciating the dollar. When the Euribor-OIS spread increases, the ECB would be expected to react similarly, depreciating the euro. We therefore use the difference between the Libor-OIS and Euribor-OIS spreads in addition to the difference between the United States and Euro Area inflation rates and output gaps for out-of-sample forecasting of the dollar/euro exchange rate.Another widely used credit spread is the Ted spread, the three-month Libor/three-month Treasury spread for the United States and the three-month Euribor/three-month Treasury spread for the Euro Area. As shown in figure 1, the US Ted spread was generally higher than the Euro Area Ted spread until 2008 and the Ted spread differential was more variable than the Libor-OIS/Euribor-OIS differential. The Euro Area Ted spread spiked with the US Ted spread in 2008:Q3, and so the differential does not display a spike at the peak of the financial crisis. Subsequent to the financial crisis, the Ted spread differential is similar to the Libor-OIS/Euribor-OIS differential. It turns against the Euro Area in 2009, reaches a maximum in 2011:Q3 and 2011:Q4, and narrows in 2012:Q1. We use the difference between the US and Euro Area Ted spreads as an alternative indicator of financial stress.Financial Conditions Indexes (FCIs) that summarize information about the future state of the economy contained in a number of current financial variables have received considerable attention in recent years. Hatzius et al. (2010) show that FCIs outperform individual financial variables that are considered to be useful leading indicators in their ability to predict the growth of different measures of real economic activity. We therefore augment the Taylor rule by using the difference between the Bloomberg and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) FCIs for the United States and the Euro Area for out-of-sample forecasting of the dollar/euro exchange rate.8 The Bloomberg and OECD FCIs are depicted in figure 1 where, in contrast to the credit spreads, an increase represents an improvement in financial conditions. Financial conditions deteriorate sharply for both the United States and the Euro Area in late 2008, but turn in favor of the United States starting in 2009.Real-time data for the United States is available in vintages starting in 1966, with the data for each vintage going back to 1947. Real-time data for the Euro Area, however, is only available in vintages starting in 1999:Q4, with the data for each vintage going back to 1991:Q1. While the euro/dollar exchange rate is only available since the advent of the euro in 1999, "synthetic" rates are available since 1993. We use rolling regressions to forecast exchange rate changes starting in 1999:Q4, with 26 observations in each regression. Keeping the number of observations constant, we report results ending in 2007:Q1, with 30 forecasts, through 2012:Q1, with 50 forecasts. We report the ratio of the mean squared prediction errors (MSPE) of the linear and random walk models and the CW test statistic of Clark and West (2006).9The Taylor rule fundamentals model with the unemployment gap produces very strong results. The MSPE of the Taylor rule model is smaller than the MSPE of the random walk model and the random walk null can be rejected in favor of the Taylor rule model using the CW test at the 5 percent level for the initial set of forecasts ending in 2007:Q1. As the number of forecasts increases, the MSPE ratios decrease and the strength of the rejections increases, peaking at the 1 percent level in 2008:Q1. In the following quarter, 2008:Q2, the MSPE ratios start to rise and continue to increase through 2009:Q1 (although the rejections continue at the 5 percent level or higher). Starting in mid-2009, the MSPE ratios stabilize and the random walk can be rejected in favor of the Taylor rule model at the 5 percent significance level for all specifications between 2009:Q2 and 2012:Q1.The results for the other models are not as strong. For the Taylor rule differentials model with the output gap, the random walk null can be rejected at the 10 percent level or higher from 2007:Q1 to 2008:Q3 and 2009:Q2 to 2009:Q4, but not otherwise. For the Taylor rule fundamentals model with the output gap and the Taylor rule differentials model with the unemployment gap, the random walk null can only be rejected at the 10 percent level or higher from 2007:Q1 to 2008:Q2.A major innovation in this paper is to incorporate indicators of fi-nancial stress, measured by the difference between the Libor-OIS and Euribor-OIS spreads, the US and Euro Area Ted spreads, the US and Euro Area Bloomberg FCIs, and the US and Euro Area OECD FCIs, for out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting with Taylor rule models. The strongest results are again for the Taylor rule fundamentals model with the unemployment gap. Using the OECD FCI, the random walk null can be rejected in favor of the linear model alternative at the 5 percent level for all but one set of forecasts, and at the 10 percent level for the remaining forecast. Using the three other indicators, the null can be rejected at the 10 percent level or higher for over half of the