Understanding Current Threats to Democracy: The Limits of the Civil-Military Relations Paradigm

Articulation and Concordance: A Dialogue on Civil–Military Relations in Fiji

Introduction: National Security and Civil-Military Relations PART I MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND THE STATE: THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1. Officership as a Profession Professionalism and the Military The Concept of Profession The Military Profession 2. The Rise of the Military Profession in Western Society A New Social Type Mercenary and Aristocratic Officership Eighteenth-Century Aristocratic Institutions Preprofessional Meals: The Military Craft and the Natural Genius The Origins of Professionalism The Emergence of Professional Institutions, 1800-1875 European Professionalism: General Upton's Summary, 1875 Formulation of the Professional Ethic: The Autonomy and Sub-Ordination of War In Clausewitz's Vom Kriege 3. The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic The Meaning of the Military Mind The Professional Military Ethic 4. Power, Professionalism, and Ideology: Civil-Military Relations In Theory The Varieties of Civilian Control The Two Levels of Civil-Military Relations The Equilibrium of Objective Civilian Control The Patterns of Civil-Military Relations 5. Germany and Japan: Civil-Military Relations In Practice The German and Japanese Patterns Germany: The Tragedy of Professional Militarism Japan: The Continuity of Political Militarism PART II MILITARY POWER IN AMERICA: THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, 1789-1940 6. The Ideological Constant: The Liberal Society Versus Military Professionalism The Historical Constants of American Civil-Military Relations The Prevalence of Liberalism in the United States The Liberal Approach to Military Affairs The Military Hero in Liberal Politics 7. The Structural Constant: The Conservative Constitution Versus Civilian Control The Constitutional Absence of Objective Civilian Control The Framers and Civilian Control The Militia Clauses and Military Federalism: The Empire Within an Empire The Separation of Powers: Dual Control Over the National Forces The Commander in Chief Clause: The Political-Military Hierarchy Civilian Control and Constitutional Government 8. The Roots of the American Military Tradition Before the Civil War The Three Strands of American Militarism The Failure of Federalism: Hamilton's Abortive Professionalism Technicism Popularism Professionalism 9. The Creation of the American Military Profession The Dominance of Business Pacifism: Industrialism Versus Militarism Years of Isolation: The Dark and the Bright The Creative Core: Sherman, Upton, Luce The Institutions of Professionalism The Making of the American Military Mind 10. The Failure of the Neo-Hamiltonian Compromise, 1890-1920 The Nature of Neo-Hamiltonianism Mahan And Wood: The Tragedy of the Military Publicist The Abortive Identification With Society, 1918-1925 11. The Constancy of Interwar Civil-Military Relations Business-Reform Hostility and Military Professionalism Reform Liberalism: The Pragmatic Usages of Militarism Military Institutions The American Military Ethic, 1920-1941 PART III THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, 1940-1955 12. World War II: The Alchemy of Power Civil-Military Relations in Total War Military Authority and Influence in Grand Strategy The Military Adjustment to Wartime Power Civil-Military Relations in Economic Mobilization The Fruits of Harmony and Acrimony 13. Civil-Military Relations in the Postwar Decade The Alternatives of Civil-Military Relations Postwar Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations Military Influence in American Society 14. The Political Roles of the Joint Chiefs Political Roles: Substantive and Advocatory The Joint Chiefs in the Truman Administration The Korean War: the Generals, the Troops, and the Public The Joint Chiefs in the First Two Years of the Eisenhower Administration Conclusion 15. The Separation of Powers and Cold War Defense The Impact of the Separation of Powers The Separation of Powers Versus the Separation of Functions The Separation of Powers Versus Military Professionalism The Separation of Powers Versus Strategic Monism 16. Departmental Structure of Civil-Military Relations The Organization Problems of the Postwar Decade The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Legal Form and Political Reality The Comptroller: Superego of the Department of Defense The Role of the Secretary The Needs of the Office 17. Toward a New Equilibrium The Requisite For Security Changes in the Ideological Environment Conservatism and Security The Worth of the Military Ideal Notes Index