forecasts, with the strongest results for the forecasts ending between 2007 and 2009. As with the original Taylor rule model, the augmented Taylor rule differentials model with the output gap is the next most successful, with the random walk null rejected at the 10 percent level or higher for all forecasts using the OECD FCI and at the 10 percent level or higher for over half of the forecasts with the three other indicators. The rejections for the other two augmented models are concentrated in 2007 and 2008.We proceed to compare the original and augmented models for the two most successful specifications. For the Taylor rule fundamentals models with the unemployment gap, the original model null can be rejected in favor of the augmented model alternative at the 5 percent level for virtually every set of forecasts ending between 2007:Q1 to 2008:Q2 for all four financial stress indicators. For the forecasts ending between 2008:Q3 and 2012:Q1, however, the original model null is never rejected. For the Taylor rule differentials model with the output gap, there is some evidence in favor of the alternative specification with the Ted spread, Bloomberg FCI, and OECD FCI.We also compare the out-of-sample performance of the Taylor rule models with the monetary, PPP, and interest rate differentials models. For the interest rate differentials model, the MSPE ratios are below one and the random walk can be rejected with the CW tests from 2007:Q1 to 2008:Q2. Starting with the panic period of the financial crisis in 2008:Q3, the MSPE ratios rise above one and the random walk null can only be rejected for the forecasts ending in 2009:Q1 and 2012:Q1. The monetary and PPP models cannot outperform the random walk for any forecast interval. The evidence of out-of-sample exchange rate predictability is much stronger with the Taylor rule models than with the traditional models.II. Exchange Rate Forecasting ModelsEvaluating exchange rate models out of sample was initiated by Meese and Rogoff (1983), who could not reject the naïve no-change random walk model in favor of the existent empirical exchange rate models of the 1970s. Starting with Mark (1995), the focus of the literature shifted toward deriving a set of long-run fundamentals from different models, and then evaluating out-of-sample forecasts based on the difference between the current exchange rate and its long-run value. Engel, Mark, and West (2008) use the interest rate implied by a Taylor rule, and Molodtsova and Papell (2009) use the variables that enter Taylor rules to evaluate exchange rate forecasts.A. Taylor Rule Fundamentals ModelWe examine the linkage between the exchange rate and a set of variables that arise when central banks set the interest rate according to the Taylor rule. Following Taylor (1993), the monetary policy rule postulated to be followed by central banks can be specified aswhere it is the target for the short-term nominal interest rate, πt is the inflation rate, is the target level of inflation, yt is the output gap, the percent deviation of actual real GDP from an estimate of its potential level, and R is the equilibrium level of the real interest rate.10According to the Taylor rule, the central bank raises the target for the short-term nominal interest rate if inflation rises above its desired level and/or output is above potential output. The target level of the output deviation from its natural rate yt is 0 because, according to the natural rate hypothesis, output cannot permanently exceed potential output.The target level of inflation is positive because it is generally believed that deflation is much worse for an economy than low inflation. The unemployment gap, the difference between the unemployment rate and the natural rate of unemployment, can replace the output gap in equation (1) as in Blinder and Reis (2005) and Rudebusch (2010). In that case, the coefficient γ would be negative so that the Fed raises the interest rate when the unemployment rate is below the natural rate of unemployment. Taylor assumed that the output and inflation gaps enter the central bank's reaction function with equal weights of 0.5 and that the equilibrium level of the real interest rate and the inflation target were both equal to 2 percent.The parameters and R in equation (1) can be combined into one constant term, , which leads to the following equation, where λ = 1 + ϕ. Because λ > 1, the real interest rate is increased when inflation rises, and so the Taylor principle is satisfied. Following Taylor (2008) and Curdia and Woodford (2010), the original Taylor rule can be modified by subtracting a multiple of the spread between the dollar Libor rate and the OIS rate, where st is the spread.We do not incorporate several modifications of the Taylor rule that, following Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998), are typically used for estimation. Lagged interest rates are usually included in estimated Taylor rules to account for either (a) partial adjustment of the federal funds rate to the rate desired by the Federal Reserve, or (b) desired interest rate smoothing on the part of the Federal Reserve. Since the most successful exchange rate forecasting specifications for the dollar/euro rate in MNP (2011) did not include a lagged interest rate and Walsh (2010) shows that the Federal Reserve lowered the interest rate during the financial crisis faster than would be consistent with interest rate smoothing, we do not include lagged interest rates. The real exchange rate is often included in specifications that involve countries other than the United States. Since there is no evidence that the ECB uses the real exchange rate as a policy objective and inclusion of the real exchange rate worsens exchange rate forecasts in MNP (2011), we do not include it. Finally, while inflation forecasts are often used on the grounds that Federal Reserve policy is forward looking, there is no publicly available data on euro area core inflation forecasts.To derive the Taylor rule based forecasting equation, we construct the implied interest rate differential by subtracting the interest rate reaction function for the Euro Area from that for the United States: where asterisks denote Euro Area variables and α is a constant. It is assumed that the coefficients on inflation and the output gap are the same for the United States and the Euro Area, but the inflation targets and equilibrium real interest rates are allowed to differ.11Based on empirical research on the forward premium and delayed overshooting puzzles by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Faust and Rogers (2003) and Scholl and Uhlig (2008), and the results in Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010), who show that an increase in the interest rate can cause sustained exchange rate appreciation if investors either systematically underestimate the persistence of interest rate shocks or make infrequent portfolio decisions, we postulate the following exchange rate forecasting equation:12where asterisks denote Euro Area variables, ω is a constant, and ωπ, ωy, and ωs are positive coefficients. Alternatively, the unemployment gap differential (with opposite sign) can substitute for the output gap differential in equation (5).The variable et is the log of the US dollar nominal exchange rate determined as the domestic price of foreign currency, so that an increase in et is a depreciation of the dollar. The reversal of the signs of the coefficients between (4) and (5) reflects the presumption that anything that causes the Fed and/or ECB to raise the US interest rate relative to the Euro Area interest rate will cause the dollar to appreciate (a decrease in et). Since we do not know by how much a change in the interest rate differential (actual or forecasted) will cause the exchange rate to adjust, we do not have a link between the magnitudes of the coefficients in (4) and (5).13The difference between the US and Euro Area Ted spreads, Bloomberg FCIs, and OECD FCIs can also be used as the measure of the spread differential. An increase in the US spreads relative to the Euro Area spreads would cause forecasted dollar depreciation. Because the FCIs are constructed so that an increase represents an improvement in financial conditions, the sign of the coefficient on the FCI differentials would be negative so that a relative deterioration in US financial conditions would still lead to forecasted dollar depreciation.B. Taylor Rule Differentials ModelEngel, Mark, and West (2008) propose an alternative Taylor rule based model, which we call the Taylor rule differentials model to differentiate it from both the interest rate differentials model and the Taylor rule fundamentals model. They posit, rather than estimate, coefficients for the Taylor rule and subtract the interest rate reaction function for the Euro Area from that for the United States to obtain implied interest rate differentials,where the constant is equal to zero, assuming that the inflation target and equilibrium real interest rate are the same for the United States and the Euro Area. Out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting is conducted using single equation and panel error correction models.14We estimate a variant of the Taylor rule differentials model with two measures of economic activity–OECD estimates of the output gap and the unemployment gap. In order to obtain an implied interest rate differential that corresponds to the implied interest rate differential (6) with the unemployment gap as the measure of real economic activity, we use a coefficient of -1.0. This is consistent with a coefficient of 0.5 on the output gap if the Okun's law coefficient is 2.0.The Taylor rule differential model using Taylor's original coefficients would have a coefficient of 1.5 on the inflation differential, 0.5 on the output gap differential, and would not include the real exchange rate.15 During 2009 and 2010, a number of commentators, most notably Rudebusch (2010), argued that the appropriate output or unemployment gap coefficient in the Taylor rule for the United States should be double the coefficient in Taylor's original rule. While there has been an active policy debate on the normative question of whether prescribed Taylor rule interest rates should be calculated using Taylor's original specification or with larger coefficients, it is clear that the latter provide a better fit for Fed policy in the 2000s.16 Since the same argument has not been made for the ECB, we implement this by estimating a Taylor rule differentials model with a coefficient of 1.0 on the output gap (or -2.0 on the unemployment gap) for the United States and 0.5 on the output gap (or -1.0 on the unemployment gap) for the ECB, where α is a constant.The implied interest rate differential can be used to construct an exchange rate forecasting equation, where, as in the Taylor rule fundamentals model, the signs of the coefficients switch and we do not have a