Contemporary studies of African Civil-Military Relations have shown that more than 50 % of the African states have undergone one or more successful or abortive military coups. A number of theories have been proposed to explain Civil-Military Relations. The purpose of this paper is to test Huntington's theory of Objective Civilian Control with respect to Civilian-Military Relations in modern Africa. Following a brief overview of African Civil- Military Relations and focus on the question of who controls whom, the paper poses the same question relative to non-African Civil-Military Relations. In a more extensive, in-depth case study of Nigeria, the paper seeks to examine the level and source of military profes sionalism, whether or not Nigeria has ever been free of military intervention in its political process because of its high level of professionalism, and whether Huntington's argument has any validity. In addition, the role of the African military in Nigeria as a paradigm in African Civilian-Military Relations is examined by discussing when and why Nigeria achieved her nationhood, the causes and consequences of military intervention and the level of Nigerian military professionalism, the role of the military and the Civil War, and why professionalism is not a reliable deterrent to military intervention in politics. This discussion illustrates the fallacy of most assumptions in the Civil-Military Relations literature today. The paper concludes that Huntington's assumption that non-military intervention is a function of civilian encouragement of military professionalism and professionalization is spurious. Based on the Nigeran case study and cross-national observations, the data show that a high degree of professionalism and professionalization is not a reliable deterrent against African military activism and intervention in civilian affairs. The data support the findings that professionalization of the military alone would not deter the military from intervening unless it is accompanied by the military's complete satisfaction with civilian control. Without this satisfaction, the military establishment is likely to challenge and possibly remove the civilian control whenever the military is disenchanted with or envious of civilian rule. Drawing from studies on political anthropology, it is sound to say that African military intervention is normal and one of the fundamental aspects of African tradi tional Warriorism. In the final analysis, Objective Military Control is not unique to Africa. It is a universal political phenomenon in Civil-Military Relations today.

Dereliction of Duty Redux?: Post-Iraq American Civil-Military Relations

The literature encompassed within the area of civil-military relations (CMR) is extremely broad. The focus in this bibliography is primarily on CMR as a subfield of comparative politics in that it deals with the power relations between the military and civilians. This bibliography is concerned with the classic question, raised in the 1st century ce by Juvenal: Who will guard the guardians? From this perspective, CMR is generally about power and politics of an organization with a monopoly in arms to exercise political power. While foreign states and international organizations may influence CMR, particularly during democratic transitions, it is essentially a national phenomenon. International law does, however, pertain in most of the roles and missions the military are tasked with. Not included in this bibliography are the following topics: military history, strategy and doctrine, sociology of the armed forces including recruitment, gender, race, and health. Thus, important authors such as Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos will not be included. This bibliography will break new ground in four ways: First, in giving attention to military effectiveness as well as the traditional focus on civilian control; second, in giving attention to roles and missions currently executed by the military; third, in including non-democracies, democracies, and those in transition; and fourth, in including the roles of private contractors in the mix of civil-military relations. The six primary sections in this bibliography are the following: Democratic Civilian Control is mainly about the United States and its emphasis is on the military taking political power, even though the American military has never sought to take power. CMR in Contemporary Non-Democratic Regimes focuses on China, Russia, and Egypt as they are all globally important non-democratic regimes, with varied relationships between the military and civilians. CMR in Democratic Transitions is included as the military is a key actor in virtually every transition from the beginning of Third Wave of democratization, starting in Lisbon, Portugal, on April 25, 1974. CMR in the Context of Roles and Missions is included as it details that the military mainly implements roles and missions not involving conflict with other militaries, and includes the role of international law. The section on CMR Including Democratic Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness is included as attention must be paid to effectiveness in the different roles and missions for military organizations. And, finally military roles and missions assumed by Non-Military For-Profit Private Enterprises are included as involvement of private enterprise raises questions regarding the state’s putative monopoly of power and roles of the military.

: This paper analyzes the impact of changing values and culture, both on American society and the military institution, against the framework of civil-military relations. Social and technological change has had a profound effect on culture and the shaping and ordering of value sets in American society. These changes affect military culture and values in a variety of ways, most notably in the realm of military effectiveness. This paper assesses the basic sociological impact of technological and social change on value systems and culture from a historical perspective. With this basic understanding, an analysis of military culture is presented, from which conclusions about military effectiveness are derived and recommendations made for the future of military culture and civil-military relations in America.

Before the wave of military coups and military governments from the early 1960s until 1990, the social science and history literature on civil-military relations in Latin America was virtually devoid of serious empirical research. In response to the surge in military governments in the region, this literature burgeoned. This article gives priority to landmark theoretical treatments, comparative research, and selected country studies with extensive bibliographical materials. While this article may have inevitably omitted the favorite books and articles of some researchers, it includes work illustrating diverse theoretical, empirical, and normative approaches to civil-military relations in Latin America. It does not include the much more extensive literature on comparative civil-military relations. In a broad sense, “civil-military relations” refers to the contact points, formal and informal, of the armed forces with civilians and civilian policymakers as well as civilian perceptions of military institutions and military perceptions of civilian and government institutions. Such contact points may include, among many others, military participation in various government agencies and policymaking councils, legislative oversight of military budgets, approval of promotions of high-ranking officers, appointments to military academies, definition of the curriculum in military schools and academies, collaboration on formation of defense and national security policy, and connections of military officers to political parties, voluntary associations, religious institutions, and other arenas in which civilian and military contacts occur. Media access to, and coverage of, the armed forces may also be an important aspect of civil-military relations. After first identifying the “pioneers” in the study of civil-military relations in Latin America, the sections of this article then focus on studies of the constitutional missions of the Latin American armed forces and their statutory authority, from internal policing to developing numerous economic enterprises, public works, and providing disaster relief. A subsequent section considers the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians both in normal times and under regimes of exception and emergency authority (state of siege, state of assembly, state of internal commotion, and other temporary suspension of constitutional rights and liberties included in almost all Latin American constitutions). Following the sections on formal and institutional treatments of civil-military relations, the article turns to the vast literature on the causes of military coups in Latin America, comparative and case studies of civil-military relations from 1959 to 1990, the transitions back to civilian government (1978–early 1990s), discussions of “civilian control” or “civilian supremacy” over military institutions, the literature on post–1990 civil-military relations in the region, and, finally, a section on the most recent research (2009–2020) on Latin American civil-military relations.

Civil–military relations is an interdisciplinary area of research, reflecting the work of political scientists, military, sociologists, and historians. History and culture, the constitution of the state and the statutes and practices arising therefrom, changes in the international security environment, technology, the character of conflict, and the changing concept of “soldier-hood” all influence the civil–military relations of a state. There are many possible patterns of civil–military relations that provide different answers to the questions of who controls the military and how, the degree of military influence appropriate for a given society, the appropriate role of the military in a given polity, who serves, and the effectiveness of the military instrument that a given civil–military relations produces. Moreover, there is no “general” or “unified field” theory that successfully explains all of these patterns. For a variety of reasons, Samuel Huntington's institutional theory remains the dominant paradigm for examining civil–military relations. When it comes to the question of civilian control of the military, Peter Feaver’s agency theory corrects some of the flaws in Huntington’s theory. Morris Janowitz and the military sociologists also provide useful insights, especially regarding the question of who serves and related issues. In the case of concordance theory, critics argue that the definition of military intervention sets the bar too low to be meaningful. Ultimately, the patterns of civil–military relations affect national security because of their impact on strategic assessment.

Civil-Military Relations (CMR) in Nepal has been a subject of ongoing contention amid the nation's dynamic political landscape. This article deals with Nepal's CMR dynamics, focusing on its historical progression and CMR-related contemporary circumstances. Despite the Nepali Army's historic non-intervention in politics, the state of CMR remains contentious. Drawing upon established CMR theories such as Principal-Agent, Institutional, Convergence, and Trinity theories, this study explores the root causes of CMR-related circumstances and its outcomes posing challenges in Nepal and proposes viable approaches for its mitigation. Highlighting the importance of civilian control over the armed forces, the study emphasizes the significance of coordinated efforts, effective communication, and respective stakeholder understanding on consolidating CMR. It asserts that the Nepali Army, being at the forefront of national security, holds a pivotal responsibility in fostering conducive CMR approaches, crucial for Nepal's national security interests. In essence, the article highlights the urgency of strengthening CMR in Nepal, advocating collaborative efforts among stakeholders to ensure effective civilian control, and safeguarding national interests and sovereignty.

American civil-military relations are rooted in constitutional foundations that distribute and check political power, such as civilian control over the military. Preserving American democracy requires adherence to these foundational democratic principles. This chapter argues that American policymakers, the military, and civilian society lack a shared understanding of the democratic norms that underpin US civil-military relations. Furthermore, poor understanding of democratic norms in general, and of civil-military relations norms in particular, puts American democracy at risk. Consequently, a review of the constitutional foundations of American civil-military relations and an assessment of the normative state of such relations is in order. This chapter defines civil-military relations; reviews the constitutional origins of American civil-military relations; presents the essential civil-military norms for democratic states; and highlights the responsibilities of political leaders, military actors, and civilian society to uphold them. Such a review contributes to improving the shared understanding of democratic civil-military relations norms that is essential to their preservation.

This study discussed the civil-military relations in the United States during George W. Bush's presidency（2001-2006）and focused on civilian control, notions and fulfillment of military professionalism. The key points included American civil-military relations theories, wars and military transformations led by civilians, civilian leadership styles, conflicts between the civilian and military top rankings, criticisms on civilian leaderships by retired generals, and reviews of civil-military relations theories. Civilian and military conflicts originated primarily from disagreements and arguments regarding military operation planning and executions in the Afghan and Iraqi wars after 911, and from dissatisfactions with Donald Rumsfeld's（then Secretary of Defense）leadership style from the generals. The changes in civil-military relations has several implications:（1）The norm theory of civil-military relations and the notions of civilian control were challenged again;（2）The armed forces became ＂partisan＂ and subjected to increasing political influence;（3）Civilian control often overpowers the military during war time, resulting in increased pressure of transformation; and（4） Civilian control remains the central belief and tradition of American civil-military relations. Tension and conflicts may occur; however, American civil-military relations generally resemble a dynamic balance.