Uncovering Inflation Expectations and Risk Premiums from Internationally Integrated Financial Markets

This study aims to investigate the effects of financial crises on tourism revenue in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) for five countries (Cambodia Thailand Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam). The financial crises include the 2003 financial crisis (the Federal Reserve reducing the savings interest rate), and the 2008 financial crisis (the insolvency proceedings of the Lehman Brothers). The panel dataset over the period of 1995-2015 is estimated using the Panel ARDL model with the Pool Mean Group (PMG) approach. The study indicates that the financial crises in 2003 and 2008 decreased tourism revenue in the long-run. Therefore, each GMS country should have tourism policies to handle financial crises, and preventive measures to handle financial crises should be implemented in each country.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of an increase of anticipated future inflation in a general equilibrium model. In the comparative statics approach taken here an attempt is made to bring together the several theoretical effects which have been presented in the literature. While the results of this inquiry suggest that inflationary expectations have a variety of effects which often conflict, they also show the necessary conditions in the economy which determine whether inflationary expectations will lead to increases in employment and output. The approach taken in this paper is unique since it attempts to differentiate between effects of currently held expectations of the current price level and the future inflation rate. This approach is necessary because the reasons for uncertainty about current prices are quite different from those which explain uncertainty about future prices. The paper treats the future inflation rate as an exogenous variable and examines the effects of an increase in the anticipated future inflation rate. The size and direction of the results depend upon how accurately agents are able to perceive current prices. Making these distinctions we come to a unique and somewhat surprising policy prescription of lowering aggregate demand as a way of simultaneously lowering both inflation and unemployment rates. We also find that jawboning efforts designed to point the finger of blame at firms and which allow unions free reign can be highly counterproductive in an inflationary world. The second section of this paper briefly discusses some of the theoretical literature on inflationary expectations. The third section describes a general equilibrium model with inflationary expectations. The fourth section performs a comparative static exercise which shows the effects of an autonomous increase in expectations of the future inflation rate upon real wages, employment, output interest rates, wages, and prices. The various results are shown to depend crucially upon misperceptions of current prices which are themselves dependent upon the relative costs of information gathering of firms and households. Section V summarizes the findings and comes to a few policy conclusions.

Comment

Monetary policy in a world of radical uncertainty

PurposeDrawing on the stakeholder theory, this study aims to empirically analyse the impact of platform enterprises’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) announcements on corporate stock market value. This study also estimates the moderating effect of stakeholder orientation and responsibility categories of CSR announcements, the platform enterprise type and the degree of CSR disclosure.Design/methodology/approachThe event study method is used to analyse the change in stock market value of 191 CSR announcements from 137 Chinese platform enterprises. In addition, a case analysis is presented for two platform enterprises with the best practices to validate and complement study findings.FindingsCSR announcements improve platform enterprises’ stock market value. Specifically, CSR announcements responding to platform enterprises’ external stakeholders, and CSR announcements with economic responsibility, have obvious positive impacts on stock market value. Furthermore, the maker platform’s CSR announcement has a more positive impact on stock market value than the exchange platform.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first attempt to identify the link between platform enterprises’ CSR announcements and stock market performance by empirical evidence, and it contributes to new knowledge of operating and evaluating platform enterprises’ CSR.