Gaurav Kampani provides a compelling account of the evolution of India's nuclear weapons program from 1989 to 1999 and rightly highlights how the need for secrecy “stymied India's operational advances.”1 “Secrecy concerns,” he argues, “prevented decisionmakers and policy planners from decomposing problem sets and parceling them out simultaneously for resolution to multiple bureaucratic actors, including the military” (p. 82). In his eagerness to argue this point, however, Kampani is too quick to dismiss other explanations for India's slow pace of operationalization. In this letter, I argue that a more complete account of “New Delhi's long nuclear journey” should incorporate civil-military relations as another influential factor.Most accounts of India's nuclear weapons program agree that India's political establishment largely excluded the military from shaping the program's pace, direction, and progress. According to Verghese Koithara, “[K]eeping the military at arm's length and sidelining military competencies the way India has done has no parallel in global nuclear weapons development history.”2 He attributes this situation to the “barren relationship that developed between the political leadership and the armed forces of the country soon after independence.”3 Ashley Tellis blames India's nonoperationalization of nuclear weapons on its “peculiar organization of civil-military relations.”4 Raj Chengappa claims that “despite the Indian Army providing all the logistics support [for both of India's nuclear tests] … it was rarely privy to India's nuclear secrets. … All this was part of a deliberate design by successive governments to rein in the armed forces.”5 More recently, Vipin Narang has written that “a distrust of India's armed forces … [produced] a civil-military relationship in which India's political leadership is patently unwilling to entrust any dedicated nuclear subcomponents to the armed forces.”6 Kampani presents little concrete evidence to undermine these views.Kampani makes four points to support his contention that “the distrust that pervades India's civil-military institutions” was not a factor in the development of India's nuclear weapons program (p. 108). None supports his claim.First, Kampani asserts that “[i]f civil-military institutional tensions were the cause [of India's slow nuclear operationalization], … one would [have] see[n] greater aggregation of information among civilians” (ibid.). He does not explain, however, what he means by a “greater aggregation of information among civilians.” What kind of information and about what? The nuclear weapons program, delivery options, nuclear targeting philosophy? If he means all of these, then there was a designated civilian official who possessed this “aggregated” knowledge: the scientific adviser to the defense minister. In the period under discussion, two individuals held this post—V.S. Arunachalam from 1982 to 1992 and Abdul Kalam from 1992 to 1999. Another key official was former Defense Secretary Naresh Chandra, who, as Kampani notes, was brought in as a “specially designated coordinator” (p. 89). In addition, members of the scientific-technocratic enclave such as K. Santhanam and R. Chidambaram would have had information far in excess of that of any member of the military.7 Still, one can argue that none of these officials would have had “aggregated information” if the military aspects of the nuclear weapons program were included—that is, the operational details and capabilities of designated aircraft and delivery options, the military's standard operating procedures, and so on. But the argument would then be tautological: if the military was deliberately kept “at the margins,” as Kampani states, then how could civilian officials stay informed about its capabilities (p. 94)? Such an arrangement would have structurally prevented the “greater aggregation of information” among civilians, as predicted by the author.Second, Kampani quotes an unnamed senior Indian defense official who justified keeping the military out the loop “because of the danger of secrecy being compromised.” The official added, “[T]he military's complaints have more to [do] with a sense of privilege and pride. Why should they be told? The cabinet ministers weren't told, the defense minister, their political boss was not told. So why should the armed services chiefs be told” (ibid.)? Kampani's use of this quote as evidence of a lack of civil-military distrust is problematic on several counts. To begin, it contradicts his earlier assertion that “the regime of information scarcity operated with nearly equal severity on both the civilian and military sides of the nuclear equation” (ibid.). Information scarcity, however, could not have been of “nearly equal severity” if, according to this interviewee, a deliberate decision had been made to keep the military away from the program. More important, Kampani accepts uncritically what he was being told. If he had challenged the logic of the interviewee, he would have found several inconsistencies. For instance, if one were to analyze the period from the time the decision for nuclearization was made—Kampani argues it was in 1989–90—to the 1998 nuclear tests, the prime minister also held the defense minister's portfolio for more than half that duration.8 It is inconceivable that information about the nuclear weapons program was withheld from such a senior official. Moreover, according to some accounts, knowledge about the nuclear program was shared with India's two defense ministers—Sharad Pawar and Mulayam Singh Yadav—who held this post for a considerable period during this time.9 Additionally, if the logic offered by the interviewee is correct, then no secret—on any subject—should ever be shared with the military. Perhaps the biggest inconsistency, however, is how the interviewee could justify keeping the military uninformed when it was responsible for delivering India's nuclear weapons.Third, Kampani argues that civil-military distrust would have manifested itself in other ways, citing examples where this seemingly has not occurred. He argues that two facts—that the military enjoys considerable autonomy in formulating India's conventional war plans and that it engages extensively in countering domestic insurgencies—reflect civilian trust in the institution. This is a spurious argument, because neither observation necessarily suggests a lack of civil-military distrust. As is well known, the predominant narrative emerging from the 1962 Sino-Indian War blamed the collapse of the Indian army on ill-informed civilian intervention. Since then, India's civil-military relationship has been “informed by the notion that civilians should eschew involvement in operational matters.”10 That the military enjoys considerable autonomy in formulating conventional war plans should therefore not be surprising, because this function is considered to be within the military's “domain.”11 In this context, the military also enjoys considerable autonomy in other fields, including specifying weapons systems, doctrine, training, defense planning, and service promotions (up to the rank of brigadier).Similarly, the military's extensive involvement in counterinsurgency operations does not necessarily suggest harmonious civil-military relations. Instead, India's civilian and military leaders have agreed to an arrangement wherein the military enjoys considerable legal immunity when engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Tellingly, civil-military tensions have escalated when civilians have tried to alter this arrangement—for instance, when trying to amend or even overturn the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which provides legal immunity to the military.12 Rightly or wrongly, however, nuclear weapons were not considered to be in the military's domain, and hence civilians were able to keep the military away from the program.Kampani's assertion that there is no civil-military distrust in India not only challenges the conventional wisdom but does not comport with contemporary events. India's problem is not a possible loss of civilian control but problematic civil-military relations, a constant theme in the literature.13 Tensions between civilians and the military were even acknowledged in two official committee reports written in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil war.14 Most recently, the controversial tenure of Chief of Army Staff Gen. V.K. Singh “saw civil-military relations reach their lowest ever in the history of independent India.”15Fourth, Kampani argues that “India's civilian leaders have shown little hesitation in institutionalizing the military's role in nuclear planning post-1998. … This change has occurred without any fundamental rewrite in the DNA of India's civil-military relations” (p. 109). Kampani's claim oversimplifies a complex civil-military dynamic surrounding the development of India's nuclear arsenal. Moreover, it contradicts the available evidence. To be sure, the government established the Strategic Forces Command in 2003 to administer all of India's nuclear and strategic forces, and it has given the military unprecedented access to nuclear weapons. At the same time, civil-military integration has not been as smooth as Kampani would have us believe. According to one school of thought, most prominently associated with Verghese Koithara, civilians have resisted incorporating the military fully into the nuclear command and control chain.16 Supporters of this claim point to the fact that the “operational controller” of the Strategic Forces Command is not a military officer but the national security adviser.17 Elsewhere, Kampani notes this strange arrangement, observing that the Strategic Forces Command essentially functions “directly under the Prime Minister's Office through the national security advisor, bypassing the defense ministry and the military's normal chain of command.”18 Adm. Arun Prakash, chief of India's naval staff from 2004 to 2006, complained about the “complete exclusion of the armed forces from all aspects of planning and structuring of strategic programmes.”19In a rare speech on nuclear deterrence on April 24, 2013, however, former Foreign Secretary Shyam Sharan dismissed the “perception that India's armed forces are not fully part of the strategic decision-making process.” He curiously added, however, that “one cannot accept that the credibility of India's nuclear deterrence demands management by its military.” Although his definition of “management” is unclear, later in the speech he acknowledged the need to “encourage better civil-military relations and coordination.” He went on to say that “the military's inputs into strategic planning and execution should be enhanced to make India's nuclear deterrent more effective.”20 Writing a few months after Saran's speech, former Army Chief Gen. V.P. Malik argued that “weaknesses” existed because the military “is not consulted adequately or given political directions and resources … for an assured and effective operationalization of nuclear capability.”21 According to a former chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), who wishes to remain unnamed: “[A]lthough the strategic target list is decided by the COSC, the Chairman is never consulted about vital issues relating to the effectiveness of the deterrent. For example: missile ranges and CEP [circular error probable] of nuclear warhead yields and reliability or development of PALs. … [A]ll these are decided ‘in-house’ by DAE & DRDO scientists. … [T]he ‘user’ [i.e., the military] is well out of the loop.”22India stands as an outlier for the manner in which it kept its military away from its nuclear weapons program. According to an unnamed former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, “[T]he Indian program never took the army into [its] confidence. We didn't discuss details with them. It wasn't a military program.”23 Moreover, the scientists wanted to prevent an “untoward build-up of the deterrent and its use, which they believed would accrue were the military to be brought into the decision-making and weapon handling loop.”24 Although the custodians of the nuclear program—scientists, technocrats, and selected bureaucrats—may have held such seemingly noble beliefs, it can also be argued that they were afraid that bringing the military into the loop might curtail their near-total operational autonomy.25 Indeed, one of the fears of the scientific-technocratic community that controlled the program was that the military might make a bid for greater involvement, ownership, and perhaps even control.26 An episode from early 1998 illustrates this point. In a meeting with Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, General Malik reported that the service chiefs jointly conveyed the need for a nuclear doctrine. Abdul Kalam, then scientific adviser to the defense minister, who was present at the meeting, claimed that there was one but that it was not to be shared with the armed forces. Expressing his incredulity, General Malik claims that this was part of “a nexus that kept the armed forces away from the nuclear weapons program.”27When talking about a civil-military gap in India's nuclear program, the custodians of the bomb will of course deny that one existed and will justify exclusion of the military from the program on the grounds of secrecy (as they did in interviews with Kampani). The civil-military divide would have been evident, however, if the author had focused on the decisionmakers at the time. Hence, on a number of occasions Kampani alleges failure on the part of Indian defense and policy “planners” (see p. 82, 88, 92, 99, and 100). But who were these “planners?” As far as we know, they were mostly scientists, technocrats, and a few select bureaucrats, such as Naresh Chandra. They did not include any military representatives.The main problem with Kampani's otherwise excellent article is his rejection of alternative explanations for the slow pace of India's nuclear program. Civil-military relations and the decision to keep the military on the margins played an important role in the program's delayed operationalization. One could similarly argue that the military was excluded because nuclear weapons were not considered weapons of war. Or perhaps the strategic culture argument explains the failure of Indian politicians to oversee the coordination of the scientific and military aspects of the program. To be fair, the need to maintain secrecy could still be the primary factor explaining this slow pace, but it was not the only one.—Anit MukherjeeSingaporeKudos to Gaurav Kampani for his deeply researched narration of the “excruciatingly long” course India has taken “to develop an operational nuclear capability.”1 “New Delhi's Long Nuclear Journey” corrects some mistaken details of earlier treatments of this history, including my own in India's Nuclear Bomb.2 Anyone wanting details on the material and institutional evolution of India's nuclear capabilities should value Kampani's contribution.The article is less persuasive in explaining the history it uncovers. The central flaw is Kampani's attempt to ascribe India's nuclear muddling to one factor—secrecy born of “fear of the nonproliferation regime” (p. 81). Here one perceives the tyranny of academic theorizing and its diktat of “parsimony,” which an aspiring academic political scientist dare not reject. The problem is twofold: no single driver can explain most of the Indian nuclear story; second, secrecy is an effect of other causes, and therefore a weak cornerstone for a compelling theory of how the nonproliferation regime affected India's (or anyone else's?) development of operational nuclear forces.Kampani duly explores other candidate causes of India's irresolute nuclear course: “the normative beliefs of decisionmakers who pitted their moral aversion of nuclear weapons against more prosaic realist national security concerns”; decisionmaker preferences for “existential deterrence out of normative concerns for strategic stability in South Asia”; “a unique Indian strategic culture of restraint”; and “the dysfunctional nature of Indian civil-military institutions” (pp. 82–83). He offers evidence of Indian actions that can be interpreted to conclude that each alternative fails to explain key developments in India.Yet, the failure of any of these single explanations to cover all or most of the relevant developments in a decade of nuclear history does not mean that their sum is invalid or without utility. In fact, the four explanations that Kampani considers do help significantly to illuminate India's nuclear history from 1989 to 1999. The quest for a single decisive independent variable is unnecessary and misleading.Secrecy's inadequacy as a central causal explanation in the Indian case is evident in several Most important, one to why India's nuclear capabilities and have been so Kampani Indian officials who that secrecy from of “the of the he it is also that and have been (p. against makes of do officials in a ever to any other for If national defense is the for but the effect of secrecy is to national decisionmakers should not it too to more One wishes Kampani had into domestic why Indian political leaders have (or secrecy for so notes