Previous article FreeCosts and Benefits to Phasing out Paper CurrencyKenneth RogoffKenneth RogoffHarvard University and NBER Search for more articles by this author Harvard University and NBERPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreThis paper explores the costs and benefits to phasing out paper currency, beginning with large-denomination notes, later extending to all but small coins and bills, and eventually those as well. It is hardly a simple issue; paper currency is deeply ingrained in the public’s image of government and country, and any attempt to change long-standing monetary conventions raises a host of complex issues. The symbolic value of the euro, for example, as a flag for nascent European institutions, is hard to overstate. Nevertheless, it is important to ask whether currency in paper form has outlived its usefulness. Today, credit and debit cards are increasingly being used for even small transactions. And although today’s cryptocurrencies fall far short of being true currencies—for one thing their prices are simply too volatile—the underlying technologies may ultimately strengthen the menu of electronic payments options.1Zero-Interest Negotiable Bonds as an Obstacle to Negative Policy Interest RatesPaper currency has two very distinct properties that should draw our attention. First, it is precisely the existence of paper currency that makes it difficult for central banks to take policy interest rates much below zero, a limitation that seems to have become increasingly relevant during this century. As Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) point out, today’s environment of low and stable inflation rates has drastically pushed down the general level of interest rates. The low overall level, combined with the zero bound, means that central banks cannot cut interest rates nearly as much as they might like in response to large deflationary shocks.If all central bank liabilities were electronic, paying a negative interest on reserves (basically charging a fee) would be trivial. But as long as central banks stand ready to convert electronic deposits to zero-interest paper currency in unlimited amounts, it suddenly becomes very hard to push interest rates below levels of, say, −0.25 to −0.50%, certainly not on a sustained basis. Hoarding cash may be inconvenient and risky, but if rates become too negative, it becomes worth it.2In a series of insightful papers, Willem Buiter ([2009], and citations therein) has discussed whether it might be possible to find devices for paying negative interest rates on currency.3 Buiter notes that there were experiments with stamp taxes during the Great Depression (currency would remain valid only if it were regularly stamped to reflect tax payment). There are a variety of other ideas. For example, Mankiw (2009) points out that the central bank could effectively tax currency by holding lotteries based on serial numbers, and making the “winners” worthless.Paying a negative interest rate on currency, or on electronic reserves at the central bank, may seem barbaric to some, but it is arguably no more barbaric than inflation, which similarly reduces the real purchasing power of currency. The idea of raising target inflation to reduce the likelihood of hitting the zero bound is indeed an alternative approach. Blanchard et al. point out that if central banks permanently raised their target inflation rates from 2% to 4%, it would leave them scope to make deeper cuts to real interest rates in severe downturns. Arguably, paying negative interest rates is a better approach if, as many believe, inflation becomes more unstable as the general level of inflation rises. Robert Hall (1983) argues forcefully that the central role of monetary policy should be to provide a stable unit of account, and in principle the ability to pay negative interest rates facilitates its ability to achieve this in today’s low inflation environment (Hall 2002, 2013).Even if there is a good case for allowing the central bank to pay a significant negative interest rate to fight a large deflationary shock, what is to stop a government from using negative interest rates as a wealth tax in normal times? This is a complex issue that parallels many of the problems in trying to design central bank institutions that will resist the temptation to inflate. Nevertheless, the challenges of conducting monetary policy at the zero bound force consideration of alternatives to the status quo. If, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) conjecture, business and financial cycles in the twenty-first century may produce larger fluctuations than they did in the last part of the twentieth century, the issue of hitting the zero bound may indeed remain a recurrent one.Anonymous Money as a Vehicle for Facilitating Tax Evasion and Illegal ActivityWe now turn to a second drawback to paper currency. Paper currency facilitates making transactions anonymous, helping conceal activities from the government in a way that might help agents avoid laws, regulations, and taxes. This is a big difference from most forms of electronic money that, in principle, can be