that prime ministers in the were in India's nuclear (p. 100). same could have been for several earlier prime He also reports that after Indian scientists and the challenges of political leaders from the weapons within and that would them operational in the military sense of the (p. 81). more than an in secrecy to keep in the these to the nuclear weapon program. and that of that these prime ministers were and about the and of nuclear weapons for nuclear weapons was not that important among the other and security India to In of the secrecy and in the Indian program prevented the military from being able to and the civilian weapons establishment and the political This on secrecy the among Indian political and that the with its and in Indian nuclear policy would to of the of nuclear weapons and to on as occurred in the and the theory is by the fact that the operationalization of India's nuclear weapons found in the defense policy and in the civilian nuclear The in all of these bureaucratic and political including of the at the of the defense and nuclear have secrecy and to and their from within as India's nuclear weapons scientists and long to the military from involvement in their the that Kampani has not been a Indian leaders have been privy to at four or among other India's nuclear and operationalization. Prime Minister V.P. Singh in one K. Gen. K. and Arun in 1999 the Kargil by K. was by the Arun Singh on Defense in The Naresh Committee on national security a in The in each of these reports were in the policy They all to India's defense including in the nuclear no prime minister has to the central of these For the Kargil and the Singh both of an defense staff chief would then have a role in nuclear planning and operations. however, among the armed forces and among political leaders have this still the that Kampani so and the 1989 to 1999 period he causes are and more than any theory can Still, they can be as Kampani's narrative to and rejection of my that secrecy was the cause of India's slow nuclear operationalization in the because it prevented successive Indian governments from a institutional within the has given for after their alternative explanations and them against the of the available I their claims his with the claim that my is a of the of academic and the of that an aspiring political scientist dare not One could similarly of on when there is He with the that I secrecy as the independent variable in my I maintain that secrecy was an variable and its cause in India's case in the to from the nonproliferation the not the nonproliferation regime as my He my argument on both his of a explanation for India's slow pace of and lack of operational planning in the political moral their in India's culture of strategic and the Indian domestic asserts that each of the alternative explanations I dismiss might not adequately explain India's their sum is greater than their The however, is that each of these explanations under the of which their into a explanation leaders by moral do not An deterrence does not into deterrence and of deterrence within a decade Strategic are not of India's of “existential to its for strategic stability with the factor in India's nuclear If deterrence and strategic stability were the of India's nuclear in the then Indian leaders could have that with to 1998 or in the after the nuclear Indian however, did not this More important, the domestic in India's to nuclear have the did not prevent India from a nuclear in but the to India's nuclear capabilities in the two and to India's and were in in Delhi's nuclear at several of all who has this history in can deny this Indeed, one of the of India's 1998 nuclear was the of a strategic with the to have central made in the early that India's from the and political of its political is that India was not It was India tried to develop a operational deterrent in the as as it but secrecy from fears of the that 1989 India the to nuclear weapons and this time, Indian defense and development to make for this which makes Indian the of moral prime ministers India's nuclear policy on because they could do little a from they on operational given the policy the with the from the that would India's and India's nuclear operationalization program therefore the of a and The secrecy surrounding it to the of The in knowledge between the scientists and the on the one who the challenges of operationalization and and their political on the who were of operational and the This is a of a to that leaders make with to them. however, is with prosaic examples of decided by Indian prime ministers the development of operational because of concerns that they could the nuclear to the as In the only of the the service with nuclear were privy to India's nuclear secrets. the government operational planning, the army and would have excluded from the was little for the civilians to the loss of control the policy The key for not through with the operational planning was to policy and that could of India's of a key Indeed, after India claimed nuclear and nuclear with the of the civilians remain in of the nuclear The among both in India and is that civilian defense scientists remain in the of the nuclear weapons program. the from the decade and the decade it do not support also makes the claim that is to India's defense and nuclear As the that India's nuclear program in the was part of the same that government operations more The problem with this argument is that can have can but need not a cause or That on India's nuclear program has the of of the lack of institutional and on the means to my explanation is to an and India's nuclear operationalization during the and the decade the in the program's pace, its during the and its in the decade the In this to the failure of successive Indian prime ministers to the of to a chief of defense staff to to the government on defense and nuclear is to the argument at is of explanations for India's slow secrecy can the of explaining the during this of India's nuclear But explanation on the logic of my rejection of India's problematic civil-military relations as a to the secrecy The problem with however, is that the of he Verghese Koithara, Ashley and Vipin does little to help his his from the is and that from the decade is an of not the for the he or the that at the my argument and India's civil-military as the cause of its slow nuclear makes a to the Indian in the to This observation is both and because the was the service of for the of nuclear delivery and operations in the more offers a of Indian nuclear policy It largely from academic and is of evidence from the of its The of written was to the of India's emerging deterrent. Tellis the main of his argument by all of the for India's to 1998 without them or their concerns how and civil-military nuclear among nuclear is of my rejection of civil-military tensions as a in the slow pace of Indian nuclear operationalization in the but he these and presents no evidence to my He is if my claim about defense ministers out of the nuclear loop is We can to this point when he greater on this He points out that Indian prime ministers held the defense portfolio for half of the decade and have about the nuclear program. I never argue that prime ministers were out of the He it that civilians in India would to keep the military out of nuclear Indeed, civilian scientists who with the in the they were to operational planning with their military a from the political argument is not that civil-military tensions in India were or are I argue that civil-military tensions were not to slow the pace of and operational planning in the For all the that pervades civil-military in the operational autonomy by the military as well as the lack of hesitation in its in with extensive domestic India's are evidence of a have an to for of claims to the that civilian have the military a role in India's nuclear and planning nuclear operations. point, is that the of civil-military nuclear is with that nuclear operations. This is and my own to however, the in India's civil-military institutional development and in the details of institutional to for had argued that civil-military tensions India from an operational nuclear Instead, the civilians have the role of the military in with civilian defense scientists under the leadership of the national security adviser in the prime minister's all of the claims made to 1998 about in the way of India an operational of its political strategic culture and the lack domestic and civil-military by the and its in successive Indian governments from a institutional is the explanation for India's long nuclear during the

Civil–military relations in Canada are “civil” not because Canadians are inherently “nice,” but because there is not much opportunity, incentive, or fodder for serious and intensive disagreement over defense policy between the military and the political leadership. This does not mean that disagreements do not arise or that the military has not chaffed from time to time under Canada’s relatively strict liberal-democratic traditions of civilian control over the military. Moreover, it is not the structure, traditions, and practices of government in Canada that best explain the relatively ordered nature of civil–military relations. Rather, one must look to the very nature of the Canadian defense and security situation. While Canada is also known for, and at times has vigorously promoted, its contributions to collective security through United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, it has been its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) that has determined almost all of defense policy and the posture and major weapons systems of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). This has had profound implications for civil–military relations in Canada and also accounts for the relatively “civil” tone, and the lack of tension and controversy, in those relations. This has meant that Canada’s political leaders and the senior leadership of the CAF have not had to engage in intensive “dialogue” on alternative conceptions of the international strategic environment and what a Canadian “grand strategy” should be in order to guide how the Canadian forces should be postured and equipped to meet security challenges. Canada does have a “grand strategy”; it is just not that grand. In the end, what tempers and smooths civil–military relations in Canada is that the CAF remains supportive of Canada’s not-so-grand grand strategy and accompanying expeditionary strategic culture, even if that culture is disciplined by a fiscal efficiency that sometimes seeks to extract as much international involvement out of as few military assets as possible. It is well understood on both sides of the civil–military divide that the CAF needs to maintain the confidence of political leaders to be effective in supporting the foreign policy objectives of the government through the applied or apprehended use of force when requested. In order to achieve this, the senior officer corps and the military apparatus must be cognizant of the breadth of nonmilitary factors that play into civil–military relations. Acknowledging that the scope of policy choices is inherently limited by international factors beyond Canada’s control, the importance of domestic priorities, and the access that Canadian politicians have to military expertise and assessments from other sources, the CAF has, for the most part, unobtrusively provided its political master with advice consistent with the realities facing Canadians at home and abroad. Even here, however, the Canadian military, perhaps more than most, understands the unequal character of its dialogue.