traced by the government. (The issue of substitute anonymous transactions vehicles, such as Bitcoin, is discussed later on.)Standard monetary theory (e.g., Kiyotaki and Wright 1989) suggests that an essential property of money is that neither buyer nor seller requires knowledge of its history, giving it a certain form of anonymity. (A slight caveat is that the identity of the buyer might be correlated with the probability of the currency being counterfeit, but until now this is a problem that governments have been able to contain.) There is nothing, however, in standard theories of money that requires transactions to be anonymous from tax-or law-enforcement authorities. And yet there is a significant body of evidence that a large percentage of currency in most countries, generally well over 50%, is used precisely to hide transactions. I have summarized the international evidence in earlier research (Rogoff 1998, 2002). Other than the introduction of the euro, rather little has changed except that, if anything, anonymous currencies have continued to grow at a faster rate than nominal gross domestic product (GDP).Given that banks and businesses are typically quite efficient in their cash management (as evidenced by several central bank surveys), the most surprising fact about currency is the sheer extant amount that most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have in circulation, far in excess of anything that can be traced to legal use in the domestic economy. Table 1 gives data on currency by denomination and as a share of GDP for the United States, the Eurozone, Japan, and Hong Kong. For example, as of December 2013, there was roughly 1.2 trillion dollars in US currency in circulation, or roughly $4,000 for every man, woman, and child living in the United States. Moreover, 77% of the total value is in $100 bills, meaning more than thirty $100 bills per person. By contrast, denominations of $10 and under accounted for less than 4% of the total value of currency in use.Table 1. A. Europe: Currency in Circulation (February 20, 2014)Denomination (€)Value (In Thousands of Euros)Value (% of Total Currency)Value (% of 2013 GDP)58,028,790.80.8380.0841020,115,075.42.1000.2102057,254,121.05.9780.59850335,791,854.335.0633.507100183,322,233.019.1421.91520039,428,190.44.1170.412500289,720,996.030.2523.026Total (banknotes)933,661,260.8997.4919.752All coins24,029,083.22.5090.251Total (incl. coins)957,690,344.010010.003B. Hong Kong, Currency in Circulation (end of 2012)Denomination (HK$)Value (in Billions of HKD)Value (% of Total Currency)Value (% of 2012 GDP)102.920.9670.1432011.383.7730.558507.002.3220.34410027.138.9981.33250074.0924.5743.6371,000169.1956.1158.305Total (banknotes)291.7096.75014.319All coins9.803.2500.481Total (incl. coins)301.5010014.800C. Japan, Currency in Circulation (February 2014)Denomination (¥)Value (in 100 Millions of Yen)Value (% of Total Currency)Value (% of 2013 GDP)5001,0660.1180.0221,00038,0364.1930.7952,0001,9950.2200.0425,00029,5953.2620.61910,000790,19687.10116.519Total (banknotes)861,33594.94218.006All coins45,8845.0580.959Total (incl. coins)907,22010018.965D. United States, Currency in Circulation (December 31, 2013)Denomination ($)Value (in Billions of Dollars)Value (% of Total Currency)Value (% of 2013 GDP)110.60.8850.06322.10.1750.013512.71.0600.0761018.51.5440.11020155.012.9350.9235074.56.2170.443100924.777.1685.504500 to 10,0000.30.0250.002Total1,198.31007.133Source Panel A: European Central Bank; Panel B: Hong Kong Monetary Authority; Panel C: Bank of Japan; Panel D: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sytem.View Table ImageThe size of dollar currency holdings, relative to GDP or per capita, is hardly unique. Indeed, in the United States the currency supply is 7% of GDP, in the Eurozone 10%, and in Japan 18%. Despite having lower per-capita income, the Eurozone also has roughly $4,000 in euros for every one of its citizen (valued at the April 2014 euro-dollar exchange rate). The euro has a much greater range of high denominations, so the value is not as concentrated in a single denomination as in the United States. Nevertheless, the same basic phenomenon holds, with roughly a third of the value of euro currency held in 50 euro notes (roughly $70), and another third in 500 euro notes (roughly $700). Adding in 100 and 200 euro notes brings the percent of high-denomination notes above that of the United States. In Japan, the total amount of currency outstanding is similar to that in the United States and Europe, despite having a population size only 40% as large. The concentration in the highest denomination is even more acute, with 87% of the value of notes being in 10,000 yen notes, the largest denomination, roughly $100 at April 2014 exchange rates.4It is true that in the case of the United States and the euro area, there is fairly convincing evidence that a large share is held abroad. Porter and Judson (1996) use seasonal comparisons with Canada and biometric techniques to infer that roughly 70% of US currency is held abroad. It should be noted that Canada is a country that has relatively low currency use compared to many other advanced countries. However, the fact that currency outstanding is comparable to the United States in so many other OECD countries, most of whose currencies are used only domestically, suggests that perhaps the size of currency holdings in the United States is similarly quite large; Rogoff (1998) speculates that the ratio of US currency held internationally may be closer to 50%. Of course, as interest rates have fallen to near zero in recent years, it is not surprising that the demand for currency in the domestic US economy appears to have risen; using similar techniques to her earlier work, Judson (2012) estimates around 50% of US dollars are held domestically postfinancial crisis. Even if foreign holdings of currency are important for a few countries (including also Hong Kong and Switzerland), this is not thought to be the case for most OECD countries. The Japanese yen does not appear to be a significant international currency.In any event, it is clear that the long-term trend domestic demand for currency in the legal economy is dwindling, due in part to advances in cashless payments.5 As already noted, the small number of central bank surveys that have been performed to measure domestic use of currency in the legal economy typically find very low percentages, on the order of 10–15% of total extant currency in the case of the United States (see also Feige 2012a, 2012b). Cash is used more intensively in some Eurozone countries. Fischer, Köhler, and Seitz (2004) use a wide range of methods to estimate the transactions demand for currency within the euro area to be 25–35% of total euro currency in circulation. This estimate is broadly in accord with European Central Bank surveys taken after the financial crisis (ECB 2011) that reported holdings and demand for euro in the legal domestic economy of roughly one-third of total euros outstanding. Of the remainder, Bartzsch, Rösl, and Seitz (2011) look at euro notes issued by the Bundesbank and find that between 40 and 55% are held outside of Eurozone countries. (It is quite possible that the overall level of euro notes held outside the Eurozone is lower, since Bundesbank-issued notes are particularly popular, even if in principle all the Eurozone central bank notes should be perfect substitutes.)Presumably, currency that is not held in the domestic legal economy or in the global economy (legal and underground) is mainly held in the domestic underground economy.6 The underground economy includes agents evading taxes, laws, and regulation. The size of the underground economy is not known within any precision, though estimates for the United States are on the order of 7–10% of GDP (e.g., IRS 2012, Feige 2012a, b). The IRS estimates that for the benchmark year 2006, the tax gap (tax not paid voluntarily) is over $450 billion, with a gap of $385 billion still remaining after tax collection efforts. Importantly, this estimate does not include the informal economy (US Treasury Inspector General 2013). In Europe, where taxes are higher and regulation is often more onerous, most estimates suggest that the size of the underground economy is considerably larger than in the United States (see Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 2010).Summing up, currency should be becoming technologically obsolete. However, in no small part due to its association with the underground economy, it is not.Arguments against Phasing out Paper CurrencyThe arguments for eliminating paper currency are impressive, but there are important points on the other side of the equation. The most straightforward is seigniorage. The United States’ money supply increased by an average of roughly $30 billion per year from 2002–2007, and averaged roughly $70 billion per year in the years immediately following the financial crisis. The magnitudes are similar in many other large advanced countries. If a phase-out of paper currency were simply met by an increased demand for electronic central bank reserves, there would, of course, be no significant loss. However, precisely because paper currency is anonymous, replacing it with nonanonymous electronic money would likely lead to a large shrinkage in demand, and treasuries would have to absorb the loss. Rogoff (1998) conjectures that this cost might be fully compensated if a modest fraction of the underground economy is induced to pay taxes and, of course, there are also potential gains from reduced law-enforcement costs. It is unclear how easily these activities could substitute into other transactions media, but presumably this could be made difficult by restricting other potential anonymous transactions vehicles.Of course, if the government simply replaced paper currency with electronic currency that it could somehow credibly make anonymous, there would not necessarily be any long-run shrinkage in demand. The government would continue to garner seigniorage revenues from the underground economy and the problem of the zero bound on nominal interest rates would be effectively eliminated. That said, it is far from clear that the government can credibly issue a fully anonymous electronic currency and even if it