This chapter argues that “objective” civilian control of the military may not be achieved now in Africa because there is no political socialization guiding the social formation of the African citizen. Instead it is asking, given all the crises and conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa (except in a few states) since the 1960s, why should there be “objective” civil–military relations in Africa? The chapter is of the view that the “subjective” civil–military relations in the greater part of Africa conform with the unstable social and political history of the region. It suggests a socialization process to build a spirit of nationalism in the citizen before he is admitted into a military school. Political socialization increases the prospect of building “objective” civil–military relations. This chapter presents a general perspective of civil–military relations in Africa. It does not provide detailed analysis of Africa generally or of selected African countries.

The establishment of democratic control over the armed forces has never been a key issue in Lithuanian politics and there have been few studies of this area.1 Civil—military relations in Lithuania since independence have generally been characterized by relatively weak organization within the military and a strong civilian presence managing the overall national defence system (encompassing the Ministry of National Defence, the Integrated Defence Staff, the Lithuanian armed forces and other related services). Democratic, and in particular civilian, control of the armed forces has been a central feature of Lithuanian civil—military relations. When Lithuania established its independence, the Supreme Council (the Lithuanian legislative body until 1992 when it was superseded by the present-day parliament, the Seimas) in theory exercised control over the Department of National Defence, which in turn controlled the military. In practice, this model did not function perfectly. The exact nature of civilian control of the military was often confused and civil—military relations were more complicated than this model suggested — a situation made worse by the absence of legislation and bureaucratic procedures relating to civil—military relations. However, from the beginning of 1994, when Lithuania officially declared its goal of joining NATO, significant reforms to civil—military relations were implemented.