could, anonymous electronic fiat money has all the drawbacks of an anonymous paper currency in facilitating tax evasion and illegal activity.There is also a question of how forcing a more rapid shift to cashless payments would affect transactions costs. Retailers are typically forced to pay a pro-rata fee to companies such as MasterCard and Visa for credit card services, but handling paper currency also entails substantial costs to protect against theft and pilferage. Also, in principle, the federal government could allow individuals to maintain ATMs and debit cards at the Federal Reserve, and arguably these could be serviced by private subcontractors at lower cost than conventional bank services.Another important argument for maintaining the status quo is that eliminating a core symbol of the monetary regime could disrupt common social conventions for using money, possibly in unexpected ways. For example, it could lead to a precipitous decline in demand for debt and not just for fiat money. This need not happen. In his hugely influential book on monetary policy, Woodford (2003) shows that central bank stabilization policy can work perfectly well in the limit as money’s role in transactions goes to zero. As long as social price-setting convention remains, and as long as the central bank can manipulate banks’ reserves to set the price level, monetary stabilization policy can still operate with full force. However, one must be careful that just because a similar equilibrium can be obtained with or without a significant transactions role for money, it does not necessarily mean that private agents will focus on the same equilibrium as they would when there exists paper currency. Yes, the government can help coordinate expectations by insisting that taxes are paid in the electronic fiat currency and that all state contracts be denominated in this currency, but it is important to acknowledge that there is at least an outside risk that if the government is too abrupt in abandoning a century-old social convention, it will destabilize inflation expectations, introduce a risk premium into bond pricing, and generally induce unexpected macroeconomic instabilities.There is also a potential risk to central bank independence. Even if eliminating currency is at least revenue neutral for the government as a whole, the central bank is the one that will lose seigniorage revenue. The Treasury is the one that will correspondingly gain through higher tax revenues and lower law-enforcement costs. Under longstanding institutional relationships, the ability to self-finance has put central banks in a privileged position. Although governments typically maintain oversight of central bank budgets, the fact that the central bank nominally appears to be a “profit center” considerably strengthens its hand in maintaining operational independence. In recent years, quantitative easing has been a massive money maker, but this is not the normal state of affairs when currency provision is a key source of revenue.Another argument for maintaining paper currency is that it pays to have a diversity of technologies and not to become overly dependent on an electronic grid that may one day turn out to be very vulnerable. Paper currency diversifies the transactions system and hardens it against cyber attack, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) blasts, and so forth. This argument, however, seems increasingly less relevant because economies are so totally exposed to these problems anyway. With paper currency being so marginalized already in the legal economy in many countries, it is hard to see how it could be brought back quickly, particularly if ATM machines were compromised at the same time as other electronic systems.7A different type of argument against eliminating currency relates to civil liberties. In a world where society’s mores and customs evolve, it is important to tolerate experimentation at the fringes. This is potentially a very important argument, though the problem might be mitigated if controls are placed on the government’s use of information (as is done, say, with tax information), and the problem might also be ameliorated if small bills continue to but not if any country to reduce the use of its currency, there is a risk that another currency would be used within domestic Even if that risk is not for a country like the United States, there is still the of revenue from foreign of currency of may be in underground or illegal activities within their even if not within US any attempt to large-denomination currency would be taken in a that at the very least the global currency into use at the time of and has a role in the global of the last 100 Despite and advances in electronic transactions it has even if its seem to be in the world underground and illegal economy. With many central banks now near or at the zero interest rate bound, there are increasingly arguments for how it might be out of there are many arguments for not the status from the of seigniorage revenues to civil in from to may already in the of the paper currency anyway. 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